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**BRITAIN'S BUFFER STATES IN THE EAST.**

By **COLONEL A. C. YATE.**

## **BRITAIN'S BUFFER STATES IN THE EAST**

At a meeting of the Society on December 5, 1917, with Colonel Sir Henry Trotter in the chair, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate read the following paper:

It is only within the last few years that British public opinion has realized that the enemy against which the British Buffer State system in the East has been built up and is being maintained is not Russia only. The present war has ere this demonstrated that to threaten India is open to two great nationalities—the Teuton as well as the Slav. Some forty years ago the Earl of Beaconsfield had to impress upon his fellow-countrymen that Herat was not the key of India. What he affirmed then—viz., that the key of India is held in the capital city of the British Empire—holds good still; nay, more, it receives added confirmation from the present war. When Russia was devoting herself to the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent and Trans-Caspian Railway routes, and to the initiation of the Trans-Persian Railway which would terminate in “a Russian port on the Persian Gulf”—as I heard one of the Russian promoters of that railway say at an Anglo-Russo-French meeting in Paris in 1911—and, further, when she was, with Omsk on the Trans-Siberian Railway as a starting-point, planning and constructing a line which, at Vierny, was destined to unite the Turkistan and Siberian systems, we might then well fix our eyes on the Oxus, and note every extension that brought a Russian road or railway nearer to the northern and north-western frontiers of Afghanistan. We had almost equally good cause to keep our eyes upon the Pamirs and Thibet, and to watch Russian movement in the direction of Kuldja and Outer Mongolia. Dr. Morrison,\* who in July, 1910, was at Kashgar, the Chinese city which was the central theme of Sir Henry Trotter's lecture here five weeks ago, has left us in a few words an outline of the present and future of that region which I deem it instructive to quote here: “The two chief routes to Kashgar from Russian Turkestan are—first, a route available for pack animals only from the railway at Andijan by Osh and Gulcha, entering Chinese territory at Irkeshtam, and thence in five stages reaching Kashgar city; and, secondly, the important cart-road which leaves the Tashkent-Oren-

\* He appeared in the illustrated papers in November as one of a group of five representatives of the Allied Powers who had actuated China to declare war against Germany.

burg Railway a few stations north of Tashkent at Kabulsai, runs by Pishpek, Tokmak, and Kutemaldi on the Lake Issik-Kul to Narin, a total distance of 544 miles, and then enters China by the Targat Pass, reaching Kashgar city in ten stages. All Russian officials travel this way. They can travel the whole way in tarantass. East of Tokmak is Vierny, a city connected by cart-road with Kuldja in the one direction and with Semipolatinsk in the other. Vierny will be the future junction of the Central Asian Railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway." Thus far Dr. Morrison. We cannot yet tell in what way the recently-formed agreement between the United States and Japan with regard to China will affect Russian plans in this part of Asia, in which the preservation of the *status quo* is distinctly in the interests of the British Empire. A strong Western China and a strong Afghanistan are the bulwarks of the Eastern Section of our Buffer-State line in Asia. Whether the self-denying Russian Socialist ordinance of "no annexation" is in itself a guarantee to the Celestial Empire that in future its boundaries will be regarded as "holy ground," time alone can decide.

This war has transferred the pivot of Britain's Asiatic Buffer-State system from the Oxus to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and from the figurative "Herat" to the very real Constantinople. With that historical metropolis of the Eastern Roman and Turkish Empires as the handle I see the Buffer system, in the shape of a fan, expanding, until it embraces the Nile on its right and the Oxus on its left. You will allow me to remind you that the motto of "no annexation and no indemnity" has been adopted only by the Socialist classes of Russia. Their mouthpiece in this country has been Mr. Arthur Henderson. Three weeks ago a *Daily Chronicle* interviewer told us that he had it direct from Mr. Henderson that "the working classes of Russia were convinced that, when the Allied Governments agreed to 'the old Russian Régime' having Constantinople, they must have secured guarantees in return for the annexation of territory in Turkey, Persia, and elsewhere.\* I consider myself that Great Britain

\* *The Times* of December 1, 1917, is enabled, thanks to the indiscretions of the Bolshevik leaders, to publish "A memorandum summarizing the terms of an agreement concluded in the spring of 1916 between Great Britain, France, and Russia regarding the future of Asiatic Turkey. Russia was to obtain the province of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van, Bitlis, and Southern Kurdistan to the Persian frontier; France to receive the Syrian littoral; and Great Britain Southern Mesopotamia, with Baghdad, also the ports of Haifa and Akka on the Syrian coast. The zone between the French region and the British in Mesopotamia was to become the territory of an independent Arabian State or of a confederation. Alexandretta was to be declared a free port. Palestine and the Holy Places were excluded from Turkish territory, and to be subject to a special control in accordance with the convention among the three Powers." (For others see the *New Europe*, Nos. 62, 63. A. O. Y., January 8, 1918.)

cannot possibly round off the Buffer system without annexation, and I purpose in this lecture to indicate where I think that annexation will be necessary. The thousands of millions which we have spent upon this war, some considerable portion of which has gone to our Allies, Russia included, entitle us to such annexation. If the Russian proletariat chooses to profess doctrines which I am not disposed to dignify even by the term "Quixotic," such profession is not binding on the other Allies. Nor will it be binding. From certain points of view we are distinctly indebted to the Russian Revolution, but those points do not include the Bolshévist. I myself reserve my regard for two names—(1) Prince Youssouff, who, as Count Seumarokoff Elston, studied for some years at the University of Oxford, and (2) M. Miliukoff, whose presence in August, 1916, at the Summer Meeting of the University of Cambridge will not have been forgotten. Prince Youssouff, since he rid Russia of Raspútín, has retired again to private life. M. Miliukoff, who denounced and dismissed the pro-German Premier Sturmer, is the leader of the Cadet Party, but can come to no terms with the Extremists of Russia. None the less, he asserts his opinions stoutly, and makes his influence felt. M. Maklakoff, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, a most important office at this time, is also of the Cadet Party. The return of M. Miliukoff and his party to power is not to be despaired of. I infer from what I read and hear that Cadets and Cossacks, Kalédin and Korniloff, may yet set the Colossus upon its legs.

We have still among us in England one who is essentially of "the old Russian Régime," and who, under that régime, has been, and still is, a respected figure in the history of Anglo-Russian relations; nor must we forget that in the wars of her country those who were nearest to her have laid down their lives. Her brother, Nicolas Kiréeff, was "the first Russian Volunteer killed in Servia in July, 1876." She commands our sympathies in this hour of her country's distress. Servia has been loyal to the Slav cause in this war. Bulgaria turned renegade. If you have not read in the *New Europe* for November 15, "How Austria-Hungary treats the Jugo-Slavs," read it, and then decide in your own minds whether Servia or Bulgaria chose the worthier cause. Neither Belgians, French, nor Armenians seem to have experienced treatment so fiendish as that meted out to the Servians. History records nothing more diabolic even in the Thirty Years' War, when, to quote Gardiner, "Soldiers treated men and women as none but the vilest of mankind would treat brute beasts," and "outrages of unspeakable atrocity were committed everywhere." The Jugo-Slav revenge will be to block the *Drang nach Osten*, and it rests with the Allies to see that this revenge is complete. That Greece, ignoring her obligations to Britain, France, and Russia, would "rat" to the Teuton was not foreseen. Russia, as a matter of fact, when she

helped to emancipate Greece, created a new candidate for Constantinople, and Berlin did the rest. However, Greece is now, for the time at least, herself again.

The fallacy of opinions put forward about Russia since this war began defies comment. *The Times*, which was far from guiltless, candidly confessed its fault, six or seven months ago, in these words: "Two months ago we were most of us acclaiming the dawn of a new era in Russia with almost as much enthusiasm as Charles James Fox showed at the fall of the Bastille. 'How much the greatest event is this that has ever happened,' he said, 'and how much the best!' Seventeen years later Fox died at the head of a Coalition Ministry, forced to combat the forces born of the revolution that he had welcomed; and doubts have already dimmed our faith in Russian redemption." That is answer enough for all the ignorant hallucinations of a sentimental school, not of thought, but of dreams.\* Mr. H. W. Nevinson commences an article in the *Contemporary Review* for April, 1917, entitled "The Dayspring in Russia," thus: "Never has a revolution been so happy in its opportunity." I must ask you to look at Russia at this moment, and then form your opinion of Mr. Nevinson's judgment and of that of the Editor who committed his Review to such undue optimism, inspired solely by Radical and Socialist sympathies. If you would set against this sound Liberal views in regard to Austro-German ambitions, study Mr. Wickham Steed in the *Edinburgh Review* for October last, who there argues that the test of the political victory or defeat of the Allies will be "the extent to which they are able to create in Central and South-Eastern Europe a chain of independent or federated national States, whose vital interest it would be to resist German political and economic hegemony." I myself consider that that is only one, although a most crucial, test of our Buffer system. I propose to indicate others in the course of this lecture. Mr. Lovat Fraser, a member of this Society, tried in May, 1917, as the mouthpiece of one of Lord Northcliffe's organs, the *Daily Mail*, to persuade his fellow-countrymen that British troops in Macedonia, Palestine, or Mesopotamia were thrown away. *The Temps* promptly replied that General Sarrail's army had saved the situation in the Mediterranean. Mesopotamia and Palestine can now speak for themselves. Whether and where Generals Allenby and Marshall will, if ever, join hands is little more than guess-work. Damascus or Homs are likely points. The Turks may be expected to concentrate near Aleppo or Adana. On the other hand, Armenia and the Caucasus may call upon our army of the Tigris. The latest authoritative intelligence that I have says:

\* Messrs. J. W. Mackail, Charles Sarolea, Geoffrey Drage and Stephen Graham, not to mention fair enthusiasts, have all indulged in laudatory hyperbole which now stamps itself as absurd.

"The state of the Russian army on the Caucasus frontier is most unsatisfactory. The only part of it which, apparently, is sure to fight against the Turks, is that which consists of Armenians, who have already fought splendidly there; and no wonder, considering what Armenians have suffered from Turkish massacres." Thus Armenia looks to us, and just beyond the Caucasus lie the Kuban, Terek, and Don Cossacks, the followers of that loyal Russian subject, General Kaléidin. I invite you to consider what the Chiefs of the Allied Military Missions meant, when, by order of their Governments, they informed the Russian General Staff that "any violation of the treaty by Russia would have the most serious consequences." It must mean that they will not desert the Russians who are loyal to the treaty. We can get into touch with Kaléidin through the Caucasus, and I counsel the Cadets to keep a stern grip on Alexandrowsk and Archangel. The Allies may have to save Russia from herself. In the sixties of the nineteenth century Russia occupied Kuldja during the Taiping rebellion. In the twenties of the present century China may return the compliment by occupying Russian Turkistan. The United States and Japan can, and doubtless will, keep Siberia in order, and the Siberian railway in working order.

My thoughts had led me thus far when last Saturday's papers brought me the views of the Rumanian General Ilescu. I admire greatly the breadth and farsightedness of his grasp of the possibilities of the future. The rôle of our army of the Tigris seems settled, and we need not despair of Southern Russia and the Black Sea. Persia must be kept open for through traffic from the Persian Gulf to Trebizond, Tiflis, Batoum and the Cossack regions. Of Afghanistan I premise nothing; but it may be that the Amir Habibullah Khan may, at a crisis, use his military power to some purpose. Our entire Buffer system from the Balkans to Baluchistan is in the melting-pot, and we wish it to solidify into a good line, both of communication and defence. I hope we can strengthen our army of the Tigris, and I see no reason why the twentieth century should not see revived the days of Christie, Lindsay-Bethune, and Hart—the British officers who made the Persian army of the first half of the nineteenth century.

Early in the present century our Foreign Office, then presided over by the Marquis of Lansdowne, obviously had an inkling that some new danger threatened our position in the East, but some time elapsed before the "man in the street" understood what that danger was. Sir Edward Grey, now Viscount Grey of Fallodon, continued Lord Lansdowne's policy and concluded with Russia the Agreement of 1907. It is always understood that Lord Hardinge of Penshurst and Lord Carnock (Sir Arthur Nicholson), who for eleven years past have between them monopolized the post of Permanent Under-

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were fully alive to the serious nature of Germany's new-born ambitions in the East. I treated that subject two years ago in an article entitled "Berlin in Quest of Asiatic Dominion," which appeared in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution for February, 1916. That article traces the growth of the Austro-German conception of Asiatic conquest or control, and incidentally dwells upon the instability of political relations between State and State. Apropos of that, Lord Bryce wrote to me in March, 1916, a letter which he now kindly authorizes me to quote. What he wrote is this: "Nothing is of more service than to correct the habit politicians and journalists have of assuming that the present political relations of States will last. Your article brings out with singular force and clearness how often we have gone wrong by such assumptions. Few, if any, statesmen have escaped doing so. The same error is likely to be repeated at the end of this war. You are right in thinking that Constantinople ought not to be given to a Great Power. Unhappily it seems to have been already promised." We are given the clear warning that Constantinople should not be given to any one Great Power, and, further, that at the end of this war statesmen will be liable to forget that "political relations will not last," just as they have done before. I have quoted the late Admiral Mahan's opinion about the Black Sea and its outlet Straits so often that I gladly now tell you instead what Lord Redesdale ("Further Memories," p. 274) thought of their cession to a great Power: "Only think what it meant: the Black Sea changed from the position of an inland lake; access to the Mediterranean through the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; the potentiality of a huge navy ready to dart out upon the world from hidden and unapproachable harbours; a strategic base from which to attack all the maritime powers of Europe." That is Lord Redesdale's view. Under the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) the navigation of the Mediterranean was to be confined to French, Russian, Spanish, and Italian ships. These are facts which enjoin upon our statesmen caution, and amply endorse Lord Bryce's warning that, at the end of this war, statesmen may forget that political relations do not last. Our journalists, notably *The Times* and the *Spectator*, signally forgot it three years ago. It was not till December, 1916, that M. Trepoff, then the Russian Premier, announced to the Duma that Britain and France had agreed to the permanent occupation of Constantinople and the Straits by Russia at the end of the war. Before 1914 had come to a close the *ballons d'essai* of *The Times* and *Spectator* were already in the air, and wild were some of their gyrations. The *Spectator* could not make up its mind whether Russia should get at Constantinople by annexing the entire north coast of Asia Minor, or by depriving Rumania and Bulgaria of their strips of Black



Sea coast. I am not surprised that Bulgaria joined Germany, and I am convinced that Rumania found it hard to choose the side that it should take; but for the treachery of King Constantine's Greece no words can express sufficient resentment. Italian ambitions certainly complicated matters. The words of M. Sazonoff, warning Italy in 1915 that she might find Dalmatia not a bridge but a wall between her and the Balkans, are not to be forgotten. What mad impulse made our Government offer King Constantine Cyprus? King Constantine, unwittingly, by his refusal conferred an inestimable boon upon a Government, the foreign policy of which cannot but go down to history as a failure.\* The Earl of Beaconsfield purposely took Cyprus as a *tête-de-pont* to protect Alexandretta, the projected terminus of his Baghdad Railway, the railway which, I trust, Britain is going to have at the end of this war as one of her essential links between the Levant and the Persian Gulf. It seems from Lord Morley's "Recollections" that the Kaiser, when in London in 1907 and 1911, befuddled our Secretary of State for India. *The Times* unkindly says that it is bravado, not courage, that inspired Lord Morley to refer to this matter now.

The part which India has played, since the outbreak of this war, in securing and improving that Buffer-State system upon which her external security depends, cannot be ignored here. I have studied with care the words and acts of the Cabinet in London and the Government at Simla, and I have come to the conclusion that not a man in authority, since Lord Kitchener left India, had any conception what a campaign against the Turks in Mesopotamia really meant. We know, from the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, that at first India was overstrained. She stepped gallantly, just as she did in South Africa, into the breach which that Government which scoffed at Lord Roberts could not close. The cartoons for which "F. C. G." of the *Westminster Gazette* was knighted seem to me to stand now as a reproach to him. But all the evidence proves that neither the Military, Foreign, nor Finance Departments of the Government of India had the knowledge that enabled them to judge what campaigning on the Tigris and Euphrates meant. One ex-Indian General paraded in *The Times* his own virtue and omniscience, but Sir V. Chirol, our Vice-President, disposed of him in a few lines. He told that General that proof positive existed that in 1911 the Headquarter Staff at Simla knew nothing of the German danger. I have never forgotten the first German Consul-General at Baghdad telling me twenty-seven years ago that the British Resident there knew nothing. I thought then that the German referred to Russian projects. I was quite as innocent in 1891

\* See R. W. Seton-Watson's article entitled "The Failure of Sir E. Grey" in the *English Review* for February, 1916.

as the Headquarter Staff at Simla in 1911; but, at all events, the welfare of an Army and the safety of an Empire was not dependant upon my incompetence. What convinces me that neither Simla nor the leaders of the British Expeditionary Force at Basra in 1914 understood what a campaign in Mesopotamia involved is the tenor of paragraph 1, part v. (p. 20) of the Mesopotamia Commission's Report. It runs thus:

"Baghdad and the possibility of its becoming an objective of the expedition constantly crops up in the evidence before us. On October 8, 1914—*i.e.*, a week before the expedition had actually left India—the Viceroy wrote unofficially to the Marquess of Crewe to the effect that he would be ready for an attempt on Basra 'or even Baghdad' in the event of Turkey declaring war. On November 23, the day after Basra was occupied by General Barrett's forces, Sir Percy Cox, the Indian Government's Political Representative in Mesopotamia, telegraphed to the Viceroy: 'With General Officer Commanding, I have been studying topographical details bearing on an advance to Baghdad, in case such an advance should be decided upon,' and he proceeded to outline a reasoned proposal for an advance on Baghdad; while three days later, on November 26, the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf wrote to the Indian Government indicating what his requirements in gunboats would be in the event of an advance up the Tigris to Baghdad."

Thus, before the expedition had started, the Viceroy expressed himself ready for an attempt on Baghdad. The three chief personages of the B. E. F. had, the day after landing at Basra, conferred together, and, with the consent of his military and naval colleagues, the Chief Political Officer submitted by telegram to the Viceroy "a reasoned proposal for an advance on Baghdad." That proposal the Viceroy telegraphed to London, whence it was vetoed, and that rightly. Neither the Mesopotamia Commission's Report nor Mr. Lovat Fraser in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1917, remark upon the significance of this fact. It was not that officers of the Indian Army had not visited this country. Within my recollection Dr. Bellew and Colonels Mark Bell, Stewart, and Sawyer travelled there, and an excellent article in the *Pioneer* of 1882 shows the value of the Karun Valley as a means of access, whether for war or trade, to Isfahan and Khoramabad. Mr. Grattan Geary, Mrs. Bishop, Mr. Douglas Carruthers, Mr. David Fraser, Miss Lowthian Bell, Captains Leachman and Shakespear—the knowledge of all these was at Simla's service, not to mention the Political Officers and merchants and engineers who have been running up and down the Tigris. And yet an advance to Baghdad evoked no misgivings except in London, and there in November, 1915, the craving for a signal success *somewhere* silenced caution. Exactly eleven days before the battle of Ctesiphon

Mr. Asquith rose in the House and used these words: "In the whole course of the war there has been no series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted and with better prospect of final success, than the campaign in Mesopotamia." Mr. Asquith had to wait fifteen months, while our gallant army, the victim of ignorance and neglect, fought and endured, before success dawned, and as for its finality, Mr. Asquith may "wait and see." Speaking later on the same evening as Mr. Asquith, Colonel C. E. Yate, a well-known member of this Society, pointed out that India had no Minister of Munitions, that the B.E.F. in Mesopotamia had no trench mortars or high-explosive shells, and an insufficiency of machine guns, and that the troops composing it were as yet inexpert in bomb-throwing. He urged that Indian troops who had undergone this training in the trenches in France should be moved to Mesopotamia at once to train the regiments there and to support Townshend's advance on Baghdad. He further insisted that more recruits\* and improved recruiting methods were needed in India. We know what followed Townshend's reverse at Ctesiphon. The truth began gradually to leak out. Colonel Yate warned the House again on March 22, 1916. A stone wall would then have been more responsive; but presently it woke up. The Mesopotamia Commission followed, and then—after a spell of shelving and whitewashing—all was hushed up. Mr. A. Boddam Taylor told us here six months ago how he offered the India Office his thirty years' experience of Tigris navigation and was—politely, I trust—bowed out. Those who heard him lecture also heard him say that the shallow-draught boats sent at the outset from the Ganges, Irrawaddy, Nile, etc., were quite useless for the navigation of the Tigris.

It is a pleasure to me to be able to point to at least four members of this Society who have, since this war began, exercised an influence more or less marked upon the events and policy of the time. I take this opportunity of dwelling upon this at a public meeting of this Society and of expressing a hope that the Society will use the power which knowledge gives it with vigour and make its influence felt, and not be guided by timid and lukewarm counsels. People want the truth. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour writes to *The Times* for opinions regarding the disposal of Constantinople and the Straits after the war. I can name six books, putting aside Reviews, on that topic alone, published since August, 1914; but I think Lord Bryce's verdict puts it in a nutshell—"Let no Great Power have them." When we reflect that the Baghdad Railway and the *Drang nach Osten* are the greatest dangers that have threatened India since first Napoleon and Paul, and then Napoleon and Alexander, 110 years

\* The latest reports (*vide The Times*, December 10, 1917) about "Man Power" in India are satisfactory.

ago, planned the invasion of India, we learn with surprise that when the Emperor William II. visited England in 1907 and 1911, he apparently twisted Viscount Morley round his little finger. When a Society like ours sees these things, I venture to suggest that it should take steps, as its wisdom may think fit, to instruct the inquirer and to denounce the delinquent. Here, at any rate, are two themes that invite the thought and pen of members of this Society. The *Kölnische Zeitung*, in a recent article entitled "The Road to India," insists that there can be no compromise with Britain in regard to Germany's road to India, and that Germany must have its outlet on the Persian Gulf. Britain has said that Germany shall not have an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and Britain can best redeem that vow by intercepting Germany's road at the very outset—i. e., in the Balkans and on the Bosphorus.

A hundred pens before mine have reviewed the story of "Russia's March towards India," to use the title of the work by Major-General Herbert Mullaly, R.E., which I regard as a trustworthy guide. I myself look back to the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 as a very important milestone on the road, and it is on "The Treaty of Tilsit and India from 1807 to 1848" that I am to lecture two days hence to the Royal Historical Society. I shall not repeat or forestall what I am to say there. The names of Pottinger, Christie, Malcolm, Elphinstone, Burnes, Abbott, Conolly, Stoddart, Shakespear, and that hardy and eccentric proselytizer and plucky adventurer, Joseph Wolff, recall to us the events which, as Sir Alfred Lyall says,\* "led us, a few years later, out upon the wide and perilous field of Afghan politics. The possibility of the overland invasion of India and the question of the measures necessary for the security of our north-western frontier, were now occupying the minds of India's rulers; and the discussion was beginning that has never since ended." That was written some thirty years ago, and, as you see, we are discussing it still, with this difference: that then a possible Franco-Russian invasion had finally resolved itself into a purely Russian menace, while now the German has thrust himself in between the other two and has invited us to decide which we like best, the Russian pressing on a front that extends from the Persian Gulf to the Pamirs, or the German pushing his railway from the Bosphorus and Levant to the debouchure of the Shatt-el-Arab. Thus the Great Powers ring the changes on the problem of Asiatic ambition of which Alexander, or someone much earlier, was the pioneer; and thus they will continue to ring them. "Plus ça change, plus ç'est la même chose." Possibly, by way of the next change, India will find herself facing the "Yellow Peril." More than a century ago, when the Shah of Persia was obsessed by both Britain and France, he found it difficult

\* "British Dominion in India," third edition, p. 305.

to decide which was Codlin and which was Short. Russia made up his mind for him. While France, in the person of General Gardanne, was proposing a joint Franco-Russian invasion of India through Persia, the Shah noticed Russia scowling at him the whole time over his Caucasian fence; whereas Britain, represented by Harford Jones and Malcolm, held out, with apparent frankness and sincerity, the right hand of fellowship. The Shah grasped that right hand and held on to it till 1828, when the imminence of General Paskievitch's armies exercised the tyranny of *force majeure*, and Persia, much harassed, jilted Great Britain and courted the advances of the Czar. This little story illustrates charmingly Lord Bryce's caution to us on the inconstancy of political relations.

In my opinion the two great factors of the last thirty years in the manipulation of the Buffer States of Asia—viz., Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan—and in a minor degree, Egypt, have been the rise of Teutonic influence in Turkey side by side with ever-growing Turkish apprehension of Russia. The latter has been growing, not for three decades, but for two centuries, and such protection from it as Turkey has in the past received from England, France, or Italy, she has for the future forfeited by her insincerity and ingratitude, her massacres of Christians, and her subservience to Germany. Still, Russia pushed her into the arms of Germany. Britain had no choice in 1882 but to establish a protectorate over Egypt, and that protectorate, which we have exercised in a manner which I feel redounds gloriously to our credit, has vastly strengthened our hands in this war, and will strengthen it after the war. Though I hold fast by Disraeli's Alexandretta-Baghdad Railway, I do not forget the opinion of Mr. Douglas Carruthers and Mr. Drummond Black—that a direct line from Egypt to the Shatt-el-Arab is feasible. Palestine is almost ours. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Moreover, the friendship of the King of the Hejjáz guards that railway on the south. We cannot say what influence the visits of bold explorers like Leachman, Shakespear and Carruthers have had upon the Arab Chiefs of northern Central Arabia; but, whatever that influence, the dogged perseverance of our race, winning the way to victory both on the Euphrates and Tigris "through much tribulation," has probably opened their eyes as no Europeans have opened them since the days of the Roman Empire. I do not forget, when I speak of the Turk, that Constantinople is the home of the Caliphate; nor do I forget that His Majesty's Government has pledged itself, in deference to the millions of His Majesty's Moslem subjects, and, I may add, to those of his Allies, to leave the settlement of the Caliphate entirely in Moslem hands. None the less, the conception of a Moslem federation under British suzerainty is no new idea, and the validity of the Ottoman Caliphate is contested by

competent judges.\* But all evidence—and among many witnesses I may specially cite Lord Bryce and Mr. Lewis Einstein—engenders the conviction that the Turk should not continue to rule races and religions alien to his own. If that is our conviction, then we cannot refuse to let the Slav and Teuton share it; but, when Slav or Teuton handles that conviction so as to endanger the British Empire, the case takes another complexion. We recall with a smile the visit of the German Emperor to Jerusalem in 1898, and his appeal then to Islam in the words: "Puissent sa Majesté le Sultan ainsi que les 300 millions de Mahométans qui vénèrent en lui leur calife être assuré que l'empereur allemand est leur ami pour toujours"—with a smile, I say, as we reflect that not a tenth part of that 300 millions has arrayed itself under the Kaiser's banner, and that the scene of his dramatic performance is now almost in British hands. The Kaiser in the rôle of Imperial Patriarch doubtless achieved at the moment *un succès fou*, in his own eyes, at all events, but to-day the scene inspires merely the caricaturist pencil of *Punch* in the sarcastic despatch: "Defend Jerusalem at all costs. I was once there myself." At last the reproach "too late" is lighter upon British shoulders. Neither the tutelary genius of the Kaiser nor the military genius of von Falkenhayn, the two influences which spirited away Jamal Pasha, the gallant defender of Gaza in March and April last, seem able to save Palestine. It is possible that the Turk may be now in doubt whether he was wise in letting fear of Russia drive him into the arms of Germany. Still, my memory recalls a powerful letter—to my regret, I have failed to find it among my papers—written by a notable Turkish refugee in Switzerland soon after Turkey declared war, in which he set forth clearly the reasons why his country had no resource but to court the Kaiser's alliance. The writer was no adherent of Anwar (Enver) or Tala 'at, but a refuge from their tyranny, and I could not steel myself against his facts and arguments. The Turk's New Year's gift for 1916 to civilized humanity also recurs to my memory. His star was then in the ascendant. He proclaimed to Europe, through Berlin and Vienna, that Turkey was the independent equal of any Power in Europe or the world.

We are only now arriving at some conception of the inexhaustible resourcefulness and unscrupulous ingenuity of German intrigue. In that drama the Kaiser has played the leading rôle, witness London, Constantinople, Jerusalem, Potsdam, and Athens. Count Bernstorff and the apostle of *spurious versenkt* merely take a back seat, while the archæologist at Baghdad, ethnologist in Baluchistan, and prospector

\* *Vide* C. A. Nallins's "Califfato" (Rome, 1917, printed at the Italian Foreign Press), whose views are supported by the distinguished Dutch Orientalist, Professor Snouck Hurgronje (*vide Times Literary Supplement*, December 29, 1917).

in China, all three of whom I met in my travels, are mere accessories. The system stamps the moral standard, and when brutality crowns duplicity, we, who almost stand aghast at this criminal confederation of two vices—a confederation which we might have hoped to relegate to Neronian and Inquisitorial epochs—can only register one vow—and that is, that, if we once swore that “Russia should not have Constantinople, or India”—we swear doubly now that Berlin shall be kept at a distance from both.

When we try to concentrate our minds on the history of this Indian Empire of ours, going back, firstly, to the grant of a Charter in 1600 to the company of East India merchants; secondly, to the Anglo-French struggle for supremacy in the eighteenth century; and, thirdly, to the question of the security of our north-western frontier; and, having done that to the best of our ability, let our mental glance travel round from the basin of the Nile through Palestine, Turkish Arabia, Persia, and Russian Turkistan, to the Pamirs, we embrace in our survey at once the territory which in three centuries we have won, and its line of circumvallation. Like other nations, we are a prospecting, fighting, and trading community. If we have marked out our “All Red Route” westward from the British Isles, we equally need it eastward. It is a serious obligation; for it means our retention of Gibraltar and Malta, our maintenance of a fleet in the Mediterranean, and the construction of a railway connecting the Levant with the Persian Gulf, and continuing that line from Baghdad or whatever point is most suitable, through Southern Persia and Baluchistan to the Indus Valley and so to all parts of India. And the time must come when railways will connect India with the Pacific coast of China. This is no new story. Britons foresaw it eighty years ago, and Berlin has long talked of “Constantinople to Kiaochow.”\* This “All Red Route” eastward from, say, Alexandretta or Port Said to Sadiya on the Brahmaputra, will come into being in the natural course of the development of our great Asiatic Empire; and I need hardly add that its permanence pivots upon our good government of India, a government which will command the loyalty of His Majesty's subjects there, and which will be able to look to the Dominions Overseas, whether Australian or African, for support.

Before concluding my lecture, I would ask you to follow me rapidly round the circumvallation of Buffer States to which I have already alluded. Commencing from the East we see China and Russia *vis-à-vis* in Turkistan. The European, as usual, has pushed his feelers into the preserves of his Asiatic neighbour in the form of metalled roads, bridges, and consular agents. The Tashkent and Trans-Siberian Railways are, when war and revolution have finished their innings, to meet at Vierny, a little north of Turkistan; and

\* *Vide Daily Mail*, October 21, 1916, and *The Times*, January 16, 1917.

there is no doubt that the long-projected branch lines from Samarcand or elsewhere to the Oxus will in due course be completed. Afghanistan has, outwardly at least, preserved a decorous composure during this war. We know that one of the Secretaries of the German Embassy at Constantinople, Herr von Henting, has, since this war began, spent two years on a mission to Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan, and China, for the purpose of turning the neutrality of their rulers into hostility to the Allies. Turkish emissaries backed up von Henting's efforts among the Moslems. We have heard of Herr von Henting's return to Berlin, and we are in a position now to say that he has failed. Not only has China declared war against the Central Powers, but the United States and Japan have concluded an agreement which both defeats German intrigue now, and would seem to insure China against the machinations of others, when this war is over. Afghanistan will continue to be within Great Britain's sphere of influence. It is true that in 1838 and 1878 our countering of Russian schemes against Persia and Turkey moved the Muscovite to so intrigue at Kabul that we let ourselves be drawn into the first and second Afghan wars; and who can say that we may not be tempted into a third? Personally, I hope that Afghanistan will gradually allow India to wean her from barbarism. Three years ago I pictured the brilliant future of Afghanistan as the Switzerland of Asia, and thereby drew from my friend Mr. Ameer Ali a pious prayer fervently entreating destiny to protect the Hindu Kush from lugeing, tobogganing, casinos, cafés-chantants, and all such vanities. I almost agree with the Right Honourable gentleman; but the providence that has let loose on man all the infernal machines of this war will surely yield to the blandishments of sport and the pursuit of the almighty dollar.

Persia is quiescent. Six or seven years ago the first authority in England on Persia told me that Azerbaijan would soon go the same way that went the Persian possessions in the Caucasus after the victories of General Paskievitch in 1828—*i. e.*, to Russia. *L'homme propose, Dieu dispose*. The Revolutionary Slav repudiates annexation. Then let Persia now grasp the opportune hour and reform and organize herself. Great Britain requires to develop Southern Persia from the naphtha deposits, near Khanikin, right across to the limit of the British sphere south of the Herat-Mashhad road; nay, I think I should say, to Zulfikar, the western terminus of that Russo-Afghan frontier which we demarcated, after two years of blended amenity, hostility, and diplomacy (which last title covers all the other virtues of negotiation) from the Hari-rud to the Oxus. General Iliescu's farsightedness, however, has made me see that Persia may become an active instrument in saving Russia from herself, and Rumania and the Allies from a breakdown in this quarter. Turkey



has been "the Sickman" for a century, and Persia *in extremis* for the same period. To-day they typify the old maxim "While there is life there is hope," at any rate for Persia.

When it comes to the great tract, largely desert, stretching from the Shatt-el-Arab to the Suez Canal—we know that the British-Asiatic Empire cannot fulfil its rôle, unless Britain is mistress of it. In my opinion, at or near Aleppo two of the greatest railways of the world, and those chiefly under British administration, will meet. The one will come up from our Union of South Africa, following the long-talked-of Cape-to-Cairo route, and the other will come from the Far East. I will again avail myself of Lord Bryce's advice when he wrote: "I should not, if I were you, dismiss the idea of a British Protectorate over Palestine. It would involve less risk than one over Mesopotamia; for we hold the sea. Cyprus, as you say, may have its use." I do not myself see how we can abandon either Palestine or Mesopotamia. The memory of that fine soldier\* Sir Stanley Maude is enshrined in the latter, and the defence of Kut-el-Amara, by General Townshend, will long live. The memory of the gross ignorance and incompetence which have deluged the Mesopotamian sands with blood, will not be washed away by that blood. It would seem to be in a deluge of blood—British, Armenian, and Syrian—that the Zionists are to return to the land which gives them a name. All the traditions of the Holy Land seem to me written in blood and tears. The Prophets of the Old Testament, the historian of the Siege of Titus, Josephus, and the Chronicles of the Crusades, tell the same story. When General Allenby leads British troops into Jerusalem, he will be the first Englishman to do so since Robert of Normandy, in 1099. When he led his army along the sands, flanked by his fleet, to Jaffa, he marched to meet the footsteps of Richard Cœur de Lion,† who, in 1191, moved south from Acre to Jaffa, flanked also by his fleet. What the highly trained "Turcoples" of the Hospitallers and Templars did for Richard, our no less thoroughly trained Yeomanry under Chetwode have done for Allenby. It is a glorious thing to have crowned the achievements of Richard Yea and Nay, and that gallant Knight Sir Edmund Allenby may well be a proud man to-day. We have, above all nations, a prescriptive right to hold Palestine, and no nation is better qualified to do justice alike to Moslem and Jew than the one which rules over millions of both.‡

We have fought and are fighting in Palestine, in Mesopotamia,

\* I, six or seven months ago, drew the attention of the Central Asian Society to the fact that the initial "M" was of good omen for the British Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia, and now the mantle of *Maude* has fallen upon *Marshall*.

† See Oman's "History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages."

‡ *Vide* Right Hon. Syed Ameer Ali's letter in the *Nation*, November 24, 1917.

in the Mediterranean, and in Macedonia, as surely for the cause of Right and Empire as elsewhere, and what *The Times Literary Supplement*, in a very fine leader entitled "How it will strike Posterity," said a month ago, may well set a coping-stone upon this address. It is this: "We would not have later generations know the whole agony of our own unhappy day. They will read of brave and wonderful deeds on land, on sea, and in the air, and of the brave and wonderful suffering and endurance of soldiers and sailors and airmen; but not even the numerous records of this generation will preserve the complete picture of that courage and endurance, or of the brave and noble spirit with which stricken wives and mothers, worthy of the men they loved, are bearing a burden not the less hard because it is common. We hope to save posterity from the terrible knowledge of what such sufferings are; but we trust that some of the simple and natural expressions of our sorrow which will go down to them will help them to understand something of the price at which their and our freedom is being purchased. We, who know, hope that what will strike a happy and unknowing posterity is not the glory of the coming victory, but the faithfulness unto death which is creating it, and the awful responsibility of those who bring upon the world such things as are happening to-day."

Whether we turn to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien—the hero of the retreat from Mons—addressing the boys at Bradfield College, and insisting that our splendid Public Schools must go on as they have begun to the end; or to Mr. T. E. Page in *The Times* (December 4) contending that the very blood of those fallen cries out against premature peace; or to General Sir James Willcocks' tribute in verse (*Blackwood*, December, 1917) to the Indian Army in this war, the same spirit inspires all, and that spirit inspired Shakespeare 320 years ago. *Vide* "1 Henry VI., Act V., Scene IV.:

"York. Is all our travail turned to this effect?  
 After the slaughter of so many peers,  
 So many captains, gentlemen and soldiers,  
 That in this quarrel have been overthrown  
 And sold their bodies for their country's benefit,  
 Shall we at last conclude effeminate peace?"

The CHAIRMAN said that, as he had anticipated, they had had an interesting and instructive lecture, and the lecturer had raised many points of great importance. Among other things, he had said that it was the duty of their Society to instruct inquirers and denounce delinquents. So far as the first part of this view of the functions of the Society was concerned, he was in the fullest harmony with Colonel Yate. There could be no doubt that this was one of the most

important duties of the Society. But he could not associate himself with the other view, that they should denounce delinquents. He thought that might be left in the hands of others. It was their duty to look upon the course of events straightly and dispassionately on all sides, rather than to sit in judgment upon the acts of politicians or generals who were not there to answer for themselves. That, at least, was his personal opinion as Chairman of the Society.

The lecturer had alluded very prominently to the constant changes in the political situation; and he could conceive of nothing more tragic than the contrast between what was expected of Russia three years ago, when she was sacrificing hundreds of thousands of lives on the Eastern front in order to protect us on the West, and what was happening to-day. There was no doubt that their action in the early months of the war had a very great deal to do with our success in staving off invasion at the time when it seemed most possible. Russia, in those days, was to be the steam-roller to crush its way to Berlin. To-day Russia found herself in a pathetically feeble state. We all hoped, however, that things would turn out better, and that we might in a few months again look to Russia for assistance. Meanwhile we ought to be grateful that America had come to our aid, and to be resolved to contribute to the national determination to continue the good fight. Another contrast was supplied by the public attitude toward the Prime Minister. A few years ago he for one looked upon Mr. Lloyd George as an enemy of the British nation; to-day most of us looked upon him, if not as the saviour of our country, certainly as one statesman in whom we all had the most implicit confidence.

The lecturer had alluded to the possibility of our exercising a Protectorate over Syria and Mesopotamia. The remarks in the paper thereon reminded him of the old recipe for making hare soup: "First catch your hare." It was true we had conquered a portion of Palestine and the greater part of Mesopotamia; but on the other hand we had to remember that the enemy had taken possession of nearly all Belgium, a big slice of France, Poland, Serbia, and Montenegro. We fully intended that they should not stay in any of these quarters; but he had no doubt that the foe argued in the same way as to our acquisitions in the Middle East. Nor was the question of Palestine so simple and plain as it might look. The French had had their eye on Palestine and Syria ever since the days of St. Louis, and they would like to have a say in the matter. Then, again, the long-cherished aim of the Jews to recover the Holy Land had to be considered. The fact was that the question was very complicated, and until the war had made further progress it seemed premature to discuss what was to be the fate of the various countries held by conquest.

Sir EDWIN PEARS said he had listened to the lecture with very great pleasure, and on many points had to bow to the superior know-

ledge of Colonel Yats. But on one subject he did profess to know something. He had lived for upwards of forty years in Constantinople, and had closely followed the discussions as to the future of that city. When it was announced in the Duma a year ago that an agreement existed between the Allies under which Constantinople, under certain conditions, was to be handed over to Russia, he for one did not believe it. At the time he was in Washington lecturing, and before a very large audience explained why he did not believe it. He agreed with Lord Bryce, who looked at all these questions with the fullest detachment and impartiality that was possible for an Englishman, that no great Power ought to have Constantinople. When the announcement was made the Revolution in Russia and the subsequent *débâcle* had not taken place. But he stated in Washington that in the interests of Russia herself he was strongly opposed to her possession of Constantinople. In the last forty years Russia more than any other Power, more than ourselves and the French, had liberated the peoples of the Balkan States from Turkish rule. The combined fleets of the three nations gave freedom to Greece at the close of the last century, and later on Bulgaria secured her freedom at the hands of Russia. There had been no movement for setting free the peoples of the Balkans in which we had not taken part; but throughout those countries Russia had all along been regarded, and he believed was still regarded, as the deliverer. Before the war there was hardly a cottage in Bulgaria or in Greece in which the portrait of the Czar as the great deliverer did not exist. Bulgaria went wrong after the outbreak of war because she was led away by her Austrian King Ferdinand, who was acting as the mouthpiece of the aged Emperor of Austria, who again had the strings of his policy pulled by the Kaiser. If Russia possessed Constantinople she could only have access thereto by sea, a distance of 300 to 350 miles; the Black Sea was so stormy that no navigator would cheerfully transport an army across it. The only other way of access would be to march an army through Rumania, through Bulgaria, and through whatever State might have possession of the Thracian peninsula. If Russia was going to do that, and still more if she was going to do what had been suggested—namely, make a railway corridor through those States for passing to and from Constantinople—she was going to alienate those States for ever. But he went further. There was not a State in the Balkans, with the possible exception of Montenegro, which had not aspirations for the succession to Constantinople when vacant. It was known that ex-King Tino had strong ambitions to be the successor to the Byzantine Empire, and put forward the prophecy current in the Balkans for more than three centuries that the successor to the last Byzantine Emperor, who met his heroic death in 1453, would be a Constantine married to a Sophia. As to Bulgaria, King Ferdinand

was said to be fond of arraying himself in a suit of clothes made in imitation of pictures which existed representing the later Byzantine Emperors. Whether this was or was not true, it was undoubtedly the ambition of Bulgaria for many reasons to secure the succession to Constantinople. He was sure that Russia, when she regained her sense, would not wish to make an enemy of the peoples in the Balkans she had helped to reinstate and regenerate, and therefore the wisest Russians would be opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople. He once had the pleasure of discussing this matter fully with M. Miliukoff, to whom reference had been made, and who was the leader of the Moderate party in Russia. Some time ago he (Sir Edwin) put forward detailed proposals for making Constantinople and a considerable enclave an international city in charge of a Commission formed on the model of the Commission of which their Chairman was a successful member, which for sixty years controlled the navigation of the Lower Danube. It should have a certain number of trained men for police purposes, but no army, and there should be no fortifications in the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. Through the Danube, the most important river in Europe, would then flow a large trade from Western Europe. They would recall that in his history of the Crimean War, Kinglake showed that the real underlying purpose of the conflict was to see whether or not the navigation of the Danube was to be free, or was to be left as Russia desired in her sole charge. M. Miliukoff told him that he agreed with this proposal, unless as an alternative Constantinople was left in the hands of a weak Power. He said that if it were left in the hands of Turkey, given secure guarantees, this would not trouble him; but their purpose would best be answered by giving the city an international status. The Russian statesman said that his country did not want the city.

Referring to the recent British declaration as to the replacement of the Jews in Palestine, Sir Edwin said he was not a Jew, but knew Palestine fairly well and sympathized with the desire of the Jews to get there. If the ancient race went back to their Promised Land, it would of course be under a constitution under which the rights of Christians and Moslems would be securely preserved. He held in honour and high respect the enlightened Jews of England, America, France, and even Germany. In Palestine they might present to the world a model of good government which would practically constitute a bond between us in the West and the Arab State which would be formed, and indeed was already being formed to the east of the Jordan. So far as Jerusalem was concerned he thought all was well. But speaking humbly as a civilian and not a soldier, he must confess he was not sure of the desirability of occupying Jerusalem. He had been in the caves under the city, and he had a suspicion that in those caves it would not require a large amount of explosive material to

blow the whole place with all its sacred monuments into the middle of the next century. If we surrounded Jerusalem without entering it in his opinion this would be a wise measure. With respect to Mesopotamia, he hoped for the sake of England and the Empire that we should retain possession, provided, as he was sure would be the case, the people of the country desired it. He agreed with the extremely eloquent paper Canon James Barry contributed to the *Nineteenth Century* a few months ago, in which he said that when we got the right orientation of our politics in England we should consider the capital of the British Empire to be in Egypt. If our people would so regard Egypt it would show that we had moved away from the narrow-mindedness which, happily, did not exist amongst men who had travelled widely, like the Chairman and the lecturer. Those of them who had observed affairs in the Near East knew that for many years Turkey had not been playing the game, and that in the interests of England her interference could no longer be tolerated.

The CHAIRMAN said that thirty years ago when he was in the Balkans both the Greeks and the Bulgarians confidently aspired to the reversion of Constantinople. He was for twelve years a member of the Danube International Commission to which Sir Edwin Pears had referred, and he had some knowledge of the great difficulties which arose from such forms of internationalization. He recollected that they formed a little party of eight members, and that he with the French and Russian representatives anticipated an ultimate division of Europe very much on the lines of that which they had seen in the last few years. They foresaw an alliance between their three countries, and generally worked in unison. With regard to Syria one suggestion, of which no mention had been made that evening, was that it should form part of the Egyptian kingdom. This would be nothing new, because in ancient days Syria often did belong to Egypt, and sometimes Egypt belonged to Syria. This might be a possible solution of a problem which they must keep in mind, though discussion at present was premature.

A vote of thanks to the lecturer, proposed by Sir H. E. M. James, closed the proceedings.

P.S.—Since this lecture was delivered I have read the article in *The Round Table* for December, 1917, entitled "Turkey, Russia, and Islam." If the Pan-Turanian movement materializes, it promises to set the Buffer-State system in the Middle East upon a new basis. Space forbids detail here. Mr. Lloyd George's statement of the Allies' "War Aims," as made on January 5, 1918, to the Labour Conference, as well as the trend of the Pan-Turanian movement, seems, however, to confirm the contention with which I commenced this paper, that the pivot of India's Buffer-State system has of late years been transferred from Herat to Constantinople. A

Stamboul still Turkish and a neutralized Bosphorus and Dardanelles mean that the "B.B.B." (Berlin-Byzance-Baghdad Railway) will still go forward, though, possibly, under international control. The most striking point, perhaps, in this evolution of the unexpected is that, after all, the Russian claim, long put forward, to mould the destinies of the twentieth century seems not unlikely, under the revolutionary propaganda of the hour, to be realized. At the present moment the statesmen of none of the great Powers venture to impugn the policy which Russian Democratic Socialism seeks to impose upon Europe and the civilized nations of the world. The "Pan-Turanian Movement" is now being further considered in *The Times*, obviously by the *Round Table* writer, in a series of studies entitled "The Turk Militant." *Vide Times* of January 3, 5 and 7, 1918. The Bagdad-Bokhara-China extension of the "B.B.B." has already been adumbrated in one or two previous letters which have appeared in *The Times*. One in particular, obviously written by someone familiar with modern German schemes and medieval Asian trade-routes, appeared in 1916, if not earlier, and named the "Old Silk Road" as the line of the railway by which Berlin hoped to establish connection with the Far East.

A. C. Y.

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*C O N T E N T S.*

**PALESTINE: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE.**

**By Miss ESTELLE BLYTH.**

**THE EVOLUTION OF THE COSSACK COMMUNITIES.**

**By M. A. CZAPLICKA.**

**LIST OF MEMBERS AND RULES.**

## PALESTINE : ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

**THE CHAIRMAN** said that the lecturer that evening, on a most interesting subject, was Miss Estelle Blyth, who was a daughter of the late Bishop of Jerusalem, and had lived in that city the greater part of her life. There could hardly be anyone more competent than she to give them an instructive lecture on Palestine.

Miss Blyth then read the following paper on "Palestine : its Past, Present, and Future :"

The future of Palestine and Syria is a problem that comes up for consideration from time to time, and, indeed, can never rest until these much-tried and deeply wronged countries are freed from Turkish rule. This great deliverance now seems to be at hand, and in view of it the future of Palestine assumes a definite place in our thoughts as being very urgently and very particularly one of England's responsibilities.

We shall start from a clearer standpoint if we consider Palestine and Syria as being quite distinct from one another. They are so, but because they are next-door neighbours, and have been under the same rule, they are always spoken of together and counted as one. The Turkish Empire has been for so long in a tottering condition that any interference with one part of it might well have caused the whole crazy structure to collapse—an undesirable complication from the European point of view. For the purposes of our argument we will separate Palestine and Syria as completely as if such division did indeed exist.

The history and influence of a land are so largely determined by its geographical position and peculiarities that there can be no real discussion of Palestine, either past, present, or future, without due consideration of its physical features, characteristics, and relationships.

**GEOGRAPHY.**—Briefly, then, it is a small, narrow strip of land running along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, dividing the sea from the desert. Presenting within its narrow confines geographical features as varied and distinct as are the events of its history, and containing the dearest shrines of the Christian and the Jew, Palestine arises from the abasement of her present weakness, a land unlike any other, remaining mysterious, aloof, remote. Geographically

it is an insignificant item on the globe ; a highway along which successive generations of races, wars, conquests, changes, and governments have passed, raising clouds of dust and leaving many footprints, but not altering the character of the road at all. These all pass, but the road remains. Palestine stretches from the mouth of the Litany River (32° 20' N.) south to where the Wadi Ghuzzi joins the sea south of Gaza (32° 28' N.), and, running south-east, includes Beersheba. The configuration of the land is thus exactly what Isaiah describes it : " A highway out of Egypt to Assyria." Within these accepted limits Palestine is less than one-seventh of the size of Great Britain.

**MOUNTAINS.**—" It is a land of hills and valleys, and drinketh water of the rain of heaven," said Moses. The chain of Lebanon runs north and south, Lebanon being divided from Anti-Lebanon by a narrow valley. Lebanon belongs to Syria rather than to Palestine, but from this great range—the pride of which is so apparent in the Bible, while the people of the land still call it " El Jebel," or The Mountain—the four big rivers take their course. Mount Hermon is perhaps chief of the peaks in historical interest ; it is 9,200 feet in height ; its " lofty triple summits " are nearly always under snow, and on clear days the view of its majestic heights from the foot of Carmel, looking across the Bay of Acca, is indeed a glorious one. Dahr-el-Khotib, to the north of Hermon, is actually higher by some 1,300 feet. Sir George Adam Smith, in his wonderful book " The Historical Geography of Palestine," very clearly defines the contour of Palestine, giving three great mountain ranges—the Western, the Central, and the Eastern—whose bold sections and bisections divide the land into " a series of four parallel lines or bands running north and south," and form a barrier to the desert, thus :

Sea	Maritime Plain	Central Range	Jordan Valley	Eastern Range	Desert
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The Central Range is the " Mount of the Amorites " of the Book of Deuteronomy. South of Hermon is a high plateau intersected by a deep ravine running north and south, which forms the bed of the Jordan and the Dead Sea. The Mountains of Moab, of Judea, of Galilee, though interesting from a Biblical and historical point of view, need not be touched upon separately, being practically offshoots of the big ranges, as Carmel, with its bold head thrust outward to the sea, is a continuation of the chain of Lebanon. Still, there must rise to our minds names dear to us from childhood—Tabor, the traditional Mount of the Transfiguration, with its steep sides covered with brushwood and trees, and its curiously flat top ; Olivet, one of the hills that " stand about Jerusalem " ; Ebal and Gerizim, overshadowing Nablous (Shechem), both alike beautiful, though so different in character, the blessings and curses uttered from whose summits could plainly be heard by Israel trembling in the valley below.

**RIVERS.**—From the cedar-covered slopes of Lebanon four rivers take their way. The Litany runs west; the Barada (the Abana of the Bible) east, enriching Damascus on its way; the Jordan, rising in Hermon, flows south to its end in the Dead Sea; and the Orontes, rising in the upper valley between the two chains of Lebanon, flows north to Antioch, then, turning west, seeks the Mediterranean. The Jordan Valley, aptly named by the Arabs "El Ghor," or the Depression, is 1,290 feet below the level of the Mediterranean; the soil has been famous from the earliest times for its extreme richness and fertility. Varying from 90 to 100 feet in width, the swift brown river runs onward with many dangerous currents, the depth being from 3 to 12 feet. Such is the intense heat of the Jordan Valley that the ground cracks in the summer, and the natives move their tents into the hills; the thermometer will register as much as 118°. Hence, despite its richness, the absence of life and movement in the Valley; the ordinary work of town and village is impossible in such heat, and Jericho to-day is but a small mud village. In the tangled scrub and undergrowth along the river-side wild boars flourish, and leopards and a species of wolf are found, but rarely. Only two out of the four rivers find an outlet, the Orontes and the Litany; the Jordan dies in the Dead Sea, and the Barada, perhaps the most beautiful and fertilizing of the four, in the desert.

**LAKES.**—Palestine has three lakes, all famous. Lake Huleh, the "Waters of Merom," lies to the south of Lebanon, where the valley begins to sink downwards; in the swamps around its margin grow thick jungles of papyrus-reed. The Lake of Galilee, nearly thirteen miles long and eight miles across at its greatest breadth, is one of the most beautiful of all the sights of Palestine. Deep blue in colour, with clear fresh waters full of fish, its appearance is so instinct with life and beauty that it is hard to associate with it the treachery of the violent and dangerous storms which mar it to-day, as long ago when Christ's word stilled the waters into peace. "Jehovah hath created seven seas," said the Rabbis, "but the Sea of Gennesaret is His delight." The Dead Sea lies nearly 1,300 feet below the level of the Mediterranean; its bitter waters wash an arid shore on which no vegetable life is seen. It is the picture of a terrible desolation, of a land under the curse.

**CLIMATE.**—Palestine lies in the subtropical zone. The extraordinary differences in altitude and surface characteristics (it varies from 1,300 feet below the sea-level to 9,000 feet above it) must widely affect the climatic conditions and the characteristics of the inhabitants. The average summer temperature is from 80° to 90°, occasionally rising to 100°. The heat is never unbearable except in the Jordan Valley, for the stone houses, with their thick walls, are well adapted to keep it out. The rainfall is from 28 inches to 82 inches; winter has even brought 12° of frost, and snow falls, but not every year. In Eastern

Palestine, I believe, the differences in temperature are even greater, the upper heights being covered with snow. The rainy season, roughly speaking, lasts from the end of November to the end of February; "the former rains" begin at the end of October, and the "the latter rains" fall in March and April. January is cold and stormy; May and October are the sirocco months, to be avoided by newcomers and travellers. In August, with the rising of the Nile, heavy dews begin to fall, refreshing the land when it is weary. Barley and wheat are sown in December, and reaped from April to June: millet, sesame, figs, grapes, melons, etc., from August to October. The chief grain fields are the plain between Lebanon and the Hauran in Syria, and, for Palestine, the Plains of Esdrælon and Sharon, districts around Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron, and, of course, the rich lands east of Jordan. The winds of Palestine are often referred to in the Bible. The south and west are refreshing winds, the north wind is a storm-bearer. The east wind, the sirocco (for the natives use the Italian word derived in the first place from their own "sharkiyeh," eastern), is a malicious wind, piercingly cold in winter, and dry and heavy in the summer. The heat of Palestine is largely sun-heat; on the hottest day (not sirocco) there will be a touch of chill in the shade; and at sunset a treacherous coolness sets in, leading to fever if due care is not taken. At sunrise lovely little silver mists rise upward from the earth, like incense at the sacrament of dawn.

**SPRINGS.**—There are many springs in Palestine, and these, with the gracious dews, partly atone for the lack of rain. The hot springs at Tiberius (temperature 140° F.) are still frequented as a cure, as in days of Herod. Hot sulphur springs are also found west of the Dead Sea. Drinking-water is stored in rock-hewn cisterns, with which, both ancient and modern, the land is strewn; when these run dry at the end of a long summer following upon a poor rainy season, fever and sickness crop up everywhere. In spite of this, nothing would induce the Turkish Government to tackle seriously the question of a water supply, by no means an impossible one, nor would it allow anyone else to do so. Water and fuel are the two chief problems of life in Palestine. We discuss every fraction of the rainfall with all the earnestness it deserves, for on it, indeed, depend both health and food for the coming year; and the disastrous taxation on trees under Turkish rule, and their wholesale destruction, either for firewood or to escape the tax, have sensibly lessened the rainfall. The scarcity of wood, the difficulty of bringing it from long distances in a country where roads are few and generally bad, and the rise in prices consequent on these hard conditions, made this one of the gravest anxieties for the future just before the war: though Cardiff coal was obtainable latterly, it cost 80 francs a ton, or £3 5s. All these things, taken in conjunction with a population rapidly increasing through

immigration, for which no provision was made by the Government, made the question of one's daily bread an anxious one. The situation must be even graver now, for trees have been cut down recklessly during the past three years, and olive-wood has actually been used on the railway to supplement the scarcity of coal.

**FLORA.**—Despite the dead hand of Turkey upon her, the fertility of Palestine is as amazing as it is great. Everything grows out in the open and, as it seems to us, under conditions that ought to prevent any self-respecting vegetable life from attaining maturity. The land, after yielding one crop, will be scratched up (for the primitive native plough does little more than disturb the surface), and planted again almost immediately; on the hillsides, which look so stony and unpromising, every little patch of soil amongst the rocks will be sown or planted, and with excellent results. Palestinian vegetables would demoralize an English market; we have cauliflowers that measure at least a foot across, and water-melons hardly to be spanned by a man's arms: to this day the grapes of Eshool grow in clusters from 3 to 4 feet in length. We have in their seasons grapes, apricots, nectarines, plums, damsons, quince, mulberries, figs, lemons, oranges, prickly pear, pomegranates, bananas, and many kinds of nuts; a rotl of grapes (6 pounds) costs about tenpence (old residents consider the price excessive), and for a trifling present you may go into a vineyard and eat as many grapes and figs as you can manage.

And what of the flowers? From the semi-tropical vegetation of the Jordan Valley to the English flowers cherished in gardens, practically everything seems to flourish. The wild flowers in spring are glorious beyond all telling, especially, perhaps, in Galilee, where they have been less interfered with. We have anemones, scarlet, white, mauve, and pink (many people believe that they are the "lilies of the field" before whose glory that of Solomon paled), hyacinths, ranunculus, narcissus, honeysuckle, daisies, buttercups, cistus, cyclamen, irises, black arums, broom, mandrake, oleander (rose and white), thrift, hyssop, orchises, asphodel, acanthus, vetches of many kinds, unscented violets, roses, speedwell—all these, and many more whose names elude me now, grow wild in Palestine with a profusion that no words can describe. Besides these, which we may term native to the land, most English flowers flourish in gardens with a little care: cowslips, daffodils, primroses, sweet-peas, pansies (we had some that shot up 9 inches in height), violets of all kinds, tuberoses, chrysanthemums, asters, jasmine, heliotrope (this grew like a tree, at least 10 feet in height), begonias, geraniums, carnations, hollyhocks, pelargoniums, white arums, roses, syringa—the list becomes unduly long, but it is not complete. When you have lived in Palestine, and marked its lavish beauty and fertility under the most harrowing ill-treatment as well as neglect, you realize that such expressions as "the glory of Lebanon," "the excellency of

Carmel and Sharon," and "the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose," are no lovely fancy of the poet, no delusion of the overfervid patriot, but the sober literal truth. Palestine is still a land of corn and wine. We see the surface richness of her, but what of the treasures hidden within, "the chief things of the ancient mountains and the precious things of the lasting hills"? Moses assured the Israelites that it was "a good land." "Thou shalt not lack anything in it; a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest dig brass." But who has looked for it? The Turkish Government, by its unscrupulous taxation, put an effectual stop to anything like private enterprise, and (to give one instance only) when, some four years ago, a Syrian found that his little plot of ground yielded oil of an excellent quality, he carefully concealed his find, knowing well what would happen if the Government got wind of it.

**FAUNA.**—The lions of Bible days are extinct now, but cheetahs, leopards, wolves (though rarely), hyenas, jackals, foxes, gazelles, and wild cats are found, and bears in the Lebanon. Sheep, goats, and cows are plentiful, but small and lean; the beasts of burden are donkeys, mules, horses, and camels. The horses, though small and slender, are extraordinarily game, and work to the very end until they drop. When a camel falls, and has to be killed, the fellahin eat the flesh and consider it a great luxury. Venomous snakes are not very numerous; lizards of many kinds, large and small, chameleons, mantises, locusts (still eaten by the Bedouin), scorpions, centipedes, tarantulas, all abound. One year a particularly rich harvest in the Plain of Sharon was eaten by an army of rats before it could be reaped, and the terror of the people in face of this plague was intense. A plague of locusts is another terrible visitation; the air is darkened by myriads of them in flight, and where they fall not a blade or leaf survives. Amongst birds, owls, partridge, quail, hoopoes, jays, swallows, thrushes, finches, and sparrows are more or less common. Large flocks of storks pass through on their way south, and I remember once a flight of flamingoes, a lovely sight; cuckoos are occasional, but not common.

**HISTORY.**—We said at the beginning that the history of a country was largely determined by its geographical conditions. The history of Palestine bears out this statement in a very definite way. It is a somewhat tangled narrative of changes and conquests, the early records being vague and unsatisfactory in the main, though certain periods and facts stand out with distinctness against the shifting background of uncertainties.

Excavations in Palestine have revealed traces of prehistoric dwellers in caves and huts whose implements were fashioned from bone. The skulls and bones of these people are akin in some instances to the modern natives of Palestine. A land of many tribes and petty kingdoms, with their perpetual wars and ineffective treaties, each one



striving to get the upper hand by guile if not by force, it is difficult to form a distinct historical idea of it from the confusion of battle ever waging amongst these tribes; and when out of the vagueness of these shifting periods arise the Hyksos, the invaders of Egypt (1700 B.C.), they present a greater definiteness of outline which we welcome. The hand of Egypt lay heavy on Palestine for many long years, some of the Kings of the land even being appointed by Pharaoh, to whose power they appealed for help, vindication, or protection in their constant internecine wars. Seti I. (1320 B.C.) led an expedition into Palestine; but the power of the Hittites (from Northern Syria and Mesopotamia) was gradually building itself up in the land, and Rameses II. (1300 B.C.) by a treaty with them renounced almost all the Egyptian holding in Palestine. Egyptian supremacy revived under Rameses III. (1200-1169 B.C.), but fifty years later the Assyrians under Tiglath-Pileser swept away in their rapid encroachment the landmarks of the Egyptian and the Hittite suzerainty. Those periods which are immediately concerned with the Bible possess, of course, the chief interest for us. Palestine, divided into a series of small kingdoms ever at variance with each other, was in a state which rendered it peculiarly open to foreign access and conquest; and amongst these petty tribal kingdoms the Hebrew invaders out of Egypt made a firm place for themselves, aided, no doubt, by that learning of the Egyptians which they brought with them in the formation of an ordered communal life. They took deep root and spread abroad, and in the interval between their entry under Joshua and the day of the Messiah Whom they rejected, theirs was the history of the land. It is strange that, with a mass of tradition and the work of scribes, the political records of the Jewish Monarchy are yet so slight. Taking the books of the Old Testament which are concerned with those years merely as historical records of the kingdoms, we are struck by the prominence given to the personal character and life of the King, and by the correspondingly scanty attention paid to the country and its foreign policy and relations. We are told, for instance, of Solomon's wisdom and of the fleet that gathered riches from all lands, but we are given no details of his policy, home or foreign, which seems to have been governed largely by a commercial spirit. Thus the records of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah are chiefly the records of the life and deeds, good or bad, of each king and the never-ending struggle between the hierarchy and the monarch. The kingdoms, which lasted, roughly, from 1075 B.C. to 597 B.C., drew to their dishonoured close: the kings went into exile and the people were dispersed, never again to be gathered in one. "Other lords have had rule over us," was the bitter lament of the prophet. The people, who had rejected every chance over and over again, were left to struggle as they might against the overwhelming pressure of outside forces.

For as the might of Israel, religious and political, waned, other influences had strengthened in Palestine—Babylonian, Chaldean, Assyrian. The growing predominance of the latter power swept Palestine through a series of mighty changes during a period of some 300 years. Warfare decimated the population, and the conquerors brought in their own countrymen to fill the empty places. The social, religious, and national life of the Jews was broken up, an exhausted people lay at the foot of an iron conqueror, and during the period of acquiescence that followed on submission the Jews absorbed the invaders after a fashion peculiarly Jewish. The kingdom of Israel came to an end about 722 B.C., whilst that of Judah lasted some 130 years longer. A number of Jews returned to Palestine some fifty years after the Great Dispersion, under the favour of Cyrus, though they “came back, not to a kingdom, but to a *medineh* or district (and city) of the Persian Empire.” (G. A. Smith, “Jerusalem,” vol. i., p. 380.) Palestine was practically a Persian province until the overthrow of the Empire by Alexander the Great (333 B.C.). After his death the Ptolemies in Egypt and the Selucidæ in Northern Syria contended for the possession of Palestine, and a time of great misery followed for the Jews, culminating in the plunder of the Temple by Antiochus IV. His cruel persecution goaded the Jews into rising, and the priestly family of the Asmonean Mattathias led the revolt, which for a time was successful. Judas Maccabæus, the son of Mattathias, founded the Asmonean Dynasty, which lasted until 34 B.C., when Herod the Great, an Idumean, or Edomite, by nationality, and Roman Prefect of Syria, murdered Antigonus, and made himself King of the Jews. Under his rule Palestine enjoyed some prosperity, and ruins of his magnificent buildings yet enrich the land; but with the death of his son Archelaus (A.D. 6), Palestine became a dependency of Rome.

The New Testament story embraces much of that of the Roman occupation of Palestine. The Roman influence was very strong, and traces of it remain to-day in the wonderful ruins of walls, aqueducts, roads, baths, temples, amphitheatres, etc., and in names of places. The Gospels are stamped with the image and superscription of Cæsar’s supremacy: Roman laws, money, institutions, customs, officials, appear all through the New Testament narrative. Before the stern onward sweep of the Roman Eagles, Greek influences, once also strong, paled and dwindled. We may trace the struggle between these two chief powers of the West in the Books of the Maccabees and of Josephus. Probably the Jews suffered more under their Roman masters than under any other foreign conqueror. Fire, sword, and persecution reduced the people to utter misery and despair, which their occasional maddened revolts only served to make more poignant. From this abyss of suffering the more beneficent rule of Constantine the Great and the establishment of the Christian faith in some degree relieved

them—though the Christianity of that day was not too kind in practice. Palestine remained a Roman province from the day when Pompey added her to the Imperial crown (A.D. 65), until the Arab Conquest in 634.

Since 634, when the Arabs swept through Palestine and took her, she has been a Moslem country. Some four hundred years later began the period of oppression of Christians, which led to the Crusades—those vain, romantic, fascinating episodes in history whose glamour affects us even now. The First Crusade (A.D. 1096) was born of the impassioned preaching of a monk of Amiens, Peter the Hermit, who had made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and was half crazed by what he saw, and also shared, of the sufferings of the Christians in the Holy City. To him the aged Patriarch of Jerusalem appealed with tears: "Behold how we Christians suffer at the Tomb of Christ for our faithfulness to Him! Behold how that sacred Tomb itself is in the hands of infidels, who mock its sanctity and our pains! Do our Christian brethren in Europe care for none of these things?" To Peter also, praying and fasting and mourning over these things, there came strange visions, and voices that urged him to champion this cause; and so, taking his way home, he preached throughout Europe the woes of Jerusalem and the shame of the Holy Sepulchre. The Pope blessed his mission; princes, knights, and commoners took fire at his tale; words and deeds ran hand in hand; and when Godfrey de Bouillon—warrior, statesman, knight, and hero—espoused the cause, the thing was done. An organized army, under the leadership of Godfrey, aided by the first knights in Europe, was to start for Palestine in the spring of 1096; and during all the winter months Europe rang with the clang of arms and the din of preparation.

Surely no stranger army ever set forth. Men of all tongues and nationalities formed it, who were unable even to speak to each other, split up into factions by international jealousies and quarrels, yet bound together in some strange way in the bond of a common cause—the freeing of the Sepulchre of Christ. By day these men marched, and toiled, and fought with strong opposing forces, and by night they slept on the alert, never putting off their arms, while at set hours heralds passed down the sleeping lines, and cried aloud, "Remember the Holy Sepulchre! Remember the Holy Sepulchre!" And at the cry those grim, fierce warriors awoke from sleep to cross themselves and pray that it might be theirs to free that Sepulchre from the infidel. Many hardships, obstacles, and perils had to be encountered and overcome by the way; yet each in turn was met and overcome, and at last one hot June day in the year 1099 Tancred of Sicily, called the Perfect Knight, with the vanguard of the Crusading army, climbed the Mount of Olives, and from there beheld the City of their desires in all her matchless charm and beauty, and, beholding, they fell upon their knees

and wept. Three years had been passed upon the road; forty days later Jerusalem fell before the fierce siege of the Crusading host. In rushed the conquerors, fighting down the narrow streets, slaying without discrimination, mad for the time being with the lust of fighting and of purpose accomplished. The Crusaders' horses trod over the fetlocks in blood, and the steep paved streets ran with it. Godfrey, perhaps unable, perhaps unwilling, to stem the fury of his men, made his way to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre with a few like-minded companions, and knelt there absorbed in prayer while the grim work of death went on outside. By-and-by others slipped in, too, and with night the horrid work of slaughter ceased; but it was resumed the next day and for seven days more, until not an "infidel" was left. Jerusalem was now a city of the Christians, in Christian hands.

With comparative ease and quickness the land fell under the Crusaders' rule, and the Christian kingdom was set up, during the eighty-nine years of whose duration Palestine was governed absolutely on the lines of mediæval Europe. Read the chronicles of the day, read that strange book "The Assizes of Jerusalem," and see with what burning zeal and energy the Crusaders set their stamp and seal on Palestine. Godfrey hung up his crown in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, refusing to wear a crown of gold where his Lord had worn the crown of thorns; but after him there came Kings who were weak or selfish, or both, from whose inert hands the sceptre of Christian Jerusalem at last fell in dishonour to the dust. The shameful quibble that a Christian need not keep faith with an "infidel" was indirectly the means of their downfall, and it led very naturally to their not keeping faith with each other, and even to treating secretly with the enemy against each other. When Saladin, the righteous-minded and upright, arose like a sword of flame, there was no longer faith, trust, honour, or courage in the Christian kingdom to oppose to his onset. Rotten to the core, even so soon, the kingdom fell by its own hand, slain by the treachery and selfishness of the rulers who should have been its bulwarks. The Christian power, broken utterly at the Battle of Hattin, in July, 1187, was never again raised to rule in Palestine. And yet it is amazing what a deep impress the Latin Kingdom has left upon the land—in words scattered throughout the language, in buildings whose majestic ruins still attest the skill and energy of the makers, in the signs of Western blood traceable to-day in the natives. Passing through Palestine to-day, vivid memories of the Crusading kingdom accompany the traveller, fascinating and enthralling him by their romantic glow. Perhaps the strange force of the Crusaders' short tenure of Palestine lies in the fact of their "coming to her, not, like most other invaders, because she was the road to somewhere else, but because she was herself, in their eyes, the goal of all roads, the central and most blessed province of the world" (George

Adam Smith, "Historical Geography," p. 13). The incense of their devotion, so freely offered, despite all faults, lingers yet in Palestine, enriching her history beyond all price, drawing East and West together by a common love, and absolving the memory of men—fierce, ruthless, unstable as they were—who bore the cross-handled sword through the land. Eight Crusades at later periods strove to recover the land, but in vain; and in 1517 Palestine fell into the hands of the Ottoman Turks under Selim I. The invasion of Palestine by Napoleon lacks the shining impress of the Crusaders' devotion and enthusiasm, and appears to us in more sordid guise, though, of course, the heroic defence of Acre by Sir Sidney Smith, from March to May, 1799, must ever be a proud memory for Englishmen. "Had I but captured Acre," said Napoleon, years later at St. Helena, "I would have reached Constantinople and the Indies—I would have changed the face of the world! But *that* man made me miss my destiny!"

**FUTURE.**—What is to be the future of Palestine? If her past is any guide to us in our attempt to solve the riddle of the future, we may well come to the conclusion that she can never belong to any one race or people after the absolute fashion of other lands. She is a road, a highway; she can be policed, controlled, kept safe and open, made beautiful and pleasant, but she cannot become the absolute property of any one nation. She has been held longest in point of time by Turkey, whose people are the most mixed and least national of all races; but Turkey has been such a weak, unstable Power latterly that it has held Palestine more or less under the will and by the grace of Europe. And Turkey, who by its cruel taxation, its insincerity, its injustice and cynical oppression, its utter faithlessness to trust, has all but ruined the country, has driven abroad the best of her youth, and broken the spirit of those who could not escape—Turkey's fetters on the land were broken for ever, we trust, on that glad day when Jerusalem surrendered to the British. The question is too wide and too wonderful in its illimitable hopefulness for us to do more than touch on points here and there; but it is a very important one, and we cannot keep our thoughts from dwelling on it in these days of great and terrible changes. For Palestine is no lonely little island lost in the midst of a great sea, whose possession is of small moment to anyone; her position on the map makes her as real and vital a factor in the world's history now as she has ever been. The Russian pilgrims ardently believe that in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem is the actual centre of the world, and it is certain that in Palestine, which contains the dearest shrines of the Christian and the Jew, and to the Moslem is almost equally sacred, are centred some of the chief and most urgent problems of the world. There is nothing more alluring and less fruitful than speculation on political problems, and as such speculation can never be entirely free from controversial bitterness, perhaps we shall do better

to dwell rather on points whereon all nations and all creeds are at one. And we *are* all one in our love of Palestine, our reverence for her sacred past, our firm belief in her sure and glorious future. We have all mourned over her abasement and her misery under Turkish misrule; we all desire most passionately that she shall now be raised to her rightful place in a cleansed and liberated world. How can this great end best be attained?

In speaking of the coming restoration of Palestine we may not overlook the dream of the Zionists for a place therein. English sympathies are very quickly stirred by the cry of a people for freedom. England, who has suffered so much in her fight for liberty, not only for herself, but for the little nations that have turned to her for help time and again—England understands the longing of a wandering race to have at last a home. Every Jew and every Zionist can now, if he will, have a home, and freedom, and utmost liberty of body and of soul, in a Palestine that is under the guardianship of Great Britain.

But a great deal has already been done by the Jewish race towards colonizing Palestine. The Jewish efforts were not always successful, and it was not until the immigration of the petty trader had given place to the agricultural immigrant that a solid foundation was laid in Palestine as a home for the Jewish race—this, be it understood, as distinct from the traditional and religious side of the question. The British forces have already freed several great Jewish centres—Jaffa, where the orange-gardens are world renowned; Richon-le-Zion, whose wine already bids fair to capture a European market; Mulebbis, and many others. Between forty and fifty settlements were scattered throughout the country in 1914, "back to the land" being the policy of the Jewish associations responsible for the development of immigration. The only rivals to the Jews in Palestine as colonizing agents have been the Germans. Their undoubted influence with the Turks has enabled them to claim many fine tracts of arable land—Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Saron. A few of the many. Happily, this dangerous growth will now be checked, allowing a larger scope to the Jewish nationalist.

Every signpost seems to point to the one end, every argument to lead to the one conclusion—namely, that Palestine, which is now being freed by the outpouring of English blood and by the ungrudging sacrifice of splendid English lives, shall remain under England's protection, and so experience those benefits of English rule which she has so long desired. England alone will hold her on trust for the rest of the world, Christian, Jewish, and Mahomedan; under England's care Christian, Jew, and Moslem will worship in peace and safety; by England every religious and national prejudice will be respected. Many voices have been raised in favour of Syria proper passing into French keeping. It seems a good—indeed, a natural—solution of her

question. France has long cared for Syria, and Syria for her; France has spent a good deal upon Syria one way or another; there is something curiously akin between the two peoples, and it is likely that Syria as a whole would welcome French protection. Syria would present a fruitful field for the exercise of that engineering skill in which France is so eminent; there are great mountains to be bridled by roads and railways, rivers to be spanned by bridges and harnessed for irrigation, valleys and plains to be cultivated for the use of men. Thus, in separating Palestine and Syria, as we did at the beginning, if France has Syria, Palestine falls naturally to Great Britain. Our present occupation of Egypt makes it, indeed, a necessity that we should guard Palestine also; for the desert between is no certain protection to either country, and if a Turkish army (which is generally destitute of every military necessity except courage) could pass the desert with such comparative ease and celerity, what would not be possible to fully equipped and organized forces? English rule has long been the ardent desire of the Christians of Palestine, and latterly even the Moslems have cried out for it openly under the ever-increasing weight of Turkish oppression. About a year before the outbreak of war, deputations of Bedouin from beyond Jordan (wild creatures who usually avoid the stir of towns) kept on coming in to ask the Turkish Governor of Jerusalem when the English were coming to take the Holy City. The Pasha, considerably perturbed by this unexpected development, put them off with specious excuses—there was no answer yet from the English; letters took so long on the way; they were coming soon. Three times these untamed men of the desert came, then ceased, in bitter disappointment. Perhaps they thought that England had failed them. What had started the idea no one ever knew. About the same time a rumour arose in the city that five English Generals were coming by the evening train to take Jerusalem. Half the city flocked joyfully to the station, many of the Jews even went down to Jaffa to view the landing, and when no one arrived the disappointment was really intense. We may smile at the simplicity of these people, but never at the real desire for liberty, the real belief in England, that lay behind it.

England is greatly trusted in Palestine, for the people have come to understand that all her institutions out there are wholly for their benefit, and mask no ugly political aim or greed. The common saying "On the word of an Englishman it is true!" must make us proud each time we hear it. English prestige suffered a temporary eclipse in recent years, owing, perhaps, to a restrained line of policy that was misunderstood by those to whom power must be shown in concrete form, but it has never been destroyed. The extraordinary joy and thankfulness with which General Allenby and his army were welcomed by Jerusalem is a convincing proof of what the people feel for

England; and it is the more wonderful when we remember that for three years they have been subjected to bitter and unscrupulous anti-English propaganda by the Germans in Palestine, with no chance of hearing even a whisper of the truth. For many years past the education of the land has been almost entirely in foreign hands, with the result that there is now ready a generation of well-educated young Syrians, men and women, who know French and English well, who (the men chiefly) have been driven by Turkish misrule to seek their living in other countries. These will undoubtedly return to Palestine with the dawn of a fairer day, and there will be at once a generation ready and fit for use. A number of young Syrians have done well in Egypt and the Sudan in British Government departments, proving the extent of the Syrian's capacity and trustworthiness under firm but sympathetic direction. One important consequence of the quickened intercourse between Palestine and Egypt and the Sudan has been that the Syrians have been able to see and to prove for themselves the benefits of British rule, and to appreciate the immense difference between Egypt under the English and Palestine under the Turks. For years past the Syrians have said, "If the English cannot take our country as it is, then let them annex it to Egypt, so that we may be under English government and protection." You see, it had to be *England* somehow!

We may not doubt that now, freed from the long bitterness of an unspeakable bondage, and brought under the splendid breadth and justice of our Mother England's rule, which is, of all Western governments, that best adapted to Eastern needs, Palestine will become once more what she should be, the highway of God. Is she not to us all the land of an eternal and infinite promise?

Colonel A. C. YARE said he was no authority on Palestine, but was closely interested in the English Grand Priory of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of which the lecturer's father was for a number of years a Sub-Prelate. He had seen the suggestion made that Jerusalem might suitably become the seat of the Court of Arbitration which was now established at the Hague, while other writers had discussed the possibility of Egypt becoming a vitally central point of the British Empire. One of the foremost German writers on German war aims had called the Suez Canal the *nerve centre* of the British Empire. Ideas and suggestions such as these could not be ignored. What aimed at becoming the power of the age was Social Democracy, pervading all nations and leaguening them together for peace, and (what is ruin to the human race) subordinating individual talent, energy, and wealth to a common dead level of national mediocrity. Were the highest social grades going to allow Social Democracy to be the one dominating feature in the world, or were they going to set up to it what every



great political movement should have—an opposition? He for one was strongly in favour of an opposition. He was going to suggest in connection with the Order of St. John of Jerusalem something that might appear quixotic, but which, none the less, might take a practical shape. He believed there was a great possible future before the grand old Order, which had been so closely associated with the history of Jerusalem. It might be vouchsafed to the Order to become, if on a small scale, but in co-operation with other interests, a centre of opposition to Social Democracy. Within the last century the Order had been one of the great Hospitaller powers of the civilized world, and it was so still; but he was not in the least convinced that this should continue to be its main work. In comparison with it the Red Cross was of mushroom growth; but the latter was a strong up-to-date organization, and it would be possible for the Order to hand over its Hospitaller functions, in whole or in part, to the Red Cross. The Order, which now had its headquarters at Rome, might well be combined, as it formerly was, under one distinct head, and then become a political power, exercising a very wholesome influence. In the old days it was an essentially international Order, and its members were obliged by their vows to refrain from mixing themselves up in national and international quarrels. That was why, when the Guelph and the Ghibelline divided Christendom, the Hospitallers were able so long to hold Rhodes and Malta against the Turk and protect Europe. The anarchy that now threatened Europe was that of which Bolshevism in Russia was for the moment the most active apostle. That was a gospel that must be taken by the throat and choked. It was deeply to be regretted that His Holiness the Pope, as Mr. Richard Bagot had ably shown in the *National Review*, had failed to observe strict neutrality, and shown marked partiality toward Catholic Austria and partly Catholic Germany. Under existing circumstances, when Italy declared war against the Central Powers, the Grand Master of the Order, being an Austrian, had been obliged to withdraw to Vienna. In the old days the Order held aloof from international disputes. It should revert to this great tradition, put aside mere sectarianism, which was entirely unsuited to the age, and, by uniting its branches, become a strong political power. He wished to add, in conclusion, how much he had enjoyed a graphic description of Palestine direct from one who knew it so intimately, such as he had never had the opportunity of listening to before.

Mr. E. R. P. Moon said that all present had been interested by the new suggestion made by Colonel Yate as to the method of internationalizing Palestine. Miss Blyth had suggested an English protectorate; but we must remember how big our commitments were as an Empire, and that internationalization might be more in harmony with the spirit of the age. He wished to express his appreciation of

the brilliant and charming discourse to which they had listened. It was more than thirty years since he visited the Holy Land; but that visit led him to be specially interested in what Miss Blyth had told them of the Crusades, in respect to which his memory had recently been refreshed by re-reading Gibbon. He could give a very trifling morsel of evidence to support her view that there was a widespread feeling among the people of that country that England had some claim in the Holy Land and would make it good some day. He and his companion, for climatic reasons, were travelling from north to south, when they encamped close to the village of Hanin, and visited the old Crusaders' castle of Subeibeh. Next morning, about an hour's ride from their camp, three rascally looking men dashed upon them from behind shocks of corn and demanded their passports. It appeared that these were respectively the lindis, the village scribe, and the head of the local zaptiehs, and that the report had got about that they were surveying the castle with a view to its acquisition, so as to hold it for the benefit of the British Empire.

The CHAIRMAN said the internationalization of Palestine was tried in the time of the Crusades without any very great success. He hoped that if tried again the result would be more successful than in the past. In reference to Miss Blyth's remarks on the French claims to Syria, it was to be remembered that for many centuries the French were closely associated with that part of the world. In the first Crusade the leaders were almost all Frenchmen, and the last Crusade was participated in by Louis IX. of France, known as St. Louis, who was imprisoned for four years in Syria, and later on died at Carthage, with the words "Jerusalem, Jerusalem," on his dying lips. Ever since, the French had been keenly interested in the affairs of Syria. In 1840 the English took possession of that country from Mehemet Ali of Egypt, and handed it over to Turkey, much against the wishes of the French, who had been backing Mehemet Ali. Since that time the French had always been very active in propaganda in Syria. In the troubles between the Maronites and the Druses, the French always exercised their influence in favour of the former, whereas the English supported the latter. When he had the honour to occupy the latter post, he and his French contemporary were good personal friends, though more or less in political opposition to one another. Usually when he went among the Druses he was received with enthusiasm, but did not have a similar cordial reception among the Maronites; while the converse position applied to the French Consul-General. On one occasion the Maronite colony had a quarrel with his French colleague, and happening to go into the country, he (the speaker) was received in a most enthusiastic way by the Maronites, much to his astonishment. It was their way of showing the French Consul how displeased they were with him. When he got back to Beirut he and the Frenchmen had a good laugh

over the incident. It was not long before the French Consul recovered his position amongst the Maronites, and all went well with both of them. After all, the principal bone of contention between the French and English representatives in his time was as to who should have the smartest cavasses. They were each allowed four of these men, and vied with one another in dressing them gorgeously, very largely out of their own pockets.

The rapid survey the lecturer had given of events in Palestine from the time of the Patriarchs called up historical memories, and the allusions she had made could be multiplied by the hundred. One curious way in which East and West were combined was that in the time of Haroun-al-Raschid that monarch entered into communication with Charlemagne and appointed him custodian of Jerusalem. We all knew the story of our own Richard Cour-de-Lion, how he captured Cyprus and then sold it again to the French, who formed a kingdom there. Another curious incident was that St. Louis, to whom he had referred, was actually in negotiation as to the disposal of Palestine with Hulagu Khan, son of Jenghiz Khan, the famous Mongol conqueror. The Mongols were at that time Buddhists, but shortly after became Moslems, and the negotiations were dropped.

The Chairman then quoted the memorandum recently published by the Bolshevist Government in Petrograd, dated February 21, 1917, outlining the partitions agreed upon by the Allied Powers, under which Palestine was to be a protectorate under Russia, France, and England. How far the document was authentic we did not know. But he did not think that the Allies would divide the Eastern territories in the same way now, having regard to the defection of Russia. It was far from easy to speculate as to what was going to happen in the future. What might seem to most people the right policy to-day, might be impossible or undesirable to-morrow. He concluded by proposing a vote of thanks to the lecturer, which was seconded by Sir Evan James, and carried with applause.

## THE EVOLUTION OF THE COSSACK COMMUNITIES

THESE are few terms which have passed through more evolutionary changes since the Middle Ages than the term "Cossack." Allow me to give you some examples of the difficulties that await the novice in attacking this subject. Given a man who goes by the name of Cossack, we might find, on inquiring into his origin, that he was a Great Russian, a Ukrainian, a native Mongol, a "Tatar," a Lett, or a Finn. If he has been a Cossack for some generations—*i. e.*, if he can be called a "hereditary" Cossack—he may, whatever his origin, have adopted the traditions of the old Cossack national communities of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Thus, first of all, it must be clearly understood that the modern Cossack regiments (*voiska*) and the historic Cossack national communities represent two opposite principles. Yet both of them formed ethnically a part of the population of Eastern Europe, though they live both there and in Asiatic Russia. But quite apart from these two groups must be the treatment of the people of purely Asiatic blood known as Kirghis-Kaizak and calling themselves simply Kaizak (which in pronunciation is almost identical with the Russian Cossack—Kazak). These Kirghis-Kaizak must not be confused with the Kirghis who rightly own this name, and who now live round by Pamir and Alai and in the Issyk-Kul district.

It is therefore necessary to enter into the origin and history of the term "Cossack," so as to differentiate these various types, and get a clear idea of the present relation of the different Cossacks to one another and to other peoples of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Until quite recently this scientific inquiry would have been rather hampered by the policy of the old Russian régime of not calling things or peoples by their right names. Thus, the Turkic nation of the Kaizak were given the official name of Kirghis, possibly through ignorant confusion with the real Kirghis, but chiefly in order to reserve the word "Kazak" for the designation of the Russian regiments which had conquered Asia. Again, the Cossack regiments were not allowed to remember their independent national past, and remain a tool in the hands of the Government for the suppression of all national aspirations within the boundary of the Russian Empire.

As a member of a nation whose feeling of national independence was stronger than that of any other unit comprised within the old Russia I had my first opportunity of meeting the Cossacks as ruthless suppressors of any public manifestation of religious and national life. Had my acquaintance with the Cossacks been limited to what I saw of them as they galloped on their Asiatic ponies through the streets of European Warsaw, using their iron-pointed whips or *nahaikas* on the peaceful crowd, it is possible that my interest in the Cossack social and racial problems might never have been awakened. When, later, I saw them in their own territories on the Don and in the Caucasus, it was difficult to conceive that they were the same people who, when sent to a far-distant province, carried their obedience to orders to such inhuman lengths. Yet another side of the Cossack character, the imaginative and exploratory, unfolded itself before my eyes when I saw them in Siberia. But it was not until I came to investigate the question of the Eastern Turks that I at last understood the profound historical and political reasons which led to the origin of Cossack communities independently in Europe and in Asia, both of which became subject to Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

I may perhaps be allowed just to mention that, when visiting Warsaw some hours before the German occupation in the autumn of 1915, I had the opportunity of seeing the Cossacks once more in action on Polish land, but this time with a curiously reverential attitude towards the Polish people, and with boundless courage hindering, if only for a moment, the inevitable German advance.

These personal experiences have in many cases thrown light on difficult points in my ethnological researches.

HISTORY OF THE TERM.—In tracing the history of the term "Cossack," "Kazak," we can follow the origin and spread of the Cossack national organizations. Various theories have been put forward on the subject. Erskine,\* the translator of "Baber's Memoirs," Sir Henry Howorth,† and Klaproth,‡ think that the term has no ethnic value, and is derived from an Arabic word which travelled through Persia and found its way to the Circassians of the Northern Caucasus, from where it spread to the Turks of Central Asia and to Russia. According to these authorities, the meaning of the term is "a martial man leading a roving life." Against these opinions we have the theory of Vámbéry\* and Schuyler that the word has acquired ethnic significance in the course of time, and that it is of Turkic origin, from *kaz*, "to wander" (modern form *kez*, *kiz*), and the suffix of the verbal noun, *ak*. Another version derives the term from the words *khaz*, "a

\* Erskine, "Baber's Memoirs," v., xi. See note to p. 7.

† Howorth, "History of the Mongols," Part II., Division I., p. 5.

‡ Klaproth, "Travels in the Caucasus," p. 311.

§ "Das Türkenvolk," p. 108.

steppe goose," and *zag*, "a steppe crow," thus making it of Perso-Turkic origin, and implying the meaning "free as a steppe bird."\* So, whatever the difference in detail, it is agreed that the term describes a people living a free and wandering life.

Already in the tenth century the land on the Lower Don was called *Kazachia* (according to Porphyrogenitus), and in the eleventh century we hear from a Persian poet Firdusi (in his "Shah-Nameh") of the nomad Kazak people, armed with lances, and of their chief, *Kazak-Khan*. These Kazak are probably the ancestors of the Turkic *Kaizak* who later migrated to Central Asia, where they still live. But it is possible that the term may have remained in Eastern Europe from the eleventh century,† though we hear of people bearing this name in Eastern Europe some three or four centuries later.

**HISTORY OF THE ASIATIC COMMUNITY.**—After this mention in the eleventh century we hear nothing of the Turkic Kazak for two centuries, and it is probable that their organization was amalgamated with some other Turkic power. But in the thirteenth century, after the death of *Jinghis Khan*, we hear that they were included in that part of his empire which passed to his son *Juji*.‡

In the middle of the fifteenth century we find the Kazak again asserting themselves as a separate unit. In the meantime they seem to have formed part of the "White Horde" from which the chieftains of the modern *Kaizak* claim their descent, and were probably united with the *Uzbek*. About the middle of the fifteenth century, however, a number of these *Kaizak-Uzbek*, discontented with the rule of their *Khan*, *Abulkhayr*, migrated with their *Sultans Girei* and *Janibeg* into *Moghulistan* (between *Issyk-Kul* and *Kashgar*), and have since been called simply *Kazak*.§

This *Kaizak* steppe community continued to exist with increasing power till the end of the seventeenth century. Their *Khans* were called the *Kasimov* dynasty, after *Kasim Khan*, son of the *Janibeg*|| who led them on their migration. At the end of the seventeenth century one of their most famous *Khans*, *Tiavka*, divided them for

\* P. Kuzniatsoff, *La Lutte des Civilisations et des Langues dans l'Asie Centrale*. Paris, 1912; p. 60.

† H. Vámbéry, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

‡ W. W. Radloff, "Aus Sibirien," p. 193.

§ *Mirza Haydar*, "Tarikh-i-Rashidi," p. 82; F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross, "The Heart of Asia," pp. 193, 194; H. H. Howorth, "History of the Mongols," Part II., Division I., p. 6.

|| V. V. Velyaminoff-Zernoff, "The Emperors and Princes of the Line of *Kasim*" (Russ.); A. Levahin, "Description of the Hordes and Steppes of the *Kirghis-Kaizak*," St. Petersburg, 1832 (Russ.); N. Aristoff, "Attempt at an Explanation of the Ethnic Composition of the *Kirghis-Kaizak* of the Great Orda, and of the *Kara-Kirghis*," 1894, pp. 391-486 (Russ.); N. I. Grodekoff, "The *Kirghis* and the *Kara-Kirghis* of *Syr-Darya* Territory," 1889 (Russ.); T. Kazantseff, "Description of the *Kirghis-Kaizak*," 1867 (Russ.). A. N. Kharuzin, "Bibliography of the Ethnographical Essays on the *Kirghis* and the *Kara-Kirghis*."

administrative purposes into three groups, called Ordas—the Great, Middle, and Little Ordas. Since then the history of each Orda runs apart.

The subjugation of the Kaizak to Russia lasted from 1734-1864, when they were finally separated by the Russian military cordons from the other Asiatic powers. But they have not ceased to take every opportunity to emphasize their independent spirit. The most important rising was that led by Kenisary, who was master of all three Ordas for some six years, 1838-1844. While the Russian occupation of the Khanates of Central Asia roused the indignation of many people in Europe, the conquest of the Kaizak seems to have met with approval. Sir Henry Howorth, speaking on this question, gives us a somewhat uncomplimentary picture of the Kaizak. He says: "The Kazaks, whose very name is a synonym for freebooters and robbers, have been the scourge of all their neighbours for generations, habitually given to robbery and pillage, bound by no promise and no oath, and constantly disintegrating under the solvent of rival chiefs, with rival reputations as leaders of bandits. The Russians were long-suffering for years to their habitual treacheries and deceits." So much for this quotation. A personal acquaintance with these people produces a more satisfactory impression of their moral. But it is true that it is only with difficulty that they can be persuaded to abandon their nomadic life, and that they ally themselves easily with other nomads, such as the real Kirghis, called Kara-Kirghis, the Kipchak, and other Turkic steppe people.

An analysis of the history of the Turkic Kaizak, especially of the later period, from the middle of the fourteenth century, when their numbers were swelled in consequence of the Chinese Revolution of 1370 on the one hand and the sweeping conquests and imperial régime of Timur-Khan in Central Asia on the other,\* leads us to the following hypothesis as to the cause, and even the inevitableness, of their organization.

Big empires composed of nations with such a variation of habits and cultures as the Empire of Mété (3-2 cent. B.C.), of Jinhis (13 cent. A.D.), or of Timur (14 cent.), were kept together only by strong autocratic rule and by imposing on all people one mode of life. Such a rule worked fairly satisfactorily in the regions near the centre of the Empire, but at the outskirts the rule would be naturally weaker, and hence would allow the people to revert, as it were, to the mode of life of their ancestry—*i.e.*, the nomadic life as against the more sedentary life of the Central Empire. The more autocratic and powerful the ruler of the Empire, the more often do we hear of rebellious people on the outskirts.

This explanation of the origin of the Asiatic Cossacks holds good

\* L. Cahun, "L'Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie," 1896, p. 479.

when dealing with the European Cossacks, but of course, since the Central Empires of Eastern Europe were more sedentary than the Central Empires of Northern Asia, Cossacks of Eastern Europe were only half nomadic, whilst the Kaizak of Asia were pure nomads. In the ethnic formation of the Kaizak of Asia the Turkic blood predominated over the Tungus and Mongolic, while in the formation of European Cossacks the Slavonic blood predominated over the Turkic. Thus, however different the European and Asiatic "outsirts people" are, they possess three characteristics in common: love of personal freedom, aptitude for nomadic industries, and skill in warfare.

HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.—I shall now pass to the history of European Cossacks, which is much easier to trace, since it is closely bound up with the histories of Russia, of Poland, and, to a lesser degree, of other East European countries.\*

Several stages may be distinguished in the history of the European Cossacks. The *first stage* corresponds to the first State organization in the old Kieff Rus, from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries.

The *second* comprises the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, and corresponds to the development of the Cossack independent national communities.

The *third* covers the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the neighbouring States tried to subdue the Cossacks, and thus brought about the Cossack wars with Poland and with Russia, which led to a decline in the Cossack national strength, and eventually to their reorganization as the light cavalry of the Russian army (*voiska*).

The *fourth* is the stage of the Cossack cavalry, or *voiska*, in the nineteenth century and until the present war.

To take the *first period*. The idea of using these conquered nomadic people as defensive outposts on the borderland was already known in the days of the old Kieff Rus, in the time of Nestor, and thus existed before the term "Kaizak" came to this region. The first we hear of anything of this nature is in connection with a branch of the Pyechenyegs, the rivals of the Cumans in the invasion of Southern Russia in the twelfth century. These Pyechenyegs were subdued by the Rus people, and a part of them, called Chorno-Klobuki, was used for defensive purposes on the borderlands. The Chorno-Klobuki, known of as early as 1162, were some seventy years later (1239) fighting

\* M. Hrushevskii, "History of the Ukraine-Rus," Lemberg, 1904 (Ruthenian); A. Jablonowski, "History of the Southern Rus until the Fall of the Polish Commonwealth," 1912 (Polish); V. Sukhorukoff, "Historical Description of the Land of the Don Voiska," 1895 (Russ.); A. Levshin, "Historical and Statistical Account of the Ural Cossacks, 1823" (Russ.); N. Kharuzin, "Information relating to the Cossack Communities on the Don" (Russ.); P. Korolenko, "The Chernomortsy" (Russ.); F. Rawita Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki, 1906-1909 (Polish); N. Rojkoff, "The Cossacks," vol. xxiii., pp. 90-118, of Jeleznoff's Encyclo. (Russ.); A. Suroff, "The Cossacks," vol. xiii., pp. 882-894, of Andreevsky's Encyclo., 1895 (Russ.).



the hordes of Batu Khan on the side of the Russians. Like so many of the other Turks in Southern Russia, the Chorno-Klobuki accepted Christianity and adopted Russian habits, but, curiously enough, one branch of them still kept their Turkic language, and they live until now in Bessarabia, to the number of some 30,000, under the name Gagauzy.\* I have purposely dwelt upon this interesting detail about the predecessors of the Cossack communities in Europe, because since the very beginning of Russia (then called Rus) the life of the State has seemed to need such a defence for its frontiers, which lacking natural boundaries, if left undefended, would have been open to invasion.

And, indeed, such an invasion actually occurred in the thirteenth century. It is significant that as long as the invaders occupied the Russian lands we hear nothing of the borderland communities. But after the Mongol-Tatars either withdrew into Asia or became merged in the local population, the end of the fifteenth century shows us again on the borderland a community this time called Cossack.

This marks the beginning of the *second period*. Over the land devastated by the invasion there poured all those rebellious members of the Polish-Lithuanian and the Moscow States who could not submit to the modernized state organization, with its industrial development and its class distinctions. The two big rivers of the south, the Dnieper and the Don, were the two chief centres round which these deserters congregated. The Dnieper community, whose history is bound up with the history of Poland-Lithuania and of the Ukraine, developed somewhat differently from the Don community, and has much more of a national character.

The constant invasions of the Crimean Khans, united with the Moscow Dukes against the Kieff and Chernigoff Princes, prevented the Dnieper community from settling on the open plains. Hence they moved towards the islands of the Dnieper, "beyond the rapids," which in the Ukrainian language is "Za porogi." From this phrase is derived their name of Zaporogian Cossacks. Since it was the Ukrainian land that these Cossacks colonized, the Ukrainian language became the language of the community, though Polish, and occasionally Latin, were often used as well. The remnants of the Ukrainian peasantry which had escaped the devastations of the Tatars amalgamated with these adventurous nobles of Poland, Lithuania, and Rumania, and the community was further increased by the addition of truant serfs and various social outcasts.

In a way this Cossack movement of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saved and developed the Ukrainian language, and laid the foundation of the Ukrainian national feeling which has just been given such dramatic expression.

\* P. Golubowski, "The Pychenyegi, the Turki, and the Polovtsy until the Tatar Invasion," *Kieff*, 1884 (Russ.).

The early organization of the Zaporogian Cossacks is so striking that I shall devote a few words to it. They were divided into Village Cossacks, living in the neighbourhood of the Dnieper, and Syech Cossacks—that is to say, those living in various inaccessible places on the cataracts of the same river. The Village Cossacks, united by ties of blood with the Syech, represented the family life of the Cossacks, while the Syech was a kind of military and moral order, involving vows of chastity and celibacy, adherence to the Orthodox Creed, and allegiance to the Dnieper community. In the early stages of the Syech, the educated classes predominated over the uneducated; but everyone was equal, no one was asked about his past, and in time of war everyone was obliged to render absolute obedience to the chief. Their chief was called *hetman*, or *ataman*, and was elected for a year. In time of war he had the power of a dictator, but in peace the supreme authority was in the hands of the Assembly, or *Rada*. No woman was allowed to enter the domain of the Syech, or to attend the political meetings or the men's dance, *kosachok*.

Though their protest against the countries from which they originally separated was chiefly based on a wish for more democratic conditions, the Cossacks soon developed two classes—the proletariat called *holytba* ("naked men"), or *chern* ("black men"), and the *domovityie*—i.e., "owning a house"—to which all the *starshini*, or elders, belong. With the advent of class distinctions among the Zaporogians, the old Draconic rules, which would hang a man found drunk during a war, began to be relaxed. But it was when their régime was at its strictest that the Polish King, Stefan Batory, made an attempt to register such Cossacks as wished to form a free army to be used for the protection of Poland's frontiers against the Turk. From the middle of the sixteenth century various reforms were introduced into the free community by the Polish Government. Among these were a more regular army organization with the famous division into tenths and hundredths which persists even now. The Cossacks who enlisted at the request of the Polish Kings were on Government pay, were ennobled like the Polish fighting men, and are known in history as the "registered Cossacks." But as soon as a war was over these regiments would naturally sink back unto the general Cossack organizations, to the dissatisfaction of the Poles, and the Polish administrators of the Ukraine would claim the unregistered as well as the registered Cossacks for the service of the King. It was obvious that an arrangement subordinating only one part of the Cossack forces could not be lasting, and the mutual misunderstanding between the Cossack organizations and the Polish administration reached its climax when, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, a strong man appeared within the Cossack community, who was, on the whole, more of a Ukrainian patriot than of a Cossack. His name was Bohdan Chmielnicki. Of Ukrainian-Lithuanian-Polish

parentage and Latin education, he joined the community only about 1627, and a few years later he was already at the head of the Separatist movement in the Ukraine. It was, however, a private affair that led to the final rupture. A Polish noble of the Ukraine, by name Chaplinski, carried away Chmielnicki's sweetheart. This gave the signal for the rising under the leadership of Chmielnicki, who was then elected Hetman of the Cossacks.

The Cossacks, it must be remembered, played at that time the rôle of the army of the Ukraine, and in alliance with the Turks they embarked upon a long and destructive war. Weakening as it was to Poland, the war was mortal for the Ukraine, and its Cossacks and led to the treaty at Pereyslav in 1654, where the Cossacks gave themselves up to such dependence on Russia as they had never known before. The Russian Tsars soon realized that the Ukrainians would never cease to claim their freedom as long as they had their Cossacks to support them, and there began a period of persecution and forcible reorganization of the Dnieper Cossacks more severe than anything ever suffered by the Don Cossacks. It failed, however, to produce the desired effect, for in spite of the forcible transportation of part of these Cossacks into the Northern Caucasus and the Azov country, the national spirit developed through all the persecution as it would never have done if the people had been left to themselves to assimilate naturally with their neighbours.

The Don community consisted largely of Great Russians, including such independent members of the Great Russian State as the Old Believers, together with other rebels of an intellectual type. Being farther away from Western Europe, the Don Cossacks had neither the quasi-monastic, quasi-knighthood organization represented by the Syech of the Ukrainians, nor did the class distinctions develop to such a great extent as among the former.

The Don Cossacks are mentioned already in the Moscow annals of the fourteenth century, and we hear of their being allied with the Russian Princes against the Tatars in Kulikoff's battle of 1380. When in 1549 the Nogai Prince complained to Ivan the Terrible of the depredations of the Don Cossacks, the Moscow Government replied that the Don Cossacks were renegades of Moscow and Lithuania who did not recognize the authority of the Tsar. Yet the Don Cossacks gave their help to Moscow in subjugating the Khanate of Kazan in 1552 and the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556. In 1570 the Tsar sent to the Don Cossacks an envoy whose mission it was to persuade them to enlist in his service, for which generous compensation was promised. This was the first of incessant and forcible attempts to subjugate the Don Cossacks to Moscow, which was finally accomplished in 1623.

The *third period* of Cossack history, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is one long struggle between the growing power of the Russian State and these communities, whose reorganization into regiments or

*voiska* (depending directly on the Russian Government and not on the army) was a task neither easy nor rapid. Curiously enough, while the Dnieper and Don, Yaik and Terek regions for a long time have not ceased to be the quarter whence many liberative movements originated, and where rebels found support, those branches of the Don and Yaik Cossacks who were amalgamated with the forces sent from Moscow to the conquest of Siberia at once became the most devoted servants of the Tsar.

The history of the European Cossacks in Siberia is thus somewhat different from their history in Europe. Their relation to the Central Government took on at once the character of the relation of the *voiska* of the later type, and it dates from the time of Yermak, at the end of the sixteenth century. It was owing to the organization of two kinds of Cossack forces in Siberia, the *Lineynyie*, or Border Cossacks, and the Town Cossacks, who formed a kind of police force, that Siberia was kept under the sway of the Tsar. It was also to the exploratory and adventurous spirit of these voluntary Cossack detachments that the rapidity of the conquest was due. The first Russian town, Tiumen, was built in 1586, and the year 1647 saw the foundation of Okhotsk on the shores of the Pacific.

The Russian Cossacks in Siberia increased in numbers with the advance of the Russian conquests. The Nerchinsk Treaty with China in 1689 led to the formation of the Transbaikal Cossacks, the occupation of the Amur country in 1865 gave rise to the Amur Cossacks, and the Ussuri Cossacks were organized in 1882. But the Cossacks living near to the old centres, especially in the neighbourhood of the Don, often hindered the Russian advance by local rebellions. Thus, for instance, in 1557 a group of Cossacks on the Volga rebelled and stopped the conquest of the Volga Finnic tribes. On their submission, the rebels were renamed Yaik Cossacks; but these same Yaik Cossacks gave their support to the momentous rising of Pugachoff, and when Catherine the Great broke up this conspiracy the Yaik Cossacks were once more renamed, and have since been known as the Ural Cossacks.

The disintegration and renaming of the Ukrainian Cossacks has a still longer history.

There exists a great deal of literature on Cossack life, and the heroes of their earlier as well as of their later stage. Those who can avail themselves of the Russian or Polish originals, or, in some cases, of translations, can spend hours in an atmosphere of enthusiasm or of horror. Among the masterpieces are Gogol's "Taras Bulba," Slovacki's "Mazepa," the "Trilogy" of Sienkiewicz ("With Fire and Sword"), and many smaller literary works by eminent Russian and Polish writers. Beautiful as these are, and perhaps because of their high literary value, they often impose upon their readers to the extent of being raised from the level of fiction and given the weight of an historical record. But

in point of fact it turns solely on whether the writer is a Pole or a Russian whether any prominent Cossack leader is lauded as a hero or stigmatized as a scoundrel. This is true in the case of Mazepa, and to a certain extent also of Chmielnicki. Again; we find that Stanko Rasin and Pugachoff, two rebels of the Don and Yaik Cossacks still live in sagas and folk-songs as democratic reformers, fighting for land and freedom for the people, generous to the Holytba, just to the Domovityie, severe in their moral, and devoted to their cause. It will be understood that scoundrel was the mildest epithet applied to them in the official Russian books. Probably, when his history comes to be written, the same double character will be given to the figure of Hetman Kaledin, Hetman once more after a hundred years, during which this title was a nominal one, held by the heir to the Russian throne.

A few words must be said as to the result achieved by the old Russian Government after they had succeeded in breaking the national spirit of the Cossacks, and had skilfully diverted their vitality to fighting the external enemies of Russia in Asia, and occasionally in the West. Until 1905, and to a certain extent until the outbreak of the Revolution, the Cossacks were used against all whom the old Russian Government considered dangerous to the State.

That a revolutionary movement, or at least a spirit of discontent with the corruption of the old Government, must have existed among them to a greater extent than appeared on the surface until 1916, is clear from the fact that in the time of the crisis of Tsardom the Cossacks took not much pains to uphold the old régime. But the significance of this must not be overestimated, for it is also true that but a few of them are found among the Left or Centre of the revolutionaries.

At present there are twelve large Cossack units or *voiska*, and several smaller units, such as the Irkutsk hundreds, the Yakutsk Town Cossacks, and the Turkoman Cossack division. The large units \* are—

			<i>Population.</i>
Don, with its headquarters in	Novocherkask	... ..	1,500,000
Kuban .. ..	Ekaterinodar	... ..	1,350,000
Ural (Yaik) .. ..	Uralsk	... ..	900,000
Orenburg .. ..	Orenburg	... ..	530,000
Terek .. ..	Vladikhavkaz	... ..	270,000
Trans-Baikal .. ..	Ohita	... ..	270,000
Siberian .. ..	Omsk	... ..	180,000
Amur .. ..	Blagoveshchensk	... ..	50,000
Semirechensk .. ..	Viernyi	... ..	45,000
Astrakhan .. ..	Astrakhan	... ..	40,000
Ussuri .. ..	Vladivostock	... ..	34,000
Yenisei .. ..	Irkutsk	... ..	30,000

Their total number is about 5,199,000, with a great predominance of males over females. The Cossacks own, or owned until recently,

\* According to the recent book by Robert Wilton, "Russia's Agony," 1918, p. 316.

141,600,000 acres of land, varying from 14 acres per head (in Kuban) to 100 in Transbaikal. Speaking generally, the Cossacks have three or four times as much land per head as the Russian peasantry. In Siberia, where they own the greatest amount of land, only 9 per cent. of arable land was under cultivation in 1910-1911.

Besides these large endowments of land, the Cossacks have the privilege of being free from taxation and of being governed by a special Cossack Board in the Ministry of War, which makes them autonomous as regards the neighbouring population. In return for these privileges the Cossacks have to render military service to the State. Theoretically all the male population from eighteen years of age has to serve for nineteen years. Those not fit for military service pay money to the community, and are placed on the lists of special regiments called *lgotnyie polki*. The Cossack is obliged to provide his own horse and uniform, the Government supplying only arms. Several other duties normally devolving upon the Government, such as the upkeep of the roads, of schools, and the providing of medical treatment, rest with the Cossack community.

Each large unit or *voisko* is divided into districts (*okrug*) and village groups (*stanitsa*), these, again, being subdivided into villages (*hutor*). The head of the smaller division is subordinate to the chief of the larger. The land belonging to a *voisko* is only to a small extent used by its own people; a greater amount is rented to various non-Cossack people, excluding Jews. Thus, on the Don territory only 400 people per 1,000 are Cossacks, and on the other territories the percentage of Cossacks is still smaller. Some part of it is appropriated for the private estates of the Cossack nobles—i.e., officers of high rank. The chief social distinction within the community is that the officers, who are nobles, are permitted to have private property in land out of the land belonging to the *voiska*. As a rule, also, they are better educated, though on the whole the percentage of illiterates among the Cossack population is a small one. The least educated are the Transbaikal Cossacks, among whom only 25 per cent. can read. The highest percentage is in the Astrakhan *voisko*—81 per cent. Among the Don Cossacks, where one would expect it to be high, the percentage of those who can read is only 66.

As compared with the bulk of the Russian army under the old régime, the Cossack regiments are of small proportions. In times of peace 55,000 Cossacks are under arms; in time of war the number is 180,000.\* But as a matter of fact during this war many more of them have been called out. It is common knowledge that as a fighting force their quality far surpasses their quantity.

In peaceful times the Cossack industries are chiefly fishing and cattle and horse breeding. Next comes agriculture, which, however,

\* N. Rojkov, v. 28; Jeleznoff Encyclo., p. 105.

is still at a primitive and wasteful stage. Then comes the cultivation of wine and tobacco plantations. The Asiatic Cossacks are well known as traders.

CONCLUSION.—Having traced the origin of these curious communities, followed their evolution, and seen something of their present state, I should now like to lay before you two momentous problems, one connected with the Kaizak, the other with the Cossacks, the solution of which is of vital importance to Eastern Europe and to Asia.

The first problem arises out of the existence, the character, and the circumstances of the Turkic Kaizak (*i.e.*, the Turkic Cossacks). They are a body who, despite their nomadic condition, have an importance not to be lightly estimated, for any cause, either within Russia or without, which has their support will be very considerably strengthened thereby. Numbering from four to five million, by no means thoroughly subjugated by Mongol or by Russian power, this half-nomadic race of the Kaizak, whom, as we saw, the Russians erroneously call Kirghis, represents a considerable fighting force in its own land, since its clan organization still remains strong. Lying between Europe and Asia, its country extends from the shore of the Caspian to Pamir, and is on the route to the fabulously rich mines of Altai and Sayan and the other wealth of Siberia.

The Kaizak may be regarded as an advance-guard to the Turks of Bokhara, Khiva, and other countries of Turkestan, but their sympathies are detached, for although they have much in common with these Turks racially and linguistically, their want of strong feeling for Mahometanism sets them apart. This is hardly surprising, since Islam was only brought to them two centuries ago, and it has never been in them a driving cultural force. On the other hand, they have always been in opposition to the Central Russian Government, an opposition of which the rising of 1916 and its subsequent massacres is a recent proof.\* Their relation to the Russian Cossacks has been that of an insubordinate native tribe to a conquering Russian army, and yet Russian Cossacks and Turkic Kaizak have more in common with each other than either have with the Central Russian Government. Wherever Russian Cossacks have settled among Turkic Kaizak, it is the latter who have kept the upper hand, the Russian Cossacks adopting their mode of life and social outlook. In disregarding their essential kinship, and fostering dissension between the Russian and the Turkic Cossacks, the old Russian Government made a grave mistake. Friendly feeling and friendly terms have grown up and been established between the Turkic Kaizak and the progressive element among the Siberian colonists, which is a consideration worth noticing. There are two alternatives before the Kaizak, one of which

\* For a fuller account on the Turkic Kaizak, see M. A. Czaplicka's "Turks of Central Asia," now in preparation (Oxford University Press).

they must choose. Either they must support the progressive Siberians who work for an all-Russian Federation, or they must throw in their lot with the Turks of Central Asia, among whom German-Osmanli propagandists work for the separation of the Turkish peoples from Russia. The support of the Kaizak will be an important factor in the future of the side they choose. It is not likely that the Bolshevists will dominate the Kaizak, since Bolshevism has its roots in industrialism, which does not as yet enter into the Kaizak civilization. Attempts at impregnation at second-hand through ideas derived from a state of society quite unlike their own are not likely to be successful among any people; furthermore, the instinct of self-preservation, strong among all nomadic tribes, runs counter to the anarchy consequent upon Bolshevist methods.

The second problem centres round the five and a half million Russian Cossacks of Europe and Asia. I am classing them all as Russian, since the seven units dwelling in Asia have throughout the War and the Revolution never broken their allegiance to the Cossacks in European Russia. The position of the Russian Cossacks has been fundamentally influenced by the War and by the Russian Revolution. Acute economic, social, and political problems now confront them, which must react gravely upon Russia itself. As a strictly organized military people, with a male population of nothing but commoners and officers, they have seemed in recent days like a blessed island for the torpedoed, a community whose stability was a certain asset; yet their strength was entirely bound up with the old régime, which they upheld and through which they existed. To remove from their horizon the name and the idea of Tsar and autocracy, and to replace it by the name and idea of the Russian country and nation, would need a political genius greater than has yet appeared during the Russian Revolution.\* The desire of the Cossacks for reforms in the old régime did not go to the length of wishing to change the form of government; but when the great majority of the other people of the country are moving in the direction of establishing a Republic, much might be gained by having the Cossacks with them. They might, of course, be won over in an evolutionary way, but the anarchy produced by the action of the extremists is not favourable soil for evolutionary changes. An essential initial step would be to identify the Cossack interests with the common cause. We know that at the beginning of the Revolution the Cossacks at the front joined the Revolutionaries, but they soon formed a separate all-Cossack party, led by the Don Cossacks, with the all-Cossack Congresses as a means of expressing their opinion. To this action they were led by the spoliation of

\* For a curious confusion of old and new ideas among the Cossacks, see M. Philips Price's article in *Manchester Guardian*, November 29, 1918, "At a Cossack Provincial Assembly."



their land by the Revolutionaries. What actually occurred was a mistake characteristic of revolutionaries everywhere. Instead of raising the landed property of the Russian peasants to the level of that of the Cossacks, the Revolutionaries, jealous of the past privileges of the Cossacks, now threaten to abolish *all* their privileges. The only way to solve the problem of the Cossack communities would be to give them protection without preferential treatment; not to destroy their time-honoured military organization, but to use it as a militia to support the new order, freed from its old lust for conquest. But while modernizing the Cossack communities in this way, it would be very desirable at the same time to revive one of their seventeenth-century traditions—namely, no distinction of classes. Had this tradition been upheld, and the distinction between the two classes of commoner-rankers and noblemen-officers been less sharp, Bolshevism would not have gained such a footing among them, and the historic crisis culminating in the dramatic death of General Kaledin \* might have been avoided.

There remains an economic problem: "How to arrive at a *modus vivendi* between the Cossacks and the Russian peasant village community?" If the Cossacks continue to be used for military service some other compensation ought to be provided for them than grants of enormous stretches of land which they neither can nor wish to cultivate. As to the national separatist feeling, it seems unlikely that this will grow if the other problems are satisfactorily settled.

The most acute of these national questions, directly connected with the Cossack problem, was the question of the Ukraine. But although the Ukrainian Cossacks have helped to preserve a separatist feeling in the Ukraine, their persecution by the Tsars was so effective that there is no longer a question of the Ukrainian Cossacks, but of the Ukrainian nation only. It is difficult to conceive a permanent bond between Germany and the Ukraine against the more natural ties which link her with her neighbours; but should Cossack communities be permanently deprived of the influx of Ukrainian blood, their racial character may become still more Asiatic, with the Great Russian element politically predominant and racially acting as a filter through which various Mongols and "Tatars" pass in the process of becoming Russified.

If oil is to be poured on the troubled waters of the present Russian chaos, it will be by the groups which prove to be the most highly organized, and the sooner the external and internal problems

\* Whether after the Russian Revolution, which one must consider to be still in progress, the report of General Kaledin's death will be confirmed or not is not important, since the true significance lies in the impossibility of his position as a "Hetman" consequent on the spread of Bolshevism among his subordinates.

of the Cossacks are settled, the greater will be the rôle they will play in the remaking of Eastern Europe.

M. A. CZAPLICKA,

*Mary Ewart lecturer in Ethnology in the School of Anthropology of the University of Oxford.*

The CHAIRMAN, after congratulating Miss Czaplicka on the excellence of her paper, stated that opinions differed as to the moral qualities of the Cossack, and quoted Mr. Eugene Schuyler's description of the Orenberg Cossacks as "mild, amiable, and hospitable, the pioneers of Russian civilization, brave, industrious, and enduring." Mackenzie Wallace and others had described the extreme cleanliness and order of the Cossack homes. Personally, he had not had much opportunity of studying them carefully, although he had come across them on the Russian frontier north of Kashghar; again during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78; and still later on the Danube, where there were Cossack patrols along the whole of the Russian bank of that river from Reni to the Black Sea; while at Galatz, where he had resided for some years, was the reputed tomb of the famous Mazeppa. He had also seen the Cossacks fighting against the Turks, and had greatly admired on one occasion their gallant and orderly retreat through three villages when attacked by a vastly superior force of Kurdish cavalry, who in those days were certainly no match for the Cossack.

One great reason for the want of unanimity among the Cossacks at the present time was the land question. The sedentary portion in the towns were inclined to sympathize with the Bolsheviks, while those who lived on the land were anxious to keep what they had possessed for centuries, and resented the inroads and claims of fresh settlers from European Russia, where the holdings were very much smaller than those of the Cossacks.

The Chairman concluded by proposing a cordial vote of thanks to Miss Czaplicka for her most interesting and instructive lecture.

SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE: The Cossack communities varied greatly from each other in character at different times and in different localities, but it may be said, roughly speaking, that the important part which they played in Russian history during many centuries consisted in defending the ever-advancing agricultural population against the frequent raids of the nomadic tribes living beyond the frontier. The villages which they inhabited (called *Stanitsas*) were organized for that purpose. They were always regarded by the Tsar as his subjects, but in early times, when the Khan of the Crimea or the Sultan of Turkey complained of their depredations, they were sometimes described as runaways and outlaws for whose conduct the Moscovite Government was not responsible. In this description there was a small element of truth, because some of them had fled to

the frontier in order to escape punishment, and many of them were inclined to take part in insurrectionary movements in their native country. In later times they were brought thoroughly under control, and incorporated in the national army as a useful irregular force, employed chiefly in the defence of the long southern frontier stretching from the Black Sea to the Far East.

Lieut-Colonel A. C. YATE: A previous speaker remarked that one came across Cossacks everywhere—from the Don to the Amur. My earliest acquaintance with a Cossack was on the walls of my father's dining-room in Yorkshire, when I was a very small boy. His name was Mazeppa—a Pole who became Hetman of the Cossacks. As I first saw him, he was represented in two engravings, after the French painter Vernet, which pictured him bound naked on the back of a horse, and borne at that horse's wild will over steppe and through forest. The story of Mazeppa may be read in the verse of Byron or the prose of Voltaire ("Charles XII."), and in the writings of authors whose names are less familiar to the everyday reader. I have not risen to treat of a subject upon which several of the other speakers have already touched—viz., the ethnology of the Cossack. I would rather take him as a figure in art and literature, such as we find him portrayed in Tolstoi's "Cossacks" and in Sienkiewicz' trilogy, entitled "With Fire and Sword," "The Deluge," and "Pan Michael." The lecturer has already mentioned "Taras Bulba" by Gogol, a book which I have not yet read, but of which I see an English translation has just been published in *Everyman's Library*. The Napoleonic War period abounds in reminiscences of the Cossacks, and in the Baron Munchausen of that period, the Baron de Marbot, vivid pictures of their deeds, and his own, may be sought. As a constituent element of the Tsar's military forces the Cossacks have long been famous. If my memory be correct, I saw the Cossacks of the Guard march past at a Grand Review at Krasnoe Selo in 1890. Of more recent years the Russian Empire, extending its ægis over the mixed races of the Caucasus and Central Asia, has added other Turanian elements to its armies. I remember, at Amu Daryā on the Oxus, when Sir James Hills-Johnes and I were there in October, 1890, General Annenkoff brought up to us a Kirghiz Colonel and introduced him. The motive was plain. It meant: "You are proud of your Indian Army. We, too, have our Tartars, and—you may catch them one day." For the moment that day is over. The Cossack now looks like arraying himself side by side with Indian troops to check Turkish and Teutonic aggression in the East.

Mr. J. F. BADDELEY: I think I can throw some little light on one part of the question that has been raised as to Kirghiz and Kaisak. When the Russians first reached the Yenesei very early in the seventeenth century, and before the date of their first journey across the

Sayan Mountains (1616) to visit the Altin Khan at Ubsa-nor, they found the country on the western bank of the river largely inhabited by various tribes of a people they rightly call Kirghiz. They attempted to bring them under subjection, and exacted *yasak* or tribute in fur; but as the Mongols and afterwards the Kalmuks likewise claimed their allegiance, the unhappy Kirghiz were for more than half a century alternately bullied by all three of these nations. They were frequently at war with the Russians, attacked more than were even Krasnoyarsk and other towns; but eventually trekked south and south-west to the Tarbagatai country and the district west of Issik-kul, where under the name of Buruts, Kamenni (mountain), or Kara (black) Kirghiz, they may still be found. They are undoubtedly near relatives of the Kaisaks, but not identical with them. Of the Kirghiz who wander in former Sungaria an interesting account from personal observation will be found in Mr. Carruthers's "Unknown Mongolia."

Mr. MOON said that Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace's book, which he had taken with him on several Russian expeditions and which he greatly admired, was probably published before Miss Czaplicka was born. He had entered a note in his copy from "The Statesman's Handbook for Russia," edited by the Chancery of the Committee of Ministers (vol. i., p. 123), as follows:

"ST. PETERSBURG, 1896.

"The word 'Cossack' is Turkish, and means a 'freeman,' or 'freelance.' The first Cossacks were settlers of various races on the River Dnieper. . . . Out of this free population in the region of the Dnieper gradually arose a martial Christian Society or Knighthood, calling themselves 'Cherkess' and subsequently 'Cossacks.'"

This doubtless represented the view which it was officially desired to promote or create at that time. The division of Cossacks into Eastern and Western, the former including the Kirghiz, had been unknown to him. Travelling through Siberia in pre-railway days, he was for several days escorted by a succession of Cossacks, who sat beside the driver of his tarantass from stage to stage. These Cossacks had the yellow band round their military cap, but had no Asiatic appearance. At a certain stage his escort forgot, or neglected, to warn a successor, so for some days he was without any such escort and, in consequence probably, was reported in London as lost.

**LIST OF MEMBERS**  
**OF**  
**THE CENTRAL ASIATIC SOCIETY**

*CORRECTED TO APRIL 2, 1918*

# OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

## **Hon. President :**

THE RT. HON. EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G.

## **Chairman of Council :**

1917. COLONEL SIR HENRY TROTTER, K.C.M.G., C.B.

## **Vice-Presidents :**

- 1904. LORD LAMINGTON, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.
- 1905. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.
- 1906. COLONEL SIR THOMAS H. HOLDICH, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B.
- 1908. SIR VALENTINE CHIROL.
- 1913. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, G.C.I.E.
- 1917. THE RT. HON. SIR H. M. DURAND, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

## **Hon. Treasurer :**

1917. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E.

## **Hon. Secretary :**

1916. SIR E. PENTON, K.B.E.

## **Members of the Council :**

- 1915. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.
- 1917. J. F. BADDELEY, ESQ.
- 1915. T. J. BENNETT, ESQ., C.I.E.
- 1916. SIR FREDERIC FRYER, K.C.S.I.
- 1916. COLONEL J. G. KELLY, C.B.
- 1916. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.
- 1916. COLONEL E. ST. CLAIR PEMBERTON, B.E.
- 1916. MISS ELLA SYKES.
- 1917. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.
- 1917. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

## **Assistant Secretary :**

1917. MISS L. B. PHILLIPS.

## LIST OF MEMBERS

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*The names marked with an asterisk are of those who have served on the Council. The names in capitals are those of present Members of Council. Names in italics are those of Councillors resident in India. The names marked with a dagger are those of original Members.*

### A

1910. Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Sahibzada, C.I.E., Assistant Political Officer, Khaiber, Peshawar, N.W.F. Province.  
 †Aglionby, Captain A., Junior Naval and Military Club, 96, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1916. Ainscough, T. M., Lindley Mount, Parbold, near Wigan, Lancs.
1912. Allen, G. B., Free Chase, Warninglid, Sussex.

### B

1908. Baddeley, J. F., 34, Bruton Street, W. 1. M. of C.
1917. Bahrein, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.
1910. Bailey, Captain F. M., 7, Drummond Place, Edinburgh, N.B.
1914. Baillie, J. R., 1, Akenside Road, Hampstead, N.W.
1906. Bailward, Colonel A. C., R.A. (ret.), 1, Prince's Mansions, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
- 10 1916. Baluchistan, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner, Quetta.
1905. \*BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., Woodlands Corner, West Byfleet, Surrey. M. of C.
1913. Barrow, Major-General Sir Edmund, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., India Office, S.W. 1.
1910. Beauclerk, Lord Osborne de Vere, A.D.C. to C-in-C. Advance G.H.Q., and Brooks's Club, 4, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1907. Bann, Colonel R. A. E., C.I.E., Resident, Jeypore, Rajputana, India.
- \*†BENNETT, T. J., C.I.E., Harwarton House, Speldhurst, Kent. M. of C.
1916. Bernière, Col. H. J. de, 115, Jermyn Street, S.W. 1.
1910. Bigg-Wither, Captain F., I.A., Deputy Commr., c/o Messrs. A. Scott and Co., Rangoon, Burma.
1916. Bombay, Sec. to Govt. Political Dept., Bombay, India.  
 Bosanquet, O. V., C.I.E., Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, Indore, C.I.
- 20 1916. †Bruce, General C. D.  
 †Buchanan, W. A., 23, Great Winchester Street, E.C. 2.
1914. Bury, C. Howard, Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.

### C

1907. †Carey, A. D., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1908. \*CHIBOL, Sir Valentine, Kt., 84, Carlyle Square, Chelsea, S.W. 3. Vice-President.

1908. Cox, Lieut.-Col. Sir Percy Z., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Knockrind, Simla.
1914. Crewdson, Wilson, J.P., F.S.A., Southside, St. Leonards-on-Sea.
1914. Crewdson, Major W. T. O., R.F.A., 44th Battery, Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force.
1907. Cuninghame, Sir William J., K.C.S.I., I.C.S. (ret.), Queen Anne's Mansions, S.W. 1.
1907. \*CURZON OF KEDLESTON, The Rt. Hon. Earl, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Hackwood, near Basingstoke, Hants, 1, Carlton House Terrace, S.W. 1 Hon. President.

## D

- 30 1908. Dane, Hon. Sir Louis, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., Clarendon Lodge, Millbrook, Hants.
1908. Daukes, Captain C. T., c/o Thos. Cook and Son, Bombay, India.
- †Dartrey, The Earl of, 10, Upper Belgrave Street, S.W. 1.
1906. Davis, W. S., Bhopal Agency, Sehore, Central India.
1918. Davis, Mrs., 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W.
1908. \*Donoughmore, The Earl of, 5, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1.
1906. Dobbs, H. R. C., C.I.E., I.C.S., Off. Commissioner N.W. Frontier Province, India.
1910. Douglas, Captain H. A., Derwent Lodge, Lansdowne Road, Tunbridge Wells.
1910. Drummond, Miss, Kensington Palace Mansions, W. 8.
1908. \*†Durand, Colonel A. G. A., C.B., C.I.E., 31, Park Lane, W. 1.
- 40 1907. \*DURAND, The Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Penmain House, Rock, Wadebridge, Cornwall. Vice-President.

## E

- †Elphinstone, Lord, Carlton Club, 94, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1911. Etherton, Captain P., Lansdowne, Garhwal, U.P., India.
1918. Evans, T. Herbert, St. David's, Lisvane, Glam.

## F

1907. Fancourt, Col. St. J. F. M., C.B., Deancroft, near Stowmarket, Suffolk.
1915. Flower, Hon. E., Durrow Castle, Durrow, Queen's County, Ireland.
1916. Forbes, Sir George Stuart, K.C.S.I., The Athenaeum Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1915. Fraser, George, Imperial Institute, S. Kensington, S.W. 7.
1916. Fraser, The Hon. Mr. S. M., C.S.I., C.I.E., the Resident, Hyderabad, India.
1906. FRYER, Sir Frederic, K.C.S.I., 23, Elvaston Place, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.

## G

- 50 1908. Gabriel, Vivian, C.V.O., C.S.I., c/o The War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.



1918. Garrard, S. H., Cavalry Club, and Welton Place, Daventry, Northants.  
 1909. Gearon, Miss S., Ladies' Empire Club, 69, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.  
 1908. Godfrey, Lieut.-Col. Stuart H., C.I.E., 7, Lansdowne Road, Holland Park, W. 11.

## H

1904. \*Hart-Davies, T., I.C.S. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.  
 †Hills-Johnes, General Sir James, V.C., G.C.B., Dolaucothy, Llanwrda, R.S.O., South Wales.  
 \*†Holdich, Colonel Sir Thomas H., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., 41, Courtfield Road, S.W. 7. Vice-President.  
 1908. Howell, E. B., I.C.S., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, 28, Chesterton Road, Cambridge.

## I

1916. India, Foreign and Political Department of Government, Delhi.  
 1906. India, Secretary of State for, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.  
 60 1915. Ingram, M. B., Cavendish Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.

## J

- \*†JAMES, Sir Evan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Glenshee, Cambridge Park, Twickenham.  
 †Jardine, Mrs., 25, Nevern Place, S.W. 5.  
 \*†Jardine, W. E., I.C.S., C.I.E., The Residency, Gwalior, Central India.  
 1908. Jennings, Col. R. H., R.E. (ret.), C.S.I., 20, Roland Gardens, S.W.

## K

1907. \*KELLY, Col. J. G., C.B., 1, West Cromwell Road, Kensington, S.W. 5. M. of C.  
 1913. Kemp, Miss, 26, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.  
 †King, Sir H. Seymour, K.C.I.E., 25, Cornwall Gardens, S.W. 7.

## L

1904. \*LAMINGTON, The Rt. Hon. Lord, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., 26, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1. Vice-President.  
 1914. Laurie, W. J. C., I.C.S., c/o The Secretariat, Behar and Orissa, Bhagalpur, India.  
 70 1907. \*Lawrence, Sir Walter, Bart., G.C.I.E., 22, Sloane Gardens, S.W. 1.  
 1908. \*Lloyd, Capt. George A., M.P., D.S.O., 48, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1.

1912. Loeb, Lieutenant P. G., 97th Infantry, c/o Messrs. Cox & Co.,  
Bombay, India.  
1908. Lockhart, Lady, C.I., 187, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.  
1909. Lyall, Captain, R.A., I.A., Parachinar, Kurrum Valley,  
N.W.F. Province, India.

## M

1909. Macartney, Sir George, K.C.I.E., H.B.M. Consul, Kashgar,  
Chinese Turkestan.  
1915. McCoy, Mrs., c/o Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Co., 67, Lombard  
Street, E.C. 3.  
1908. Malcolm, Brigadier-General Neill, D.S.O. -  
1906. McMahon, Lieut.-Colonel Sir H., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., 59,  
Pont Street, S.W. 1.  
1915. Maunsell, Colonel, Constitutional Club, Northumberland  
Avenue, W.C. 2.  
**80** 1912. Medlicott, Captain H., Cavalry Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.  
1910. Miles, Major-Gen. P. J., c/o Lloyds' Bank, Bath.  
1908. Moon, E. R. P., 6, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7. M. of C.  
†Murray, John, M.A., D.L., J.P., F.S.A., 50A, Albemarle  
Street, Piccadilly, W. 1.  
1915. Mylne, Miss Nina, Commonwealth Bank, New Broad Street,  
E.C. 2.  
1916. Mysore, The Hon. the Resident, Bangalore, S. India.

## N

1905. Neill, Professor J. W., I.C.S. (ret.), 10, Holland Park  
Court, Holland Park Gardens, W. 14.  
1916. North-West Frontier Province. The Hon. the Chief Com-  
missioner, Peshawar, India.

## O

1906. O'Connor, Major W. F. T., R.A., C.I.E., H.B.M. Consul,  
Shiraz, Persia.  
1905. Oliver, Captain D. G., 67th Punjabis, Junior United Service  
Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.

## P

- 80** 1908. Payne, Mrs. Wood, 101, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.  
†Peel, The Viscount, 52, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.  
1907. Pemberton, Col., R.E. (ret.), B6, The Albany, Piccadilly,  
W. 1, and Pyrland Hall, Taunton.  
\*†Penton, Sir E., K.B.E., 2, Cambridge Terrace, Regent's  
Park, N.W. 1. *Hon. Sec.*  
†Perowne, J. T. Woolrych.  
1908. Phipson, H., 10, Hyde Park Mansions, N.W. 1.  
\*†Picot, Colonel, Indian Army (ret.), Hotel Beau Séjour,  
Lausanne.

## R

1910. Raines, Lady, 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.  
 1916. Rajputana, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General,  
 The Residency, Mount Abu, Rajputana, India.  
 1912. Richmond, Mrs. Bruce, 3, Sumner Place, S.W.  
 100 \*†RONALD SHAY, H.E. THE EARL OF, Governor of Bengal,  
 Government House, Calcutta, India. Vice-President.  
 1914. Rose, Archibald, C.I.E., 46, Abingdon Villas, Kensington,  
 W. 8.

## S

1918. Salvati, Signor M. N., Via Lamarmora 41, Torino, Italy.  
 †Sandbach, General A. E., D.S.O., R.E., Naval and Military  
 Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.  
 1916. Spranger, John Alfred, 2nd. Lieut. R.E., 4, Via Michele,  
 Florence, Italy.  
 1912. Stainton, B. W., c/o Messrs. Hickie, Borman, Grant & Co.,  
 14, Waterloo Place, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.  
 1909. Stein, Sir Aurel, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., D.Sc. Superin-  
 tendent Arch. Survey, Frontier Circle, N.W.F. Province,  
 India.  
 1910. Stirling, Capt. H. F. D., 59th Sind Rifles, Frontier Force,  
 Chitral, N.W.F. Province, India.  
 1907. Stokes, Major C. B., 3rd Skinner's Horse, Military Attaché  
 at Teheran, 50, Marlborough Hill, N.W. 8.  
 1908. Stoner, J. J., 19, Kensington Court, W. 8.  
 110 †Sykes, Miss Ella E., Elcombs, Lyndhurst, Hants.  
 1905. Sykes, Miss Ethel R., Elcombs, Lyndhurst, Hants.  
 1904. Sykes, H. R., Longnor Hall, Leebotwood, Shrewsbury.  
 1907. Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy, K.C.I.E., C.M.G.,  
 Shiraz, via Petrograd and Teheran.

## T

1908. Tanner, Miss, 8, Cavendish Place, Bath.  
 1908. Taylor, Arthur Boddam, 96, Brook Green, W. 6.  
 1905. Thomas, F. W., Ph.D., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.  
 1908. Tod, Colonel J. K., Indian Army, 7th Haryana Lancers,  
 Jacobabad, Sind, India.  
 1907. Trevor, Sir Arthur, K.C.S.I., 16, Harcourt Terrace, Redcliffe  
 Square, S.W. 10.  
 1907. \*TROTTER, Col. Sir H., K.C.M.G., C.B., 18, Eaton Place,  
 S.W. 1. Chairman.  
 120 1915. Tryon, Capt. H. W., J.P. (late Gordon Highlanders), 32,  
 Hans Mansions, S.W. 1.  
 1908. \*TUCKER, A. L. P., C.I.E., Hayes, Northiam, Sussex. M. of C.

## V

1905. Vanderbyl, P. B., B4, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.

## W

1911. Waller, Miss D., 82, Knightsbridge, S.W. 1.  
1911. Waller-Sawyer, Mrs., 82, Knightsbridge, S.W., and Moystown House, Belmont, King's Co., Ireland.  
†Walton, Sir Joseph, M.P., Reform Club, 104, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.  
1905. Watson, Major John William, I.M.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay, Groome and Co., Bombay.  
†Whitbred, S. H., 11, Mansfield Street, W. 1.  
1916. Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel James Allan, D.S.O., 8th Gurkhas, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Calcutta, India.  
1912. Woods, H. C., 171, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.

## Y

- \*†YATE, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur C., Beckbury Hall, Shifnal, Shropshire. M. of C.  
1905. \*Yate, Colonel C. E., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P., 17, Prince of Wales Terrace, W. 8.  
1916. Yorke, Mrs. F., Ladies' Imperial Club, 17, Dover Street, W. 1, and Hotel Cecil, Western Parade, Southsea.  
\*†YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut. - Col. Sir Francis E., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., 3, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1. Vice-President.

R U L E S  
OF  
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

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1. THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY was founded in 1901 for the encouragement of interest in Central Asia by means of lectures, the reading of papers, and discussions.

2. Persons who desire to join the Society shall be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and shall then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible.

3. The Secretary shall in all cases inform Members of their election.

4. The Annual Subscription of Members shall be £1.

5. The Council shall have power to remit subscriptions in special cases in which such remission shall appear expedient.

6. All subscriptions are due on election, and thereafter annually, but if the election takes place in November or December, the second annual payment will not become due till the expiration of the succeeding year; thus if a person be elected in November, his second subscription will not be due till the second January following.

7. Every person elected a Member of the Society shall make the payment due thereon within two calendar months after the date of election, or if abroad within six months after election; otherwise the election shall be void unless the Council in any particular case shall extend the period within which such payments are to be made.

8. Annual subscriptions shall be due on the tenth day of January in each year; and in case the same shall not be paid by the end of the month, the Treasurer or Secretary shall be authorized to demand the same. If any subscriptions remain unpaid at the Anniversary Meeting of the Society, the Treasurer shall apply by letter to those Members who are in arrear. If the arrears be not discharged by the 1st of January following such application, the Member's name as a defaulter shall be suspended in the meeting room, and due notice be given to the Member in question of the same. The name shall remain suspended, unless in the interval the arrears be discharged, until the Anniversary Meeting next ensuing, when, if the subscription be not paid, the defaulter will cease to be a Member of the Society.

9. A Member, who is not in arrears, may at any time resign his

membership by notice in writing, but such notice of resignation must reach the Secretary before the 1st of January, otherwise the subscription for the current year will be payable.

10. A Member's resignation shall not be valid, save by a resolution of the Council, until he has paid up all his arrears of subscription; failing this he will be considered as a defaulter, and dealt with in accordance with Rule 8.

11. The Officers of the Society shall be: (1) The Honorary President, (2) the Chairman of the Council, (3) six Vice-Presidents, (4) the Honorary Treasurer, and (5) the Honorary Secretary, all of whom must be Members of the Society. In addition to these there shall be an Assistant Secretary.

12. The Chairman shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for one year from the date of his election. He shall be eligible for re-election on the expiration of his tenure of office.

13. The Honorary President shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for five years, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for four years. Two shall retire annually by rotation, and not be eligible for re-election as such until after the expiration of one year. They are eligible on retirement for re-election on the the Council.

13a. The Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting, on the nomination of the Council, for two years, and are eligible for re-election.

14. The Assistant Secretary shall hold office during the pleasure of the Council.

15. The Chairman, as head of the Society, shall have the general supervision of its affairs. He will preside at Meetings of the Council, conduct the proceedings, give effect to resolutions passed, and cause the Rules of the Society to be put in force. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees, and may at any time summon a Meeting of the Council.

16. The Honorary Treasurer shall receive all moneys, and shall account for them. He shall not make any payments (other than current and petty cash expenses) without the previous order of the Council. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees. He shall exercise a general supervision over the expenditure of the Society, and shall prepare and submit to the Auditors at the expiration of each year a statement showing the receipts and expenditure of the Society for the period in question. All cheques must be signed by him, or in his absence any Member of the Council acting for him.

17. The Honorary Secretary shall, in the absence of the Chairman,

exercise a general control over the affairs of the Society, and shall, *ex officio*, be a Member of Council and of all Committees.

18. The Honorary Secretary shall attend the Meetings of the Society and of the Council and record their proceedings. He shall conduct the correspondence and attend to the general business of the Society, and shall attend at the Rooms of the Society at such times as the Council may direct. He shall superintend the persons employed by the Society, subject to the general control of the Council. He shall be competent on his own responsibility to discharge small bills, but any account exceeding the amount of Five Pounds shall, except in cases of great urgency, be submitted for approval to the Council before payment. He shall have the charge, under the general direction of the Council, of printing and publishing the Transactions of the Society.

19. The Assistant Secretary shall act generally under the orders of the Hon. Secretary, and if at any time the latter is prevented by illness or any other cause from attending to the duties of his office, the Assistant Secretary shall act in his absence; but in the case of prolonged absence the Council shall have power to make such special arrangements as may at the time be considered expedient.

20. There shall be a Council consisting of the Vice-Presidents and twelve Members of the Society, exclusive of the Chairman but inclusive of the Honorary Officers of the Society.

21. The Members of Council as aforesaid shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting on the nomination of the Chairman in Council, subject to any amendment of which due notice has been given, as provided in Rule 23.

22. There shall be prepared and forwarded to every Member in Great Britain, together with the notice as to the Anniversary Meeting, a list containing the names of persons so nominated to serve on the Council for the ensuing year, together with any other names, should they be proposed and seconded by other Members, a week's notice being given to the Secretary. The List of Members nominated as aforesaid shall be first put to the Meeting, and, if carried, the amendments (if any) shall not be put.

23. Of the Members of Council other than those referred to in Rules 12 and 13—*i.e.*, the Officers—three shall retire annually by seniority. They shall be eligible for re-election.

24. Should any vacancy occur among the Honorary Officers or other Members of Council during the interval between two Anniversary Meetings, such vacancy may be filled up by the Council.

25. The Ordinary Meetings of Council shall be held not less than once a month from November to June inclusive.

26. Special Meetings of Council may be summoned under the

sanction of the Chairman, or in his absence by a circular letter from the Secretary.

27. Three Members of the Council shall constitute a quorum.

28. At Meetings of Council the Chair shall be taken by the Chairman, and in his absence the Senior Member present shall take the Chair. The decision of any matter shall rest with the majority, and in case of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote in addition to his ordinary vote.

29. Committees may be appointed by the Council to report on specific questions, and unless otherwise stated three shall form a quorum. Such Committees shall be authorized to consult persons not members of the Society.

30. Ordinary General Meetings are for hearing and discussing papers and for addresses, but no resolutions other than votes of thanks for papers read shall be passed at such meetings except by permission of the Chairman.

31. Special General Meetings are for considering and dealing with matters of importance, such as the making or amendment of its Rules, or questions seriously affecting its management and constitution. No business shall be transacted at such meetings except that for which they are summoned, and of which notice has been given.

32. The Anniversary Meeting for receiving and considering the Annual Report of the Council and Auditors, and dealing with the recommendations contained therein for the appointment of Members of the Council and Officers for the ensuing year, and for hearing the President's Address (if any), and deliberating generally on the affairs of the Society, shall be held in June of each year. But no resolution seriously affecting the management or position of the Society, or altering its Rules, shall be passed unless due notice shall have been given in the manner prescribed for Special General Meetings.

33. Ordinary Meetings shall be convened by notice issued to accessible Members, and as a general rule they shall be held on the first Wednesday in each month from November to May, both inclusive, the Wednesday of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas weeks being excepted. At such meetings, and also at the Anniversary Meeting, but not at special General Meetings, each Member of the Society shall have the privilege of introducing, either personally or by card, two visitors.

34. Ten Members shall form a quorum.

The Accounts shall be audited annually by an Auditor nominated by the Council. The employment of a professional Auditor shall be permissible. The Report presented by the Auditor shall be read at the next ensuing Anniversary Meeting.



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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. V.

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1918

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PARTS III. AND IV.

PUBLISHED BY  
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY  
22, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

# OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

## Hon. President:

THE RT. HON. EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

## Chairman of Council:

1917. COLONEL SIR HENRY TROTTER, K.C.M.G., C.B.

## Vice-Presidents:

1904. LORD LAMINGTON, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.

1905. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I.

1906. COLONEL SIR THOMAS H. HOLDICH, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B.

1908. SIR VALENTINE CHIROL.

1913. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, M.P.

1917. THE RT. HON. SIR H. M. DURAND, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., ETC.

## Hon. Treasurer:

1917. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E.

## Hon. Secretary:

1918. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

## Members of the Council:

1917. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.

1915. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I.

1915. T. J. BENNETT, ESQ.

1916. SIR FREDERIC FRYER, K.C.S.I.

1916. COLONEL J. G. KELLY, C.B.

1916. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.

1917. J. F. BADDELEY, ESQ.

1918. COLONEL A. C. BAILWARD.

1918. CAPTAIN GEORGE A. LLOYD, M.P., D.S.O.

## Assistant Secretary:

1917. MISS L. B. PHILLIPS.

## THE MOSLEM PROBLEM IN CHINA

By REGINALD FARRER

At a meeting of the Society on April 17, 1918, with Colonel Sir Henry Trotter in the chair, Mr. Reginald Farrer gave a lecture on "The Mahomedan Problem in China." He said :

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—The first part of my address must take the form, to a certain extent, of apologies, because, perhaps, I have chosen almost too ambitious a title for my lecture ; and what I propose to tell you about to-day is really more the record of my own personal observations and experiences among the various ethnological problems presented on the western borders of China. These matters, the Mohammedan Rebellion and so forth, you will find dealt with *in extenso* in other and more learned works. All I have to give you to-day is, as I say, the record of the troubles and the remarks that a traveller has occasion to make and to meet with in the course of exploration on the rather devious and difficult frontiers that separate China from Tibet—the frontiers of Kansu.

I journeyed from Peking in the very early spring of 1914, and worked my way through the southern borders of Kansu, up to Lanchow, and thus in 1915 up through the Alps by the Koko Nor, and then towards the end of the year down through Lanchow once more to Chung K'ing, on the Yangtse Chiang, and then back to what is called civilization.

Though the province of Kansu is all bravely marked China on the map, you have to remember that all the western side may be described as more Tibetan than Chinese. The map makes hard-and-fast lines, but the populations do not. If I wanted to describe the country to you roughly, I should say that where the mountains begin China leaves off, and that the Chinese, an eminently practical people, abandon the whole country, the worthless Alps, to the Tibetan population, who alone can make use of it.

As you know, the great Tibetan highland breaks down into China in a succession of enormous mountain ranges running, roughly, parallel to each other. (And I would like to say here in parenthesis that the map, like all the maps of Central China, is very largely erroneous.) The mountain ranges break down above the Blackwater River and above the Whitewater River, and then again in successive chains northward,

after which there are no more until you get the further descending range of the K'un-lun up north. All this country is Tibetan. Lower down you get a belt which runs through Yunnan and Szechwan, of the Mohammedan populations on which I am addressing you to-day.

As I told you, I do not propose to give you the history—which nobody knows—of the Mohammedan populations in Kansu, Yunnan, and Szechwan. I have no experience of Yunnan or Szechwan; but the legend goes that in the ninth century one of the Emperors of the T'ang Dynasty imported a body of Turkish mercenaries to fight for him, and that they gave, as mercenaries frequently do, trouble to the Central Government; that, after a great deal of difficulty and diplomacy, that band of Turkish mercenaries was settled on the remote borders of the Tibetan-Chinese frontier, where they have increased and multiplied for several centuries at such a rate as now to constitute a very serious menace to the Chinese Central Authority; for the Tibetans and the Chinese themselves are already on the worst possible terms. And when you add to this a very large population, amounting in Kansu, Yunnan, and Szechwan alone to more than thirty million of people, roughly speaking, who are on the very worst possible terms, not only with the Tibetans, but with the Chinese Authorities themselves, you will then gather that there is material for a very important and very serious cleavage to be made in the Government of the Chinese Empire. Europeans, perhaps, know too little, for the thing was far away and out of our time, of the history of the great Mohammedan Rebellion that filled the reigns of the Emperors Tao Kuang and Hsien Feng, and which was only extinguished, with great difficulty and after incalculable loss of life, during the first reign of the Empress-Dowager. What people do not realize is that all down the western border of Kansu and right down through Yunnan and Szechwan there exists this gigantic Mohammedan population, assimilated in many ways to the Chinese, but always at enmity with them, and always preparing, day by day, month by month, for a new outbreak which will repeat, equal and very likely surpass the appalling horrors of the Great Rebellion which only ended in 1877. Of that Rebellion the echoes still linger, and all up the country above Lanchow you will find the towns and villages, even to this day, still laid waste; and though the flood of the Chinese population is perpetually creeping back, yet it will take many years before the harm done by the Mohammedan Rebellion is wiped out, and before that happy date there is every reason to suppose that a new Mohammedan outbreak may take place. Which reminds me to give you another caution with regard to anything I may have to say to you. My own experiences are confined to the years 1914 and 1915, and though we say that the East and Asia never change, yet in those two years so much water has run under so many bridges, and so much of that which is thicker than water has run also, that who knows but the conditions on the Chinese-Tibetan frontier may be changed by now in a way that

I have not in my power to tell you, because from that very remote part of the world no news ever penetrates, and it remains a matter of doubt whether even the Central Authorities can be as fully aware as they should of the ever-changing conditions attending the problem of the Central Asiatic populations. This I will say before I come to the tale of my own adventures: that when you go up on to the remote borders where China and Tibet meet on the northern frontier, and you come in conflict also with the Mohammedan populations, you then realize that there are, so to speak, three dominant personalities with whom—I am speaking now for 1914-1915—you have to reckon. One of them is old and ailing; the second is remote geographically; the third is now remote, not only in geography, but in history. And each one of them corresponds to one of the three races involved in this vague and troubled corner of the world.

The first is Ma-an-liang, the old leader of the Mohammedan populations; he who signed the truce between the Chinese and the Mohammedans which is supposed only to last for his lifetime. He, though I never met him, is reported to be, as I say, old, and also, I regret to say, stupid; but he is the acknowledged leader of the Mohammedan populations in Western Kansu, and on his life hangs the peace between China and Mohammedanism. Not only that, but so definitely does that peace depend upon his life, that even now, during his declining days, or when I was there, the young bloods of the Mohammedan population were daily sharpening their swords in anticipation of the moment when his death should set them free to fly once again at the throat of the Chinese Empire.

The second personality on that northern border is, of course, his holiness the Dalai Lama. And the third, and, even to this day, you might say the most vital and the most dominant of all, is the Grand Dowager-Empress of China. One has to reach the remote extremities of the Empire to realize what a strong seal that tremendous personality has put upon the future of her race. We read "Lives" of the Empress-Dowager which give the different aspects of her character and diplomacy, but it is only when you get into the hinterlands of her dominion that you begin to understand what power she wielded, and still wields even to this day, though dead and buried nearly ten years since.

The Grand Dowager—to give her the title with which she died—as people do not sufficiently realize, had two distinct and different reigns. During the minorities of the Emperors T'ung Chih and Kuang-Hsu she reigned as Empress-Regent, but in 1898, in self-defence and in defence of the Empire, she executed the *coup d'état* which made her for the last ten years of her reign not only Empress-Regent, but virtually Empress-Rgnant. And it is by the record of her last ten years of sovereignty that the Grand Dowager must be judged; and behind all

the petty tittle-tattle, behind the dust and the scandal and personal gossip and the various passions engendered by the currents of her diplomacy, you get the impression, overwhelmingly stronger as you advance in the wilds of the country, of the great and dominant character.

It was under the first reign of the Empress-Dowager that the Mohammedan Rebellion was brought to a conclusion, and it was by the energy of the Grand Dowager in her second reign that peace was restored upon the border and the various troubled populations were brought at last to heel. The years from 1898 to 1908 were marked all up the western borders of China by a great Imperialist outburst, effected by the Grand Dowager. The Viceroy of Szechwan, Jao-erh Fêng, was directed to produce law and order throughout the lawless monasteries and throughout the Mohammedan populations stretching up Western Szechwan and Western Kansu. And even to this day (I am speaking, as I remind you, of 1914-1915, for now that China has once more been thrown into the cauldron, who knows what the lot of the traveller might be ?) the result of the firm policy of the last years of the Grand Dowager's rule has been that law and order, perhaps for the first time in history, reign supreme up the borders of Kansu, and that the foreign traveller, armed with a passport from the Central Authorities, is safer and better looked after under the name of the Grand Dowager-Empress than he would be in any European country—certainly now, and I would say even before the days of the war.

I use the name of the Grand Dowager advisedly, because to this moment, up and down the border, it is her name that carries sway. You must not do this, you must not do that, to this moment, because it would be displeasing to the great Dowager-Empress. Wherever you go you meet the name ; in every little village and in every little town that authority still holds sway ; you cannot escape from it. And though people are well aware that she is dead and gone—for even up there there are changes and chances in the various cross-currents of modern Chinese government—yet it is still the shadow of the old Imperial authority that rules, and it is the memory of those last ten years of the firm and efficient personal government directed by the Grand Dowager that still guarantees the security and peace of the traveller and the native all up and down the Tibetan March and throughout the Mohammedan populations of Western Kansu. Even on the very edge of the border, in the little town of Siku, which is within some three miles of what is called the Tibetan frontier, to this moment, so far as I know, the half-dozen vagabonds, clothed in rags, who represent the Chinese garrison are still clothed and armed in the shabbiest and weirdest panoply of the old Imperial house. Though the population may do homage to the new authorities, yet it is always with the thought at the back of their minds of the old Imperial tradition. I need hardly

remind members of the Society that it was in Northern China that the new Imperialist movement had its strength, and that it was on North China's support that the late President, Yuan Shih k'ai, attempted to rear his perilous and precarious throne.

I talked to you of law and order, but in point of fact the year in which I first adventured up upon the borders of Kansu and Tibet was not a year favourable to law and order at all, for, as if for a forecast of coming events, the beginning of 1914 was marked by storms sweeping across China which, though they were relegated in the papers to small paragraphs of tiny print at the bottom of the main columns, yet, I can assure you, when you were in the country and travelling between storm-blast and storm-blast, were a very serious consideration not only to one's comfort, but to one's life. I am talking now of the White Wolf Rebellion which started towards the close of 1913, and in 1914 devastated the internal provinces of China in a way which perhaps the British public to this moment has no fair idea of. At least, I know for my own part that when I was in London, and even when I was in Peking, the White Wolf Rebellion sounded a curious, rather interesting, rather remote thing that one need never have any personal concern with. But as soon as I reached the centre of China, and all through the six months of the summer, I found that the White Wolf Rebellion was a very serious thing to reckon with. The Rebellion of the Bei Lang started down in Honan. There are many legends as to the personality of the White Wolf himself. There seem to have been, so far as I could collect, like Cerberus, "several gentlemen of the same name," but the main legend attaches to a certain official who was disappointed of the Viceroyalty of Honan, and accordingly started out on a rather aimless rebellion of his own. In course of time that rebellion developed into very large proportions, and it devastated the provinces of Honan and Hupeh and threatened the province of Shensi. When I arrived in Sian-Fu the Rebellion of the White Wolf was sweeping up the course of the Han River to the capital of Shensi, the Viceroy not knowing what to do, the troops half of them disaffected and the remainder not to be trusted from the point of view of courage or adequate ammunition. I succeeded, by dint of mere diplomacy, in leaving the town and escaping westwards towards the Tibetan border, and I was the last foreigner who was allowed out of the gates of Sian-Fu. After my departure the White Wolf Rebellion surged up into Shensi and occupied the whole southern province, with the sole exception of the capital itself, which, like a great walled island, stood intact and isolated in the midst of the surging waves of rebellion.

Meanwhile, I had gone westwards over the Tibetan border into the mountains of the Tibetan highland, secure in the confidence that the White Wolf and his minions would never by any possibility succeed in invading Kansu; that he neither wished to nor had the power. I need

hardly tell you after that that the first thing he did was to do so. Towards the end of April the White Wolf Rebellion swept up round the western corner of the Tsinling Range, passed out of Szechwan into Kansu, and within the first three weeks it laid waste and destroyed twenty-three walled cities in the southern half of the province, and was advancing upon the capital, Lanchow. I meanwhile was safe, or more or less safe, across the Tibetan frontier, where, to give you an idea of how careful the Chinese Government—as I say, by the tradition of the last ten years of the Grand Dowager—is of the welfare and comfort of foreigners, though the Viceroy and all the officials had their hands filled to overflowing with the perils and problems of the White Wolf Rebellion, yet all the time they found occasion to harry the wretched local Governors yet further out of their wits by perpetual inquiries as to two foreigners who had escaped out of the storm over into the borders of Tibet (where yet further storms were raging with which I will not trouble you to-day).

Meanwhile, I pursued my course in and out between the rebellious populations of the border, and the White Wolf Rebellion swept up into Kansu. We now come once more to the Mohammedan population. I have told you that all up the western borders of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kansu there stretches this vast body of Mohammedans, hating the Chinese, hating the Tibetans, but willing to make common cause with the Tibetans against the Chinese, and sometimes with the Chinese against the Tibetans. It became there a question of practical politics which side the Mohammedan population would take during the course of the White Wolf Rebellion. I may tell you that all the soldiers of the army in Kansu, a very large proportion even of the bodyguard of the Viceroy of Lanchow, are composed of Mohammedans; and for a long time it remained doubtful, while the White Wolves were laying waste the walled cities in the southern province, what course the official troops in the employment of the Chinese Government would take. Kansu is a province really divided into two halves. Immediately south of Lanchow run the last few mountain ranges, the feeble outliers of the great Tibetan highland in which the Hoang-ho and the Yangtse Chiang are born, and thus the northernmost ranges of those mountains are the last defences of the northern half of the province. The White Wolf swept up from the south, ravishing, burning, and destroying; he came into conflict with both elements of the population; he even threatened the great Buddhist monastery of Jo-ni, which, after Labrang and Urga, is perhaps the most important point of Lamaism in North Central Asia. The White Wolf armies, amounting to some twenty or thirty thousand men, poured up through the various passes and openings from Szechwan towards Lanchow and Taichow, Old and New, both of them strongholds of the Mohammedan populations. Yet a little higher up we come to Hochow, which is of all the cities in



Kansu the essentially Mohammedan city, so intensely and essentially Mohammedan, indeed, that no Chinese dare trust himself in Hochow unprotected. Beyond that, again, there are the Tibetans, with the abbeys of Gumbum, Jo-ni, and Labrang. Labrang, though not sufficiently realized, is the important storm-centre of North Central Asia ; it is the largest Lamaist monastery outside Lhasa. It contains at a minimum some 12,000 monks ; it has eight living Buddhas ; it has a corresponding complement of high ecclesiastical officials, and ever since its foundation, rather less than a hundred years ago, Labrang, with its population and its temperament, has been the most turbulent element with which the Chinese have had to deal all up the northern border. Over Urga and over Lhasa the Chinese Government has asserted a dim authority, more definitely recognized than definitely exercised. But Labrang, hidden as it is in the folds of the enormous Alps, is a point of which the Chinese themselves openly own they are afraid. Foreigners have been there, and in the annals of the Royal Geographical Society accounts can be found of the abbey itself. But it is not a point to which the Chinese will allow a foreigner to go, because they know that their power of protection fails as soon as they enter the atmosphere and environment of Labrang. In 1914-1915, in their hostility to the Chinese Government, the Tibetan monastery and the Mohammedan soldiers were making common cause, so that even more than ever Labrang was considered by the Governors a great centre of peril.

In case you wish to understand the Government, I will point out that the Viceroyalty of Kansu has its centre at Lanchow ; the Viceroyalty of the Koko Nor, which is an advance post of Northern Tibet, has its official seat out beyond Dangar, in a lonely little crumbling mud-walled town, within sight of the lonely desolations of the great Salt Sea, which is called the Koko Nor. But very long ago the Chinese Governors discovered that living there was very uncomfortable and very dangerous. Therefore Si-ning Fu, which is the centre of the Governorship of the border, also became the centre of the Viceroyalty of Koko Nor ; that is, the Governors of the Koko Nor live now, or in my time, securely and comfortably within the walls of Si-ning Fu. You were not supposed to know it ; the Chinese Government was not supposed to know it ; nobody was supposed to know. There they lived in the full state of the Chinese Viceroyalty. They have to deal with the Mongolian tribes up north and with the Tibetan tribes all round Koko Nor. The Governor of Kansu has to deal with the Mohammedan problem down the province and with the insurgent Tibetans up the western border.

Meanwhile, the White Wolf Rebellion advanced, sacking and burning and devastating the whole southern province, until they arrived at Minchow. They then moved up north, still unattacked, towards Taochow the Old and the New. There was a legend that Old Taochow

had never been captured in the four hundred years and more of its history, and therefore, to the Chinese mind, that was quite sufficient reason for supposing that Taochow would never be captured. Accordingly, the whole population, Mohammedan and Chinese, for many miles round took refuge within the walls of Taochow on the approach of the White Wolf. The White Wolf army advanced to the gates, met a feeble defence, which gradually became more bitter and more fierce, but was in any case ineffectual; and at the end of April, 1914, the White Wolf troops swept Taochow from end to end to such effect that only one house was left standing in the city from wall to wall, and even that only by accident. The White Wolves destroyed every living thing they could find, down to the dogs and cats in the streets. And the streets were stacked so high with carrion that for many weeks nobody could approach the place. And meanwhile the Mohammedan troops still sat securely upon the mountains to the immediate north, barring advance on the capital, but doing no more. Nobody knows exactly why the city was sacked with so unparalleled a ferocity. The White Wolf Rebellion had destroyed in horrible circumstances many another city, but the destruction of Taochow ranks as the very darkest of his achievements in the way of horror. There remains a legend that many years since some ancestor of the White Wolf, or one of the many gentlemen of that name, was murdered by a Mohammedan in Taochow, and lies to this day buried in the graveyard of the Prince of Jo-ni farther down the river. That and that alone was held by the Chinese to account for the extraordinary ferocity with which the city was destroyed. In any case, the whole town was wiped out; and still the Mohammedan troops on the mountains made no move. However, the destruction of Taochow, which, as I have told you, was a Mohammedan town, was too much for the troops on guard in the province, and at last they descended from their mountain heights; they occupied the ruined city, and within twenty-four hours the White Wolf army broke and scattered as a cloud scatters before the wind, breaking backwards in utter disaster down towards the southern province, where the whole rebellion faded out in complete rout and vanished. The Mohammedans had moved, indeed, too late to save their own people, and it will give you an idea of the temper of that warlike population when I tell you that when all was lost and the city in the hands of the White Wolves the Mohammedans in the town gathered themselves together in their mosque and set fire to it, and there they all perished together, men, women, and children, rather than fall into the hands of the Chinese invaders.

So much for the destruction of Taochow. When I followed on the track of the White Wolf some two months later he had done his worst, and broken away to the south again and disappeared. The whole

movement—and this seems hard for us to understand—appears to have been, so far as one can gather, entirely without motive, entirely without serious purpose. At one moment it was thought that the leading White Wolf might have a serious dynastic purpose, and might meditate establishing a northern throne in China. Hardly had he fallen than there appeared upon the scene in Kansu a candidate of the old dynasty of the Sung Emperors, who, when I arrived in Lanchow in the winter of 1914, had duly been captured and was there imprisoned in a cage preparatory to being sent up to Peking as a present from the Viceroy of Kansu to his cousin, Yuan Shih k'ai.

The first year of my travels, as you may well imagine, was a year of storm, from which, even among the murderous proclivities of the Tibetan monks across the border, one was comparatively safe from the troubles and storms of the Mohammedan and Chinese struggles. But the second year was entirely different in character, and I was able to see more of the Mohammedan populations themselves, and of pacified China in the district north of the Koko Nor.

All these mountain ranges belong to China, though inhabited by Tibetans and by aboriginal tribes; and lying as they do between the great Chinese high roads, one of which goes up from Lanchow to Hami, Urumtsi, and Kashgar, the other from Si-ning down to Lhasa, are so close to Chinese authority that neither Mohammedans or Tibetans are in any humour to rebel against it. We are accustomed, perhaps, to think too lightly of the weight and majesty of the Chinese Empire. In many ways the Chinese Government offers food for ridicule; but we have to remember, and more than ever nowadays, that the Chinese Empire is the oldest civilised force in the world (and if you were to tell me it was the only civilized force I should not quarrel with you). Anyhow, it has four thousand years of definite existence to its credit, and, what is more, there is every sign of its continuing for another four, or forty, thousand years. As somebody has said of the Church of England, it moves with a foot of lead in a velvet shoe; it moves slowly, but it moves exceeding surely. And though Mohammedans and Tibetans may raise their bloody rebellions and lay waste whole provinces of the Empire, and though brigands of the Empire may do the same, yet sooner or later, slowly and inexorably, China flows back again and is never conquered; always returns, wipes out the invader, swamps him in the enormous weight of her population and her organization, and that magnificent machinery which, however corrupt in personnel, is still the greatest machinery of government, that a human race has ever organized. This country is a peaceful land, therefore, by comparison with the mountain countries all up the border, where, as I have forgotten to tell you, you have not only the Chinese and the Mohammedans, but you also have the various little local Tibetan principalities, ranging up and down the border, each

one of them quasi-independent, each one of them nominally owning allegiance to China, each one of them doing as best what pleases itself. People think of Tibet rather too much as they might think of the Papal States; they think of the Dalai Lama as a sovereign ruler over a whole unified country, with a definite hard-and-fast power. In point of fact, the Dalai Lama is no such thing. He is the spiritual head of all who follow the Lamaist or the northern school of Buddhism. But he is very far from being the undisputed temporal autocrat that people imagine when they talk of Tibet as being under his sway. I have found that to my cost, for these monasteries and the principalities up the border, many weeks' journey removed from Lhasa, may be under the authority of the Dalai Lama in matters spiritual, but in matters temporal a letter from the Dalai Lama would be as little use to you in travelling up there as a letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Pope of Rome. They run, in the words of the player, their own show, and they care as little for the Dalai Lama on the one hand as they do for the Emperor of China on the other—or, at least, as they did, until the old Grand Dowager-Empress at last demurred, put her foot down, called the Dalai Lama to heel, and reduced the Tibetan Marches into a real semblance of order for almost the first time in the history of the Manchu Dynasty. The Dalai Lama has, of course, his weight in Chinese politics; he is recognized as the head of that large web of Buddhism which runs through the Chinese nation, and, of course, is dominant all up the border. Of himself personally I have little to say. I never had the privilege of seeing him, but I have travelled in his tracks; I have seen the impression that he made upon the population of China, and I have seen the traces of his passage on the roads. For be it known that the Dalai Lama is a Pontiff of such supreme sanctity that he may never pass under a gateway. All the way up from Lanchow to Si-ning Fu you will find the little red gateways decapitated in order that the Dalai Lama might go through without suffering a speck upon his sacrosanctity. When he reached the city of Si-ning Fu, where the walls are vastly solid and the expense of demolishing them would have been too great, he had to be lifted over them in a basket. When he reached Peking the problem became even more urgent. However, he realized that the immediate neighbourhood of the Great Dowager-Empress was no very comfortable place for the indulgence of ecclesiastical airs and graces, and accordingly the supreme Pontiff of Northern Buddhism solved the problem by entering the Imperial city in a train.

Si-ning Fu is situated almost on the very borders of Tibet. There, again, you meet the results of the Mohammedan Rebellion, and you see all through that country the devastation which was brought about by that Rebellion. Of half a dozen little towns you will find five still uninhabited, desolate, and ruined, the remaining sixth gradually creeping back to life under the returning influx of the

Chinese population. You cannot look from the walls of Si-ning itself without seeing in every direction the signs of the destruction wrought in that fearful Rebellion, and all the time I was there, from 1914-1915, we had the sensation of a new rebellion perpetually brooding.

I told you that the truce between the Chinese and Mohammedans depends upon the life of Ma-an-liang, and it may have ended now; but in any case the whole air was dark with the brooding of a coming storm, and one knew that it was merely a matter of, it may be, months or years before once more the forces of the Mohammedans were let loose against the Chinese Empire, with the usual result, no doubt, of appalling massacres, unheeded over here in the story of yet more massacres nearer home; but to be followed in time, no doubt, with the everlasting reflux of the Chinese Empire. You will see at once, without my telling you, what a chance the existence of this population gives to anybody who may wish to breed trouble in Europe at second or third hand by stirring up the Mohammedan population against the Chinese. In other words, you will ask me, probably, what signs I saw of any anti-British or anti-Allied feeling, or of any German propaganda or German feeling, among the Mohammedan population. I tried during 1915, when I had grown aware of the conditions in Europe, to find out what the point of view was that the Mohammedan population took in Western Kansu, and I must honestly say that I found there nothing but a strong Allied sympathy. There was no trace of German propaganda there then; what there may be now I cannot tell you, but I should believe that the country and the people offered little ground for such. The Military Governor of Si-ning, the Military Governor of Lanchow, and the Governors of all these towns, were Mohammedan, and every one showed a very un-Chinese interest in weapons, war pictures, and all the stories one could tell them of our prowess and the general conduct of the war. But of any pro-Turkish, of any distinctive Moslem feeling, of any fanaticism about the holy places, about the German alliance with Turkey, I could find no trace. And therefore I still maintain the hope and the belief that those populations, trouble-breeders though they might easily be, have no particular trouble to breed for us in the present or near future; at least, so long as measures are taken, as I believe they are being taken, to keep them informed of what we are doing and what we are fighting for. Their interest is different from that of the Chinese, whose share in the war—at least, up in those remote parts, as you can well imagine—is but academic and pictorial. The Mohammedans, on the other hand, are as keen as mustard to learn all they can about guns, aeroplanes, machinery, and so forth, and our task is to keep ourselves perpetually in their mind's eye with a definite sense of what we are doing and achieving. In case anybody here should feel, as one very often does about remote corners of the world one does not know, any sort of instinct that we are perhaps

letting those populations slide, I would say, of my own knowledge, that on the contrary very much is being done, and has steadily been done for the last two years, to keep all these peoples thoroughly well aware of what it is that we are doing and what it is that we are achieving.

However, for a final note, I must add that there is no propaganda that will appeal to those people so much as that ultimate victory to which, out of the present darkness, we look forward with more confidence than ever, as towards the ending of our long night.

The CHAIRMAN said they were very much indebted to Mr. Farrer for his most interesting and instructive account of a part of the world which most of them knew very little about. We had heard much this afternoon of the White Wolf Rebellion, and only the previous evening he had been reading of a former rebellion in Kan-su in a book entitled "Islam in China," published by the Inland China Mission. This rebellion took place in 1895, and was so severely repressed that it might have been supposed that there would be but few Mahomedans left. Colonel Mark Bell wrote that in some districts nine out of every ten Chinese and two out of every three Mussulmans were killed. He gathered that the lecturer considered that there were some 30,000,000 Moslems in Northern and Western China. The estimates of population in the Empire varied enormously. A native of Kujua, Abdul Aziz, a learned man who had been in Egypt and Constantinople, and had travelled all about Northern China in some undefined capacity, possibly as a Turkish diplomatic agent, also put the Moslem population at about 30,000,000, but he included the inland Moslems right up to Tashkend and Kashghar, which would increase the total by at least a couple of million. The book "Islam in China," by Mr. Broomhall, to which he had referred, contained figures carefully compiled from data supplied by more than two hundred correspondents, some of whom had devoted careful study to the subject, and it showed varying estimates of the total Mahomedan population in China from 5,000,000 to a maximum of 10,000,000. The writer was himself inclined to accept the maximum; but even this varied very greatly from the figure of 30,000,000 mentioned that afternoon. The only point on which all writers appeared to be unanimous was that the Moslem population of Kan-su was far larger than that of any other province of China. It was to be regretted that definite *data* were not available, for the question of numbers made a very great deal of difference in estimating the political importance of the Mahomedan population. The native writer, Abdul Aziz, classed the Moslems in Salar, a district in Kan-su, as Turks, and said they were very superior to all the other Moslem races in China, the great bulk of whom were known as Tungans, so called, he believed, as being Chinese converts to Islam. The name was derived from the Turkish word "tunmek," to turn, and

meant those who turned to another religion. If so, it corresponded with the Chinese words "Hui," or "convert," which was the name applied to the Mahomedans by the Chinese.

Mrs. ARCHIBALD LITTLE said that her enjoyment of the lecture did not entitle her to go away without a critical reference to Mr. Farrer's account of the influence still said to be exerted by the Dowager-Empress a decade after her death. Having lived for a great many years in the vast province of Szechuen, she could say that she never recollected anyone discussing the subject and expressing respect for the Dowager-Empress. The people who talked of the Dowager-Empress to Mr. Little and herself recognized that the Dowager-Empress used her great power for her own advantage and her own selfish pleasure. They spoke with respect of the young Emperor, and praised him, but said that his influence was not great, because all the real authority was wielded by the Dowager-Empress. It almost seemed ungracious, after seeing such beautiful slides and hearing so extremely interesting a lecture, to raise this question. But she felt she ought to express an opinion about the Dowager-Empress and the feelings entertained toward her in China, because there were two tendencies in connection with people of distinction of dubious record who had passed away. One was to hound them down, and one was to exalt anyone who had had a bad name in the world. In the case of the Dowager-Empress, there was a certain party who seemed anxious to cover over her evil deeds.

Colonel A. C. YATE said it had been his privilege to listen to Mr. Farrer in quite a different capacity at the Royal Geographical Society on March 11, when he appeared in the light at once of a botanist and traveller. Mr. Farrer had told them that it was believed that in the ninth century of the Christian era the Chinese had invited Turkish mercenaries to enter their country, and thus introduced the thin edge of the wedge of Islam. The only authority of which he (Colonel Yate) could think as likely to give the requisite data for a conclusion on this point was Yule's "Marco Polo." In occasional dippings into that book he had noticed the frequent mention by Marco Polo of the Christian and Mahomedan communities across which he had come in various parts of China. Of living authorities on such a topic he imagined one of the best to be Sir Henry Howorth, whom he had the pleasure of meeting occasionally at the Royal Historical Society, and whose "History of the Mongols" was a *magnum opus* upon which historians and booksellers alike set a high value. Another authority was Sir Percy Sykes, now commanding the South Persia Rifles at Shiraz, and doubtless looking forward keenly just now rather to doing something to checkmate German ambitions to penetrate into Persia than to elucidate Marco Polo's mediæval wanderings.

The only occasion, Colonel Yate added, on which he himself came

into contact with the Moslems of Western China was when he accompanied, thirty years ago, as Intelligence Officer, the "Northern Shan Column," which, setting out from Mandalay in December, 1887, marched by devious and—in some parts to Europeans—unknown paths to the Salwun River at the Kunlon Ferry. On the way that column met occasional droves of Panthay mule transport. The Panthays are the Moslems of Yunnan, and their mule transport the best trained that he had ever seen. When it was a case of loading, the method was this: Two (or possibly more) men held the prepared load well aloft, gave a signal to the mule, which obeyed the signal by walking of itself in under the load, which was then lowered on to its back and adjusted. On the march each mule moved independently and separately. Thus, if any mishap befell any one mule, one mule only suffered; whereas the Indian transport system of linking three mules together frequently sacrificed the trio to the fault or failure of one.

Mr. Farrer has made it very plain that a Moslem insurrection in Western China is a certainty of the future. The question is, Will this associate itself in any way with the Pan-Turanian project? To this question Mr. Arnold Toynbee may possibly offer some solution on May 22.

Mr. FARRER, in reply, said he thought Mrs. Archibald Little had spoken from the point of view of the Southern Chinese rather than of Northern China in respect to the Dowager-Empress. As the storms of discussion respecting that autocratic lady had died down, she appeared more and more definitely as a really great sovereign. Her errors were great and admitted, though he was somewhat sceptical about the evil deeds with which she had been charged. If she made her mistakes, she recovered from them with a magnificent courage and resource which only really great rulers of the world had exhibited. In Northern China, at least, which supported her great adventure in 1900, her influence went on increasing, as history left behind that outstanding figure, and advanced more and more into the quicksands into which China appeared to be sunk at the present moment. So far as Northern China was concerned, she had left behind a name that would live, and, he thought, deserved to live, and influence all ranks of the people. She would figure in history amongst the great personalities of the Manchu dynasties, which had previously given before her time two of the greatest rulers who had ever directed the affairs of a large section of the human race.

The proceedings terminated with a cordial vote of thanks to the lecturer.



## ISLAM IN RUSSIA SINCE THE REVOLUTION

At a meeting of the Society on May 22, 1918, with Colonel Sir Henry Trotter in the chair, Mr. Arnold J. Toynbee lectured on this subject. In the course of an extemporaneous address he said :

I must ask you to excuse the charlatanism of one who has not travelled among the Russian Moslems and does not know their languages in venturing to lecture upon them. My excuse is that Islam in Russia was, before the Revolution, an unknown field—at least, compared with other fields of sociological study in Asia and Europe. It is characteristic of our lack of knowledge that we do not know whether to call it an Asiatic or a European problem.

This ignorance is due to the Russian autocracy, which crushed all free movement among the various people of that great Empire. As we now know, Russia was teeming with life—with nationalities, parties, classes, sects, with cherished aims and original points of view ; but all this life was held down by the Tsardom. Under the old régime Russia presented herself to the outer world as politically (not spiritually, of course) a military machine, which might be on the right or wrong side, for us or against us, but was essentially a formidable machine, and not a nation or commonwealth of peoples. Thus the Russian Moslems passed unnoticed, although it was obvious that they were bound to be important. To begin with, they were numerically important. There were 19,000,000 Mohammedans in Russia, or hardly a smaller number than the Moslems under the rule of France. Thus Russia was the third largest Moslem power in the world—larger, probably, than Holland with her East Indian possessions, and larger, of course, than any independent Moslem State. There are 16,000,000 Turkish-speaking Moslems in the Russian Empire, or twice as many as in the Ottoman Empire.

Geographically, also, they are bound to be important, because they are likely to be one of the main transitional elements between European and Islamic civilisation. Throughout history there have been two routes, geographically, by which the East and the West have come into contact. There has been the sea route, by which British, French, and Dutch traders have gone to tropical lands and founded Empires in Eastern countries. Most of the contact of Europe with the Mohammedan world has been by sea, and the ocean has served as a sharp dividing line between the two civilisations. When the English-

man, the Dutchman, or the Frenchman made their way by sea to distant countries of the East, they found the inhabitants sharply divided from themselves in history, manners, and standards of civilisation. The sea routes during the last few centuries have been paramount in the formation of our ideas of the relations between Europe and Asia—we have thought of the problem in terms of them. Yet all the while there has been another bridge of contact, the land routes, along which differing civilisations have shaded into one another. If the importance of these routes has been very much overlooked, the reason is that they were by way of Russia and Turkey, and the government of both countries being reactionary, the national and social tendencies of the peoples of both Empires were suppressed. But the war, which has overthrown the Tsardom, and will, it is hoped, overthrow Turkish rule over other peoples, will perhaps put the decision of the relations between East and West in the hands of the nations on the land bridge. At any rate, they will influence those relations to a much greater extent than hitherto.

The Russian Moslems at least provide the material for just such a transitional element between East and West as I have mentioned. They include Moslems more Europeanised than any others—practically Europeans of Moslem religion. I refer to those of the Volga region, who are geographically encircled by European civilisation. Again, the Russian Moslems include nomadic tribes and countries which till half a century ago were the most isolated and fanatical of any in Islam, being still in the full dark age produced by the barbarian invasions. In other parts of Russia there are Islamic peoples who have taken a full share in the great economic development of the country. The Russian Moslems include modern industrialists, peasants who are specialists in cotton growing and other forms of profitable industry, and, again, the populations of the Steppes, who are pure nomads. Indeed, you find almost every type of economic life and culture, from the prosperous and enterprising, to that which is wholly untouched by European influences.

After these generalisations I must attempt a rapid survey. The first group of which I would speak are the Moslems of what may be termed the Volga-Ural-West Siberia region. Their centre is at Kazan, and they speak a Turkish dialect. Their number is estimated at four to five millions. Their conversion to Islam dates from about A.D. 950, perhaps a generation before Christianity reached Russia. They were extraordinarily isolated from the outer world by the Steppes and by the pagan Turkish tribes intervening between them and Persia for about four centuries, just as the Christians of Russia were also cut off by nomadic tribes from contact with the peoples from whom they had drawn their civilisation and religion. Friar Rubruck, who visited the Steppes in the thirteenth century, heard of these Islamic tribes, and he

was very much perturbed in consequence. "I wonder," he wrote, "what devil carried the religion of Mohammed thither." This region was converted to Islam something like four centuries before the Steppe to the south of it. But about 1250 the Steppe and Kazan were united under the Mongols of the Golden Horde, and the conversion of the Steppe followed. The Steppe began to settle down in civilised fashion, and the Volga Moslems acquired a Turkish dialect, one which varies from type more than any other, probably because the populations previously spoke Finnish. The result of the rule of the Golden Horde for a period of three centuries was that the Steppe country and Kazan were welded together into a single Moslem Turkish-speaking population. Then there came the Russian conquest about A.D. 1550. From that time these Moslems have been continuously under the rule of a European and non-Moslem State. They are, indeed, the oldest Moslem group to have been continually under European rule, for though the Moors in Spain were conquered earlier by a Christian State, they were either stamped out or forced to emigrate. But the Russians allowed these Tatar Moslems to continue, and so for more than three and a half centuries Europeans and Moslems have lived under one European Government in the region of the Volga.

There are various sub-groups to whom reference should be made. First of all there are the Tatars of Kazan. They form a majority of Moslems in no single province, and only in two out of ten districts of the province of Kazan. They are mostly townsfolk, business and professional men, and artisans. Since 1905 they have taken a vigorous part in Russian politics, and have developed a press and literature. Until 1917 they worked with the Cadet party, a fact which shows that they are *bourgeois* in their point of view—Liberals, but not Socialists, nor very much interested in the nationalisation of land. They are, in fact, a prosperous middle-class element.

The second sub-group, the Bashkirs in the Urals, are more backward. Fifty years ago they were entirely nomadic, and they are still partially nomadic. They are more compact than the Tatars, and in the Ufa province they are in an actual majority, though only a slight majority, over the Russians. That is to say, there is a majority of Moslem elements, including the Tatars. They are also numerous in Orenburg, Samara, and Perm. But the tendency is for them to be swamped by Russian colonists, who have settled in these regions in large numbers in the last fifty years. Great tracts of country are now under tillage by the Russian peasants, and the Bashkirs are being crowded out in some districts. So far they have been under Tatar influence. There are many Tatars to be found in the towns. But the compactness of the Bashkirs and the special problem of Russian colonisation have tended of late to produce a different policy among them.

The third sub-group is that of the Siberian Tatars. They are the remains of a sub-Khanate of the Golden Horde. They are to be found mostly in the older towns of Western Siberia, such as Tobolsk, and they are less connected with the modern towns along the Trans-Siberian Railway, where Russian civilisation has been developing latterly. A great many of them may be Tatarised Finns or Samoyeds ; but the original Tatars have maintained their identity. They are an important element in trade as well as in Moslem culture. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the earliest political leader of Islamic Russia came from Siberia. I refer to Sheikh Abdurrashid Ibrahim, who is an old man now. He was born at Tara in 1842, and was the earliest Russian Moslem to travel to the different Moslem centres in Russia in the interests of Moslem culture and unity. He visited Moslem centres all over the world, and he was a member of the second Duma.

I now come to another and very different main Moslem group, that of Kirghizistan. This group, numbering about five millions, represents the old nomadic population of the Steppes from the Carpathians to Altai and Thian-Shan. They were probably outside the jurisdiction of the Golden Horde, and only drifted into its camping grounds after its power had been broken. They were the latest people in Asia to be converted to Islam, and the process was only completed last century, after they had come under Russian rule. The Kirghiz are still practically pure nomads, and I imagine that Islam has only touched them superficially at present, while they are touched scarcely at all by European civilisation. Since the end of the fifteenth century the nomads have been crowded out of the Steppes, like the Red Indians on the prairies of North America. The process was begun by the Cossacks, who early in the sixteenth century came down from the region of the Dnieper and made settlements along the rivers of the Steppes. In the seventeenth century, too, the Kalmucks came from Mongolia westward and settled on the Eastern Steppes, and this had a disintegrating effect on the nomadic tribes. In the third place, there has been considerable Russian colonisation from the north during the last twenty years, and especially since the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The movement has been on so large a scale that it is comparable in character with the colonisation of the West in the United States and in Canada. That, of course, has resulted in crowding out the Kirghiz, who have either had to take to agriculture and settled life or to vacate the northern part of the Steppes. They are to be found in the Eastern Steppe still ; but if the colonisation movement continues, that Steppe, like the Western, will be covered with European peasantry within, say, the next twenty years. The Kirghiz themselves now belong to the Eastern extremity. They spread to the Volga in the sixteenth century, filling the vacuum left by the Usbegs, under the pressure of the Kalmucks.

The third main group of Russian Moslems is that of the Caucasus, where there are about four million of them. The Caucasus is a second Balkan peninsula, and harbours a confusion of nationalities and religions, hitherto banded together by a military empire, though in this case a Christian empire. The position of the Moslems is best understood by classifying them in sub-groups.

There are, first of all, the Azerbaijanis, forming by far the largest sub-group, and believed by some authorities to number 2,500,000. They are the "Tatars of the Caucasus," a Turkish-speaking population who drifted in from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. They came up the Araxes valley, the highroad of migration from Central Asia to Anatolia. They are identical with the Turkish-speaking population of Persian Azerbaijan, being only separated from them politically by the Russian conquest a century ago. Baku, the great oil city of the Caucasus, is not their home in the full sense. It is not really a Tatar city, for the population is Russian, Armenian, and Persian, together with many foreign elements. The Tatars only share in its cosmopolitanism. But there are amongst them several important men who have taken a very prominent part in Moslem politics in Russia. They include some self-made millionaires. They are less civilised, but more vigorous and also more drastic and radical in their views, than the Kazan Moslems, who have an older Moslem civilisation and greater contact with European influence.

Another sub-group is that of the Daghestanis, who are thought to number about a million. They are very much split up, some of them belonging to indigenous tribes, and some to tribes deposited from the Steppes. They are confined to the North-Eastern Caucasus.

Thirdly, there are the Georgian Moslems in the extreme south-west, in the provinces which Turkey has seized under the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. These people are Georgians in nationality and language. They became converted to Islam after the Turkish conquest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as the Albanians were largely converted after the Turkish conquest in Europe. It has been a matter of discussion whether they ought to belong to a Moslem State or a Georgian State, but the Turks have settled the matter for the moment by occupying the country once again by force.

In the fourth place there are the Crimean Tatars, numbering perhaps 200,000, again a fragment of the people of the Steppes, chiefly in the mountains of the coast. They are much outnumbered by the Russians and Ukrainians. The last sub-group is that of the Tatar nobles in Lithuania, numbering perhaps 10,000. They were invited to the country by the Lithuanian Government in the fifteenth or sixteenth century, and have since been settled there. They have kept their religion, and form a really important social factor, though only a very

scattered community, in the territory occupied by Germany on the basis of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The last main group of which I have to speak is that of Central Asia, where there are not less than five million Moslems hitherto under Russian rule. I refer to inhabitants of settled regions where there are towns and cultivation of the land. Perhaps about 80 per cent. of the Central Asiatic Moslems are Turkish-speaking, their dialect being closely related to that spoken over the frontier in Chinese Turkestan. The remainder are Tajiks, the relics of an original Iranian population, and speaking Iranian dialects. These are townsmen and cultivators. They have suffered by constant invasions, and notably by the Uzbek conquest at the beginning of the sixteenth century, after the break up of the Golden Horde. Before the Russian conquest, which went on from 1863 to 1886, they were in the full dark age, broken up into a number of petty Khanates, and subjected to constant wars and slave raiding. Great areas of land went out of cultivation, and exhausting taxation was in force. Since the Russian conquest there has been security, a steady growth in communications, following on that remarkable engineering feat the Trans-Caspian Railway, which brings Central Asia into direct communication with Europe, and also profitable specialisation in agriculture. This is especially noteworthy in respect of cotton. The great cotton mills of Moscow are largely dependent on the cotton-growing districts of Central Asia, which were developed for the purpose of enabling Russia to become independent of the American market. Thus over hundreds of square miles within the Russian frontier, and especially in the province of Ferghana, the peasantry have been encouraged to specialise in cotton cultivation. Formerly, while the country was insecure, it was so isolated economically that the peasants produced only the absolute necessities of life for themselves, because there was no certainty of trade or communication. But when the Russians developed the railways and paid advances for the prospective cotton crop, the peasantry began to plough up their cornfields and to substitute cotton. It was the State policy to obtain foodstuffs for Central Asia very cheaply from European Russia. Thus, economically at any rate, there was rapid growth and organisation, notwithstanding the fact that Central Asia, as is natural, remains in culture the most Oriental and the least assimilated region in Russia.

From this survey it is clear that the Russian Moslems came under Russian rule at very different dates; that they are widely scattered geographically; and that there are a great many different nationalities, degrees of civilisation, and forms of economic life among them. Sixteen millions out of the nineteen millions speak different Turkish dialects, but these almost amount to different languages. There are three main groups of these dialects, and the Osmanli Turkish spoken in Asia Minor is very different from the form of Turkish spoken in

Kazan. This forms a considerable barrier in communication between the Kazan Moslems and other Turkish-speaking peoples of the Empire. But while there are many divisions, there are certain great principles of unity tending to bring them together. First, of course, there is Islam, in which the ties and claims of brotherhood are still very strong. They are made the stronger by the fact that the Mohammedan world has felt itself latterly to be on the defensive against penetration from Europe. Then another great point of unity has been the existence of the Russian State, with its conquests, its centralised administration, and its railways, not only round, but across the Steppes. There were rough tracks along the Steppes in the old days, but communications in any real sense did not exist before the Russian conquest. The Rostov-Baku, the Trans-Caspian, and the Orenburg-Tashkent Railways have had a great unifying influence. Most important of all was the economic reciprocity which was being worked out before the war.

On the other hand, there are centrifugal principles at work. Though the Russian conquest was fundamentally unifying in effect, the Russian Government was severe, and this tended to create a Moslem opposition. The Government took care to promote ecclesiastical decentralisation, though the Moslem ecclesiastics were allowed considerable liberty locally in organising their own communities. There was one ecclesiastical centre for the Tatars of the Volga, another for the Caucasus, and so on. Then, again, there was differentiation as to military service, which was confined to the Moslems of the Volga-Ural, Siberia, and the Crimea. Some groups were much more amalgamated with the Empire than others, and it was on this basis that the differentiation was made. Again, there are the special interests of various elements to be considered, such as the fear of the Bashkirs and Kirghiz as to the effects of Russian colonisation.

All these factors were more or less in suspense under the Tsardom ; but since the Revolution the various forces concerned have found free play, and have begun to work out the problems affecting them. The first tendency to assert itself was towards unity and cultural autonomy. The All-Russian Moslem movement was led by the scattered Moslems, especially the Kazan Tatars, and others who had been the longest under Russian rule. They naturally felt that Moslem unity within a united Russia was the only solution of their political problem, since they were so scattered themselves that it was only by having a great Moslem block that they could hold their own in the Russian State. Supposing the Moslems more recently incorporated in the Empire broke away, they felt that they themselves would be left as a small scattered minority amongst the Russian population. On the other hand, the unity of the Moslems would make them a political power within the Russian Empire. Thus the Kazan Tatars went in for a policy of bringing the forces of Islam together within the Russian political

system, in order to form a Moslem party in the Russian State, and to exercise a marked Islamic influence on its policy.

These views, shared by many other groups, were especially dominant during the first period after the Revolution. In April, 1917, there was a Moslem Conference in the Caucasus, attended by delegates from all parts. The Sheikh-ul-Islam of the Shia Moslems of the Caucasus and the Mufti of the Sunnis publicly embraced before the whole assembly, amid demonstrations of great enthusiasm. They even began to talk of abolishing the separate ecclesiastical organisations and forming an ecclesiastical, and not merely political, Moslem union for the Caucasus. This is an extraordinary fact when we bear in mind how strong has been the traditional separatism between the two great sects of Islam, in Russia as elsewhere. The Conference passed a resolution in favour of All-Russian Moslem co-operation.

Accordingly a few weeks afterwards, in May, 1917, there was an All-Russian Moslem Conference at Moscow. It was characteristic that the official language was Russian, since this was the only language in which all the delegates could understand one another. The delegates, or one large section of them, went strongly in favour of the All-Russian movement. They appointed an All-Russian Moslem Council, with an executive committee at Petrograd, which has produced a weekly bulletin for the Moslems on the course of affairs. The remarkable thing about this bulletin is that it is not merely confined to the affairs of the Russian Moslems, but shows an even greater interest in general events and in the course of the Revolution. The Conference also established an All-Russian Ecclesiastical Council at Ufa, to be the centre for all the groups, and to have authority over all the Moslems in Russia.

The tone of the proceedings was very democratic, and though the six members of the Ecclesiastical Council were not appointed by universal suffrage, that was laid down as the basis of their election for the future. There was a noteworthy development of feminism. Out of the 800 delegates at Moscow, over 100 were women, and a woman was elected to be one of the six members of the supreme Ecclesiastical Council. Thus we see a very pronounced Liberal movement brought into relation with the idea of Islamic cultural unity within the Russian State. The Conference did not ask for the formation of separate federal Moslem States, because they felt that that would be a barrier to their unity for the work of cultural autonomy. It is interesting to note how sensitive the Conference was in respect of the world of Islam. The leaders broke with the Cadets on the question of the future of Constantinople, since the latter still favoured its acquisition by Russia. They formed a party of their own gravitating toward the Left, though not toward the extreme Left.

But another tendency quickly declared itself, in consequence of the



course of events in Russia, and that was a tendency toward political or territorial autonomy, whether under a federal system or on the basis of complete independence. The first sign of this came from the Daghestanis, who held a rival May Conference at Astrakhan, and complained of the Azerbaijanis trying to Tatarise the Caucasus. As a matter of fact, the Azerbaijani Tatars are at the head of this territorial movement. Their ideal was almost from the beginning a territorial State with complete local political autonomy, including all the Turkish-speaking populations of the Caucasus. Federation with Russia was a subordinate feature; the main idea was that of forming a State of their own, and federation with Russia was put in rather for form's sake. This was obviously a more drastic solution of the Moslem question. But the Bokharans were still more intolerant and drastic. There was a local revolution, and the Khan was forced to agree to a democratic Constitution. Then followed a reaction against the Young Bokharan party, which was given a fanatical turn by the Mullahs and was favoured by the Russian Resident at Bokhara. He belonged to the old régime, and was anti-revolutionary. These disturbances were put down, but they were bound to have a discouraging effect upon the idea of Moslem unity in Russia. The tendency for a separatist solution has steadily won, in consequence of the general course of events. The Bolshevik revolution and acquisition of power has turned the scales all over Russia in favour of separatism and against unity, and the Moslems have shared in this tendency. Even at a Conference held at Ufa last December to appoint a commission for working out cultural autonomy, the territorialists carried territorial resolutions and appointed a committee of their own. A few weeks earlier there had been a proclamation of the territorial autonomy of Bashkiristan. All this is an unhappy turn of policy; but probably it is merely a symptom of the general disorganisation of Russia. If Russia (or parts of her) comes together again in a Federation, the idea of unity among Russian Moslems may revive.

In conclusion Mr. Toynbee read from a German paper (the *Neuer Orient*) extracts from speeches on the great question at issue at the Moscow Conference between the two leaders—Tsalikov of the All-Russian Party and Rasulzada the territorialist from Baku.

The CHAIRMAN said they were very much indebted to Mr. Toynbee for the care and trouble he had taken to collect and co-ordinate the facts respecting the Russian Moslems. He saw from that day's paper that the new cry at Berlin to replace or supplement "Berlin to Baghdad" was to be "Hamburg to Herat," a much longer line. The existence of such ambitions was important, and it was very desirable that we should inform ourselves, and that the country should inform itself, respecting the populations occupying the lands through which

penetration was desired by our enemies. There was an enormous population taken altogether in those lands, and beyond them we had some 70,000,000 Moslems within the Indian Empire. It was noteworthy how large a proportion of the Russian Moslems spoke various forms of Turkish.

Colonel Sir THOMAS HOLDICH said that one statement in the lecture had surprised him. A glance at the map would show how enormous a proportion of Russia was Moslem country. He believed it would amount to four-fifths. While it could be taken for granted that the Moslems were very much scattered over that vast area, and that much of it was very thinly peopled, there were still very large compact bodies of Moslems there, especially in high Asia, and notably in Bokhara. The Central Asian people were Sunni Mohammedans to a man, and amongst them, so far as he knew, there was no scattered Christian Church or any other non-Moslem faith. On these grounds he could not help thinking that in the Russian Empire as we have known it there must surely be far more than 19,000,000 Mohammedans. The inhabitants of Russia might be divided into Slavs and Moslems, mainly Turkish-speaking Moslems. That being so, it was still more remarkable that in consequence of the Revolution there should have been any decided expression of opinion on the part of a large body of them in favour of unity within the Russian State. It was entirely contrary to what they had heard as to the results of the Revolution in other respects. The exact opposite of unity was its most patent political principle. It was difficult to see how 19,000,000 Mahomedans among 180,000,000 Slavs could make themselves quite sufficiently prominent and powerful in the political future of Russia to effect anything very great. Toward the end of his address the lecturer had shown that there were very considerable differences of opinion amongst the leaders of the Russian Moslems as to their political future. One could easily understand that within certain limits really powerful Mohammedan republics might be formed, but that they could have any decided influence over the vast mass of the Russian people he confessed he did not believe.

He would like to ask Mr. Toynbee what had been the attitude of the Russian Moslems during the war. Did they recognise the Sultan of Turkey as the head of their faith, or were they, like the Mohammedans of India, very doubtful indeed about the particular position which the Ottoman Emperor claimed in this respect? We did not find that, taking it all together—though there were, of course, exceptions—the Mohammedans of India in the Army had very particular objections against fighting the Mohammedans of Turkey. Did the Russian Moslems throw in their sympathies with Russia, and did the soldiery amongst them take any prominent part against Turkey? Would they now be prepared to welcome the Turks into that part of Russia which was

overwhelmingly Moslem to which reference had been made in the lecturer's survey? When they considered all these questions, it seemed to him that if anyone in the West adopted the mantle of prophecy he would have a big problem in front of him.

Mr. ISPAHANI said he would be obliged if the lecturer would explain to them the condition of the Russian Moslems before the Revolution. From his personal knowledge as a traveller in Russia before the war, when his visits extended to Turkestan and the Caucasus, he could say that the Moslems suffered from harshness of rule. They were not allowed to educate their children in the way they desired and in the practices of their faith. It might well be that more liberal ideas would prevail after the existing confusion in Russia had been overcome.

Sheikh M. H. KIDWAI said they had heard that the Russian Moslems were strongly opposed to the idea of Russia taking over Constantinople. He would like to impress this fact upon Englishmen present who thought there was no restlessness about the present situation as regarded the Moslem position in the war. In India there were numbers of religious leaders interned because they were said to have had sympathy with the Turks. Mr. Montagu, during his visit, received a great number of telegrams declaring the sympathy of the Mussulman senders with the Turks, not as Turks, but as Moslems.

Mr. TOYNBEE, in reply, said that he had shown that before the war the freedom of the Russian Moslems was very small, and that they were very much suppressed. Their ecclesiastical organisations, like those of other communities not belonging to the Orthodox faith, were very much broken up. There could be no doubt that one general effect of the war and the Revolution had been to evoke in the minds of the Moslems, and especially those which had come under Russian rule in the last century or so, a keen wish to have an independent life of their own, though there were great differences of view as to the proper political means towards this end. They had seen European progress, and wished to share therein on their own lines and in accordance with their own culture. They wished to retain the economic results which had flowed from European organisation. Generally speaking, the attitude of Islam toward Europe had been very much that of Japan.

The meeting concluded with a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

## ANNIVERSARY MEETING

THE anniversary meeting was held on June 26. Owing to the absence of Colonel Sir Henry Trotter through illness, Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich took the chair. The annual report, read from the chair, was as follows :

### REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR 1917-18.

The Session of 1917-18, during which, notwithstanding the war, we have had a series of most interesting papers, opened in October with a lecture by our Chairman, Colonel Sir Henry Trotter, entitled "The Amir Yakoub Khan and Eastern Turkistan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," a concise account of the history and geography of a little-known part of Central Asia. In December Colonel A. C. Yate gave a paper on a subject of peculiar interest at the present time, "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Miss Estelle Blythe in February read a delightful paper on "Palestine: Its Past, Present and Future." In March we had a most instructive address by Miss M. Czaplicka on "The Evolution of the Cossack Communities," illustrated by lantern-slides showing different types of Cossacks. The April lecture was given by Mr. Reginald Farrer—most interesting and instructive—on "The Mahomedan Problem in China," and, in May, Mr. Arnold Toynbee's address on "Islam in Russia" was full of information. The last lecture of the Session will be given in June by the Right Hon. Syed Ameer Ali on "Persia and her Neighbours." There has been a good attendance at all the meetings.

The following four new members have been elected during the year : The Political Agent, Bahrein, Mrs. Davis, Mr. G. Herbert Evans, and Signor M. N. Salvati. The Council regret to report the loss by death of Colonel St. J. F. M. Fancourt, C.B., and Mr. G. R. Allen. The Society has also lost by resignation the following members : The Viscount Bury, Mrs. F. A. Crow, Sir Walter Lawrence, Mr. John Murray, Mr. E. J. Salano, and Colonel J. K. Tod.

The Council much regret the loss of their Secretary, Miss Hughes, who held that post ever since the formation of this Society, but resigned on her marriage in November, 1917. Much of the success of the Society has been due to her excellent work, and the members of the Council, past and present, who have been so long and pleasantly associated with her had the gratification of showing their appreciation

of her services by subscribing for the presentation of a small wedding-gift. Miss Phillips, Assistant Secretary to the Royal Asiatic Society, was appointed in her place.

The year has again happily ended without a deficit, there being a balance of receipts over expenditure of £22 7s. The total expenditure was £109 7s. 1d. The statement of accounts is appended.

New rules were passed at a special meeting in February relating to the appointment of an Hon. President, and regulating the position of the six Vice-Presidents. Under the new Rule 13 the Hon. President is elected by the Council, and holds office for five years, and is then eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents are elected by the Council, and hold office for four years, two retiring annually by rotation, being ineligible for re-election until the expiration of one year; but this arrangement will not come into force until the general meeting of 1919.

Lord Curzon, on being approached, most cordially accepted the new office of Hon. President, to the great satisfaction of the Council.

Under Rule 23, Sir Hugh Barnes, Sir E. Penton, and Mr. T. J. Bennett retire, and Colonel E. Pemberton has resigned his position on the Council; the three former gentlemen are recommended for re-election, and Colonel A. C. Bailward is proposed to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of Colonel Pemberton.

The CHAIRMAN expressed his regret that their President, Sir Henry Trotter, was very ill, and that it was doubtful whether he would be able to resume his work amongst them. That meeting ended the 1917-18 session, and they earnestly hoped that before their three month's vacation was over they would find he would be able to return to them. On his proposal a vote of sympathy with Lady Trotter in her trouble was carried.

The report was adopted, and its recommendations as to the election of members of Council for the ensuing session were agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN said the distinguished gentleman who was about to address them on Persia was not altogether a stranger to the Society. Many of them must know him as a great Orientalist, and a very close observer of the peoples and policies of the East. The paper would show him to be master of his subject, and would carry the authoritative weight to be expected from him.

The Right Hon. SYED AMEER ALI then read the following paper :

#### PERSIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS.

On two previous occasions you did me the honour of inviting me to read a paper, which, owing to pressure of public duties, I was unable to do. I am happy to be able this evening to make amends for my former default. Persia, which forms the subject of my present address, is at this moment engaging a great deal of attention, and if I do not succeed in stimulating a keener interest in her fortunes among a

well-informed and cultured circle as the Central Asian Society, you must put it down to my deficiencies in handling it.

The great Empire of the Chosroas, which stretched at one time from the land of the Five Rivers to the shores of the Mediterranean and even beyond, has now shrunk, comparatively speaking, into a small kingdom. Even thus she is of unfailling interest to both scholar and statesman, from her past history and existing potentialities. Situated in the middle of Asia, the home of a particularly gifted people, who, in all the vicissitudes of their country, have never lost their national entity or characteristics, she has always exercised a powerful influence on the development of the Western world. In the domain of religious thought, for example, the cult of Mythra spread from Persia into Europe, and wherever the Roman legionaries went they carried with them from the valley of the Euphrates this worship of the Sun-god. Under Diocletian it became the dominant cult of the Roman Empire, and appears to have found its way into countries so far away from the centre as modern Yorkshire and Cheshire, where even to-day effigies and figures of Mythra hunting the bull may be found in sufficient numbers to excite the wonder of the student of history. And we know how vastly Jewish conceptions were affected when they came in contact with the followers of Zoroaster. In the fourth century of the Christian era the Persian Mani promulgated a new version of the old philosophies. To Manichæism is traced the doctrine of sacramental grace and other esoteric dogmas. It gave birth to Paulicianism, which was persecuted with such fury by the Court of Byzantium. The Paulicians were the progenitors, as we know, of the Albigensis, whose doctrines gave birth to Lollardism. One might say with considerable truth that Modern Europe in its religious and philosophical conceptions has borrowed much, though it acknowledges little, from the doctrines of Manes or Mani, the Persian. Nor have the Manichæan ideas left untouched even the iconoclasm of Islam, for most of the Gnostic sects that are to be found in Islam have received their inspiration from Mani's conceptions.

In the department of administration the Sassanide sovereigns, those benevolent despots, created a revenue system which was afterwards copied by the Saracenic Caliphs, who shaped and developed it to such a remarkable degree as to make it a model for posterity. From the Caliphs it was borrowed by the Ghaznevid sovereigns, and thence introduced into India under the Great Akbar; and it forms to-day under British rule the best developed system of revenue administration.

The whirlwinds of conquest that have passed over Persia never destroyed the kernel of the race, they seem only to have touched the surface; the political entity was lost under the onslaught of the invader, but the people continued with wonderful tenacity their hold on national life. It is one of the marvels of history that the Persians have

always conquered their conquerors. Even in the lifetime of Alexander the Macedonian horde became a Perso-Hellenic amalgam ; the Saracenic conquest caused only a short-lived displacement. For in less than a hundred years Persia had recovered her vitality, and the Abbasside Caliphs ruled their vast empire with the help of Persian ministers. The Mongol avalanche fell over Western Asia in the thirteenth century, and destroyed in its course all civilized life in the countries over which it swept ; but before four generations had passed Persia recovered her vitality, and Persian culture, Persian thought, and the Persian language dominated the Courts of the Mongol sovereigns and the palaces of Mongol chiefs and magnates.

Of the culture of Persia and its influence on the development of the neighbouring nations I have spoken in a paper I read to the Persia Society in 1912. It is hardly worth while going over the same ground here. But to judge of the place Persia holds, shrunk as she is, among the nations of Western Asia, it is necessary to bear in mind that Mahommedan India, Afghanistan, Transoxiana, and Turkey have, either wholly or in part, their culture based on the magnificent Perso-Arab culture which was evolved in the reigns of the early Abbasside Caliphs—the finest product of the commingling of the two races, Arab and Persian. In India, from the earliest establishment of Mussulman power down to the time of Lord William Bentinck, Persian was the language of administration ; and in spite of its dethronement by that utilitarian Governor-General, who wanted to pull down the Taj and sell it as common marble, it remained in Upper India the language of polite society, both Mahommedan and Hindu, until the Urdu language attained its full development.

Shah Ismail Sufi, the founder of the Seffavean Dynasty, who traced his descent to the Prophet, founded the first Shiah Empire in Asia. He brought back to Persia her national life, and from his time forward we see an intensely strong national spirit animating the Persian people. And the wars of Shah Ismail with Sultan Selim, the first Ottoman Caliph, towards the west and with the Uzbek Shaibani Khan towards the north consolidated this national spirit in a remarkable manner. The Seffavean sovereigns were loved and respected as national kings ; and certainly the early rulers of this dynasty deserved their popularity, for they were great monarchs, under whom Persia attained a prosperity and power equal to the best-ruled kingdom of the West. About the end of the seventeenth century Persia was overrun by a rude, rough set of warriors from Afghanistan, and once again her national life and culture were swept away. The rise of Nadir Shah restored the national life of Persia and re-established her military dominancy in Middle Asia, but her cultural life remained under a blight. Agha Mohammed Khan Kajâr, the founder of the present dynasty, obtained the dominion of Persia toward the end of

the eighteenth century. Agha Mohammed Khan, though a cruel, almost a ferocious, tyrant, was not a bad ruler. He introduced law and order into the country, which was distracted and ruined by a long civil war.

Although there were several wars between Russia and Persia in the reign of Agha Mohammed Khan, systematic aggression on the part of the great Northern Power, and an organized intrigue to crush all other Western influence, began in Fath Ali Shah's time. A great Mussulman scholar, a native of Jounpore, in Upper India, who visited Persia in 1819, and spent some years at the Court of Fath Ali, has left an interesting record, not merely of this Persian king's entourage, but also of the insidious policy which was at work then in Persia and Afghanistan—a policy which came to an end only with the downfall of the Romanoff Dynasty. I gave a résumé of his account some time back in an article in the *Nineteenth Century*. Returning from Persia through Turkestan and Afghanistan, he spent two years in the Court of Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan. There again he observed the same Russian propaganda at work. On his arrival in India the British Government, in recognition of his learning and services, made him the Curator of the important Shiah Endowment at Hooghly, in Bengal, which he held from 1837 to 1876. And here I enjoyed the privilege of his friendship for nearly twenty years. His writings, unhappily still in manuscript form, are a mine of information on Central Asian politics during the long years of his sojourn in Persia and Afghanistan. His description of Persia and of her King was of the utmost interest. Nasir-ud-din Shah, the third in succession to Fath Ali, came to the throne in 1848. It was under his long rule, which extended to 1896, that Persia felt the first stirring of national life. The year of Nasir-ud-din Shah's accession to the throne is memorable in the history of Europe, as it witnessed the first organized effort of Continental nations to obtain some form of representative government. The European movement could hardly leave Persia untouched. Persians had travelled for many years past into different parts of the world. They had been to Europe, they had been to England, many had settled in Constantinople, some even had studied in Paris and London. In the beginning of his reign the Shah had, in fact, encouraged promising youths to prosecute their studies in Europe. Many Persians had been to Bombay and Calcutta. At this latter place and at Hooghly, which at one time was a seaport town before Calcutta had become the capital of Bengal, large colonies of prosperous Persian merchants had settled, along with Armenian compatriots, who had left their homes in Persia to make their fortunes in the land of the pagoda-tree. All these men, travellers, merchants, students, had learnt lessons of freedom of thought and liberty of government in the lands where they had spent many years of their lives. Their return to



Persia was not often welcomed, and many of them suffered from the jealous suspicion of despotic governors, but, all the same, they were strong elements in stirring up national life. It may seem extraordinary, but, nevertheless, it is a fact, that the expounders of the sacred law, commonly called by European writers the "clergy of Persia," were the principal supporters of the movement for the demand for emancipation from absolutism and the liberalization of the government in their country. And it is still more extraordinary that the Persian women, who might be supposed from their seclusion and isolated lives to be hardly equal to association with such a demand, should help materially to foster, stimulate, and promote this great national movement. Hitherto the command of the Sovereign was practically the law of the land, tempered by the opinions and verdicts of the *Mujtahids* and divines who, as the representatives of the Apostolical Imam, wielded an extraordinary amount of power. The system of *bast*, or taking sanctuary, also protected the innocent and even real culprits from the vindictiveness or the just punishment of the Shah. Equality of rights has ever been a cardinal principle of Islam; it embodies, in fact, the ideals of true democracy, and lays particular stress on the association of the people in the governing of their affairs.

Nasir-ud-din Shah was an able and astute Sovereign, with a strength of character which in better surroundings would have renewed the days of the early Sufis. But before referring to the circumstances which turned his progressive tendencies into aggravated absolutism, I should like to refer to the potentiality of Persia as a factor in Central Asian development.

Persia, though small in size compared to the vast extent of her old Empire, is a rich country—rich in minerals, with large forests especially in the north, large manufactures of textile fabrics, porcelain ware, gold and silver and other metal goods. Her population is estimated at twelve millions, about the same as that of Spain. The people are hardy, industrious, and thrifty; even the commonest muleteer takes a keen interest in the past history of his country. Recitations from the national epic are the ordinary diversions of the common folk. The Persian is a patriot to the backbone; he loves the thorn of his country as a poet says, better than the roses and violets of a foreign land. And the longing of the exile for his home (the *vilait*, from which the now familiar "Blighty" of the British Tommy Atkins is derived) is a well-known feature in the Persian character.

As I mentioned before, at the outset of his reign Nasir-ud-din Shah was all in favour of progress; he founded a great academy in the capital, encouraged students to proceed to Europe for the prosecution of their studies, and even established two consultative assemblies to assist him in the government of the country. The deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz, and his subsequent tragical death under sinister conditions,

roused the suspicions of the Shah, which were stimulated by the same insidious methods from St. Petersburg which succeeded so well with Sultan Abdul Hamid. Repression took the place of toleration, and the promise held out in the first part of Nasir-ud-din Shah's reign remained unfulfilled. But in spite of all his efforts to put back the hour-hand, the popular desire for a share in the government of their affairs and for emancipation from the grinding tyranny of a corrupt bureaucracy continued to grow. In 1890 the Shah granted the now notorious Tobacco Concession to a European syndicate, and this brought matters to a crisis. At the command of a single Mujtahid the entire people gave up smoking. This extraordinary strike proved wonderfully effective, and the Shah had to abandon his attempt to mortgage the interests of his people to a body of foreign exploiters. The Tobacco Concession was withdrawn in 1892; for the next four years there was a constant struggle between the King and the people, not open, not direct, but yet tangible enough to affect all classes, and causing, especially among the foreign diplomats and exploiters, anxious to keep Persia in a state of tutelage, no small amount of flutter and anxiety. On the side of the monarch were ranged the forces of reaction, repression, and vested interests; on the people's side, the burning desire for freedom from a system of government which was fast driving their country to ruin, was daily growing in force, and threatening an inevitable explosion. The influence of the "clergy," to give them their European designation, whilst encouraging popular aspirations, imposed upon the patriots remarkable self-restraint. In spite of their efforts, matters became acute at the beginning of 1896; and in January, 1896, Nasir-ud-din Shah was struck down by one of those zealots which similar agonies have produced in other countries. The tragic event, which created a most unfortunate impression in St. Petersburg, in Constantinople, Berlin, and Vienna, was used by foreign reactionaries for the purpose of discrediting Persian aspirations.

Nasir-ud-din Shah was succeeded by Mozaffur-ud-din Shah—a monarch of a totally different type. He had neither the ability nor the force of character of his father; his mild disposition, while it made him more pliable to his courtiers, inclined him at the same time more readily to listen to the popular demands. The struggle that followed was due entirely to the forces of reaction which had wrecked his father's reign, and which were still at work. In this extremity it became clear to the leaders of the patriotic party that, unless immediate measures were adopted to open the eyes of the Sovereign to the necessity of a change in the form of government, the country would become so entangled in foreign debts, and the administration so hopelessly mismanaged, as to lead straight to bankruptcy and collapse. This time the blow of the zealot was not aimed at the King; an unpopular Minister was struck down by another *fedai*. The Constitutionalists, who were alive to the

probable effect of this crime on the mind of the Shah to embitter him against the people, unqualifiedly condemned the murder of the Minister, and decided upon a passive strike in the capital for the purpose of conveying to the Shah an emphatic and unmistakable expression of the popular will. At this crisis in her destiny Persia was fortunate in having in Teheran a British Minister who combined with keen political insight and sagacity a singular breadth of view and sympathy with popular aspirations. On the appeal of the patriots he allowed the Constitutionals to use the vast grounds of the British Legation as a place of refuge in Teheran ; traders, merchants, students, scholars, with large numbers of the clergy, flocked to the Legation as a sanctuary, and remained encamped there until the Shah yielded unconditionally to the popular demands.

The Constitutionalist Government which the Shah granted to his people was formally embodied in a Charter, and the proclamation of the news roused immense enthusiasm throughout the country as the opening of a new era in the national life of Persia. This happened in July, 1906 ; a few months after Mozaffaruddin Shah died, and was succeeded by his son, Mohammed Ali Shah. Three times he took the oath on the Koran and by the holy Imams to maintain the constitution inviolate, and to govern his country in accordance with the organic laws on which it was based, and three times he foreswore himself. He attacked the Parliament Hall with his Cossacks, commanded by a Russian officer, murdered many of the deputies, and committed other atrocities. Driven out of Teheran by a combined popular effort, he returned with Russian help, and nearly succeeded in capturing the capital. But the Constitutionals were resolute ; unaided they beat him back, and ultimately forced him to take refuge in the territories of the Czar. And then Russia threw her shield over the foresworn son of Mozaffaruddin, and obtained for him a handsome pension from the Persian Government. Thus, shortly told, stands the story of the Persian liberation.

Mohammed Ali's final expulsion from Persia occurred in 1910. His minor son, the present Shah, was placed on the throne in his place with a Government responsible to Parliament, and an enlightened magnate, educated in Oxford under Dr. Jowett, assumed the regency during the young King's minority. The Constitutional Government—in other words, the government by the people of their own destinies—had now a chance of success in that country. With the exception of a few, who found in the new order of things a block to their own ambitions or avarice, and who, therefore, intrigued with the deposed King or his foreign supporters to upset the new Government, the nation as a whole rallied round the National Assembly, which represented the national aspirations. It was a singularly representative body, which, if its constitution had been sufficiently explained to the

Western nations, and not merely kept secret in the archives of diplomacy, would have evoked the sympathies of all well-wishes of human progress. As I said before, all classes were represented in the Assembly. Cultured Parsees and Armenians of position were members of that body, and they all seemed animated by one spirit—the spirit of bringing Persia into line with the democracies of Europe; and the ecclesiastics were as keen as the laity in the assertion of popular rights. The Persians, like all of us, have many faults. Their enemies were numerous and not few among their own people. They themselves admit that they did not possess what is called the “technique of popular government.” They certainly lacked the capacity of handling finance. Their revenue system was out of order. The foreigners who had come from the Continent of Europe to their help were more bent on their own enrichment than on the advancement of Persia. In their travail they looked round for assistance. Other nations far more advanced in the art of popular government are still backward from many points of view in realizing the true meaning of democracy, and it is no wonder that the Persians, with only five years’ existence of national life, should not have realized the limitations of popular power; and yet it is admitted by unbiased observers that they showed an amount of self-restraint which, exhibited by a young body elected in some hurry for the assertion of popular rights, was remarkable. They first directed their attention to the finances of the country, which were admittedly in perfect disorder, and were bringing the country fast to ruin; to evolve order out of chaos they evoked the assistance of the United States of America, a country which seemed least likely to ruffle the feelings of jealous neighbours, with the result of the loan of Mr. Shuster’s services. A more competent or more honest or more sympathetic helper could not have been found. He has told his own story how he was hunted out of Persia by Russian intrigue in his remarkable book “The Strangling of Persia.”

From the first emergence of the Persian people as a national entity, desirous of enjoying some share of the liberty which was the birthright of most Western people, and of being allowed some participation in the government of their country, the Constitutional movement was looked upon with strong disfavour by most of the foreign elements, diplomatic as well as commercial, as likely to create, if successful, serious obstacles to the ambitions of their States or the exploitations of their nationals. The capacity of the people to govern themselves was despised. Extraneous help to assist in the development of their resources or revenue was either refused or counteracted. Recent happenings in Russia enable one to speak more freely of the designs and ambitions of the Romanoff Empire than was possible even a year ago.

The relations of Persia with the British Empire have ever since the time of Shah Abbas the Great, with a slight intermission at the

beginning of Nasir-ud-din Shah's reign, been marked by a singular friendliness; and the Persians have never relied upon any nation more than the British until the memorable year of 1907, when British diplomacy and statesmanship, forced perhaps by the pressure of circumstances in Europe, took a sharp turn in favour of the designs of Persia's northern neighbour. Russia's encroachments began in the early part of the nineteenth century, and from that day forth, until the collapse of the Romanoff Dynasty, there has been a consistent endeavour on the part of Czarist Russia, as in other directions, to squeeze out the life of Persia. Russia's slow but sure strangulation of this stricken and afflicted country remind one vividly of the process by which the python crushes out the life and afterwards swallows the victim of its appetite.

The first collision between Russia and Persia to which reference might be made occurred in 1800. The Persians were successful at the outset, but met with defeat at the end, which brought about the Treaty of Gulistan, and established Russian rule in Georgia. Russian pretensions caused another outbreak of hostilities in 1826. The Persians, under Abbas Mirza, won a brilliant victory at first, but the parsimony of Fath Ali Shah led to large disbandments of the tribal levies; important cities were bereft of their defenders; many of the Persian governors were bribed; at last Persia was forced to conclude, in 1828, a treaty, politically as well as economically, of the most disastrous character. This is the well-known Treaty of Turkomanchai, by which Russia obtained a predominant position in both respects in Persia.

During the whole of this period Russia, whilst extending in every possible way her power and influence in Persia, was obliged to maintain an appearance of restraint by the likelihood of a collision with England in case she showed her hand too openly. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which divided Persia into two spheres of influence, Russian and British, removed the checks that had hitherto kept Romanoff ambitions within bounds. And she began at once her disintegrating work.

The Anglo-Russian compact was concluded on August 31, 1907, shortly after Persia had extracted from her King a promise of real national life. In an article in the *Orient Review* I ventured to call attention to the unwisdom of the policy which led England to enter into that compact, and I gave a résumé of Romanoff attitude from the end of the eighteenth century down to 1907, showing one continuous record of want of good faith on the part of the Czarist Government towards Great Britain. The Romanoffs were known not to keep faith even with the people they subjugated. It is no wonder that they did not attach much importance to fair dealing with outsiders.

And only recently, in November, 1916, 500,000 Khirgiz Mussulmans were slaughtered in the presence of their women and children because

they refused to be conscripted during harvest-time. An account of this inconceivable atrocity appeared again only in one English newspaper from the pen of Mr. Phillip Morgan Price.

In 1909, under the pretext that the Russian Consul was in danger, a large Russian force entered Tabriz. A few months later another body of troops was landed in Persia, and marched to Kazvin in order to prevent the Constitutionalists from advancing on the capital to dethrone Mohammed Ali Mirza. In September, 1909, the well-known brigand and Russian protégé, Rahim Khan, attacked Ardebil in the north of Persia; this formed a pretext for sending more troops into Persia. When Rahim Khan was defeated by the Persian Government forces, the Romanoff Government, in defiance of its treaties with Persia, afforded him a refuge in Russian territory.

In the following year (1910) a Persian Prince naturalized in Russia conceived the plan of overthrowing the Persian Constitutional Government; the Russian authorities not only refused to allow the Persian forces to deal with the rebel, but actually fired on them near Kazvin and killed the commanding officer.

In 1911 more troops were poured into Persia, where their treatment of the inhabitants was that of a conquered country.

The December of 1911 will always be remembered by the Persians as one of the darkest in their history. Romanoff agents succeeded in provoking in Tabriz an armed conflict between the Constitutionalist police force of that city and the Russian troops, which was attended with great brutality. In the course of this fight a large number of women and children were killed. The climax was reached on the 10th of Moharrem, a day of great sanctity in the Mahommedan world. Among other enormities they hung the chief ecclesiastic of Tabriz, the Sikutul-Islam, a man who was highly esteemed and venerated throughout Persia.

In April, 1912, the Russians also bombarded the sacred shrine of Meshed.

The hanging of Persian ecclesiastics in Tabriz and the slaughter of innocent people, coupled with the bombardment of Meshed, sent a thrill through the Mussulman world. Elegies were published in most of the Moslem papers in India, where the sorrow at the treatment of Persia was most keenly felt. Russia's object always was to bring about her dissolution, and for that purpose she resorted to every form of intrigue likely to produce disintegration and chaos. Every sign of vitality among the people, every effort to introduce reforms or improvements in the administration, was made a reason for aggression. When we bear in mind that the initial success of the Constitutional movement was due to the support of the British representative in Persia, we can easily understand the consternation of the Persian people at the acquiescence of England in these acts of the Romanoff Government,

and especially in the expulsion of the American financial expert. Now that the Romanoff Dynasty has fallen, Persian hopes for the dawn of a new era in their country have risen high; and it remains for England, who is fighting this great war as the champion of liberty for all small nationalities, to be true to her own ideals, true to herself, and to give Persia a helping hand to make the best use of the free system of Government her people wrested from the hands of a tyrant.

Persia has always looked upon England as her friend and as a champion of her liberty and progress. While Russia was viewed with suspicion, and her advance towards the East was regarded with alarm, England was trusted, and her advice was invariably sought and acted upon. In issuing loans or giving concessions for the development of the country, England was always approached first and her counsel asked for. In 1905, when the Persian Revolution began with a pacific strike, the Constitutionalists sought refuge at the British Legation in Teheran. This in itself was abundant proof of the confidence the Persians reposed in England. The Anglo-Russian agreement, with its manifest tendencies, which soon proved themselves in direct acts of interference and aggression, caused the widest apprehension. The attempt of the Czarist Government to obtain control of the Persian army and finance, and the occupation of most of the northern provinces, were all part and parcel of the policy designed for the final absorption of Persia. When the present war broke out, the Romanoff army treated the part of the country they had occupied as conquered territories.

The provinces in which Turk and Tartar have fought their recent battles have suffered grievously, chiefly from the professed defenders of Persia. And the withdrawal of the Russian troops after the revolution in their country left behind in their wake burning and plundered villages. The loot was often accompanied by the forcible abduction of women and girls.

Persia covets no territories, has no aggressive designs, desires no accession to her present possessions. What she wants is peace—peace to work out her own national life. She sees with sorrow and anguish the gigantic slaughter of the manhood of the world which is going on before her eyes, and she does not wish to be drawn into the struggle by the policy or ambitions of either side. It is to be earnestly hoped that she will be left alone, and that she may escape the vast affliction from which Europe is suffering. Her destinies at the present moment are in the hands of men, some of whom are the best products of what was best in Europe before this war came to destroy centuries of material and intellectual progress. The fortunes of Persia, so far as they are in her hand, are guided primarily by eight men, enlightened and patriotic, assisted by an assembly elected on a broad basis of constitutional liberty. All men possessed of property or business worth not less than £100 have the franchise and the right to vote

in the election of members to the Persian Parliament. There is only one House, and all creeds and nationalities are represented in the Assembly in proportion to their numbers and importance. The young Shah, who attained his majority a little while ago, is a constitutional monarch, carefully brought up during the regency of that gifted statesman, the Nâsir-ul-Mulk, and seems to possess qualities which might make him a benefactor to his country.

The conditions in Persia, I am informed, are just now verging in many parts on famine. In this, of course, she is not singular; other neutral countries are suffering in a similar way. But it naturally adds to the difficulties of the Government, and makes the people suspicious of all foreign movements, which they conceive as foreboding an aggravation of their miseries and a fresh invasion on their independence. I hear that in Ghilan and Mazendran, Persian provinces that had been seized by the Muscovites, the inhabitants, immediately on the retirement of the Russian troops, formed a federation to resist in the future all foreign aggression. Would it not be a wise policy on our part to encourage and support this national desire to combat enemy designs without giving cause for suspicion against ourselves? It is a question for statesmen to deal with. We hear much now about a so-called Pan-Turanian movement, and the possibility of Persia being entrapped into it. If there is any reality in this alleged Pan-Turanian movement, if it is not a mere red-herring, we must not forget the feud between Iran and Turan, which has lasted ever since the birth of history, from the days when Rustam and Isfandyar battled against Afrasiâb, the national hero of Turan. There is as little likelihood of Iran being drawn into the Pan-Turanian movement as there is of the Celt becoming merged in the Saxon.

I do not think it is intended to confine the ideal of "a commonwealth of free nations" to Europe alone. And I trust, in the interest of the British Empire, Persia will find in it, and on the Amphictyonic Council it is proposed to establish after this war, the place she deserves from her history, her economic potentiality, and from the vigour and self-restraint with which her people have won their liberty far more than many of the Balkan nationalities. If Persia is treated with consideration and generosity, if the feelings and sentiments of her people are carefully regarded, if her independence is scrupulously respected, I do not dream for a moment that any outside intrigue would shake her fidelity to England. What appears to me essential—a view shared by a distinguished Moslem friend—is the necessity of avoiding even the semblance of an attempt to "Egyptianize" Persia (to borrow a French phrase), and of not repeating the mistake, which was common twenty-five years ago in the Native States of India, of allowing British officers an undesirable and impolitic latitude in their treatment of the Native Government.



England possesses a great asset in her vast Mussulman population, who have proved their steadfastness and loyalty in every sphere. A wise statesmanship and thorough understanding can employ this moral force most beneficently in the consolidation of her hegemony in the Eastern world, by establishing a cultural federation, under her guidance, of the Moslems within the zone of her influence. No competitor possesses this great asset, and posterity will regret if she allows herself to miss her great opportunity.

At this moment I gather from the papers a terrible and destructive class-war is being waged in the mountains of the Caucasus, which Shamyl defended with such heroic valour against Romanoff invasion.

Men whose greed and hatred have been stimulated by the grinding slavery of centuries or by imported racial bitterness are now fighting to destroy the descendants of Shamyl's followers. In spite of a lurking affection for the men who pulled down Czarism from its pedestal, the Persians do not want their country to be infected by Bolshevism. It would be a far worse calamity than Romanoff domination. But now that the Dynasty is dead, we hope we may also be able to say of the Anglo-Russian Convention, *Requiescat in pace*.

The CHAIRMAN said they had had a most enlightening paper. It was a great pity that the British public did not know more of the political conditions prevailing in Persia, and of the efforts of her sons to maintain a national existence. His only criticism of the paper was that it was so packed with information that its full value could not be properly appreciated until it was seen in printed form and considered at leisure.

Disastrous as the outcome of the Russian Revolution had been to the Allied cause, we might at least gather some shreds of consolation out of what they had been told by the learned lecturer as to the disappearance of the Romanoff Dynasty. They believed it had disappeared never to return. But whilst all their sympathies were with a nation like Persia (which could hardly be called a very small nation) in struggling for liberty and self-determination, as it was called, we did look in this country to the small nations to help themselves as far as they could. Persia always reminded him of a derelict ship tossing on the wide open sea, and waiting for a ship under some other flag to tow her into port. Persia could not be called a military power, determined to defend her own liberties and to help herself. The lecturer did not refer to the boundaries of Persia, but, as a matter of fact, she was a well-protected country in this respect. On the north she had the Elburz Mountains, which were crossable, no doubt, but which could easily be made strongly defensive. On the east there was more open country, and an interchange of hostilities with Afghanistan was not rendered difficult by natural conditions. To the south she

had the sea everywhere, and in the south-west there was a chain of very difficult mountains, inhabited by very rough and difficult people, of whom the Bakhtiaris were the principal. One of the easiest lines of approach was on the extreme north-west, where the first railway ever constructed in Persia now connected Tiflis with Tabriz.

It might have been thought that the Persians would take great interest and pride in their first railway. Tabriz in itself was a very important town, probably one of the most important towns in the whole of Persia as a mercantile centre. And yet they heard that the Turks had walked in and taken possession, apparently without any particular opposition on the part of the Persians. Whilst we ourselves were very much engaged in Mesopotamia, the Turks were swarming over the parts of Persia within reach of them; and when they were turned out, it was not so much by the efforts of Persians themselves as by that of the Russians, who had proved themselves such unpleasant neighbours. He thought Persia had something to learn as to the first principles of national evolution. Any evolution which was to end in self-government, progress, and prosperity must be based on security, and security in these days was only to be gained by means of armed strength. Therefore Persia must rely on her own exertions in securing herself from external aggression. There could be no doubt that she had excellent material to work upon. From personal observation he could testify that the people were of magnificent physique, with plenty of capacity in mind and muscle. He regretted to think that under successive Governments, which had treated them hardly and harshly, they were more or less chicken-hearted. That was the only word for it. He hoped that in course of time Persia would regenerate herself, not only from the civil, but also from the military point of view. We had not reached the millennium yet, and he was quite satisfied that no small nationality would be able in the future to hold its own that was not prepared to take up the cudgels in its own defence.

In conclusion, the Chairman asked the lecturer to give them some idea of the real nature of *bast*, or "sanctuary," a custom which was at least as old as the Old Testament in the time of the Judges. It was known more or less, he supposed, in all Eastern countries, though he could not say he recollected anything of the sort either in India or in Afghanistan. In Persia one part of Meshed was *bast*, and no doubt there was a fine assembly there of criminals from all parts of Persia. On the coast a British flagstaff or a British gun were *bast* for the escaped slave, who had only to touch the flagstaff or the gun to be a free man—at least, so long as he remained within the British jurisdiction. In this connection Sir Thomas related a story of the result of a controversy, during the delimitation of the Perso-Afghan frontier, between the Persian representative and the local Persian Governor. An outbreak of turbulence led the latter to issue an edict

that every member of the Persian delegation and soldiery was to be bastinadoed ; but when he endeavoured to have this order carried out, the men gathered round a cantankerous old mare belonging to a young British officer (now General Sir Percy Sykes) and claimed *bast*, with the result that the threatened punishment was not inflicted. It seemed to him at the time that this amusing incident was a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle of salvation by *bast*.

Colonel C. E. YATE, M.P., said he did not know that he entirely agreed that the lecturer had used quite the fitting word when he described the Persians as most patriotic. Wherever one went in Persia one would always find the Persian goose in the eyes of the Persian to be not only a swan, but a super-swan. The people had the most exalted idea about anything that belonged to Persia and of Persia itself. But, after all, was that real patriotism? Was not willingness to suffer and die for one's country the real test? There was amongst the Persians intense pride in their country, and a feeling that there was no country to equal it; but they did not seem to get beyond that. He agreed that these sentiments were in many ways highly commendable, but they did not wholly cover the definition of patriotism.

The lecturer had given a very glowing account of the Medjlies and had referred to its actions at the time when the Regent was in power and at present. Now his own recollection was that as soon as the Regent got out to Persia he dissolved the Medjlies, and ruled the country by himself. The lecturer had said the Medjlies was sitting now ; but his information was that it had not been sitting for a long time, and that Persia was governed by its Ministers. He was credibly informed that, as these Ministers were not very sure of their retention of office, they were making money as fast as they could. [The lecturer : That is not the case.] He was glad to hear that. But he was driven to the conclusion that the Medjlies was more or less of a name in Persia at the present time. They all knew that changes were rapidly made amongst Ministers in Persia, and there was a temptation to those in office to make the most of their opportunities while they had the chance.

The lecturer had told them of atrocities committed by the Russians from 1911 onwards. These were deplorable ; but he would remind the audience that at that time, in the absence of protective measures from without, the greatest insecurity prevailed within. In South Persia all the roads between Bushire, Shiraz, Ispahan, Bunder Abbas, and Kirman, were absolutely in the hands of robber tribes ; British trade was held up, and enormous losses were inflicted on all the merchants concerned by the unsettled condition of things. In the north, where the Russian troops were, although it may have been unpleasant to the Government, still the Persian merchants were, he believed, thankful

for the Russian protection, because they were able to get their goods through with safety, and trade went on unmolested. However much we might regret what was done by the Russians, it could not be denied that the Persian traders benefited by the Russian occupation.

Well, the Russians had gone, and at Tabriz the Turks had taken their place. But as the Chairman had said, they had no information that the Persians had opposed this aggression. We in England had always done our best to protect Persia from outside interference. All this time, throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, we had defended her from Afghan incursion. Many a time, when talking over the camp fires on the borders of Seistan and Afghanistan, Afghans had said to him, "If it were not for the British Government, we would be over the border to-morrow," and so they would. He hoped we should continue to protect Persia, and do all we could to maintain the integrity of the country, both north and south and east and west. He was glad to hear from the lecturer that in the provinces of Ghilan and Mazendran the people had formed a federation to resist foreign aggression. He hoped the movement would grow. The great difficulty was that the Persians usually did so little to help themselves, and were always crying out to other people to help them, and complaining of other people for not doing so. The Persians generally, and notably the muleteers, were men of good physique, and in the past had been able to defend their country. The Persian Cossacks were a fine force, and he hoped the South Persia Rifles would become a good force; but what was wanted was a great indigenous movement for self-defence. The use of the Persian flag on the Caspian Sea was prohibited by the Treaty of Turkomanchai, and we should do all we could to help Persia in this and other matters. He would like to see Persia with her own ships on the Caspian, and taking her place as an independent power in the world. (Cheers.)

Mr. ISPAHANI said that Colonel Yate's experience of Persia was perhaps twenty years old, and the learned lecturer, while very sympathetic towards Persia, was without personal knowledge of the country. He was misinformed in stating that the Regent Nasir-ul-Mulk dissolved the Persian Medjlies. He was in Persia during the period, and could speak from personal knowledge. If it did not exist afterwards, this was probably due to the machinations of Russia. Past history showed that up to our own times Persia was a real military power, and she successfully defended herself against aggression only sixty years ago. But it must be admitted that since then Persia had fallen into a trap for reasons explained by the learned lecturer. When Russia marched a force into the country, she did so simply to compel the Shah's Government to ratify the Convention of 1907, as he could testify from personal knowledge. If Persia had not agreed the Russian troops would have occupied Teheran, and there would be no

independent Persia to-day. The fact was the country had not been given a dog's chance. When Mr. Shuster was in Persia, he told him more than once that he could do nothing effective because of Russian intervention and want of finance. If Great Britain had followed the same sympathetic policy towards Persia as she did towards Afghanistan, by giving the latter country moral and material help to consolidate its independence, Persia to-day would have been the greatest bulwark of the British Indian Empire. For forty years Afghanistan has been pampered, and British gold has poured into the country and British moral support has been at its disposal, whereas poor Persia has been like an old rag left to be pulled to pieces by all and sundry. As to the alleged chaos in the south, in the absence of British intervention, speaking as a merchant, he could say that the loss from pillage at that time did not amount in the aggregate to more than 5 per cent. of the total trade. Colonel Yate had said that Russia made the northern routes safe. They did so in prosecution of their own selfish designs. There were robber tribes in the mountains, no doubt, but the Persian muleteer was a reliable man. He would take goods 300 to 400 miles across country, and have every opportunity of abstracting some of them, but would deliver them intact. This might be compared with what went on in India, where railway thefts often occurred even from sealed trucks. He would say of the Persians, Give them a dog's chance, and they will show themselves capable of self-defence.

Colonel A. C. YATE said the last speaker did not reach the real point—that of why Persia was not defending herself at the present time. It should be the natural instinct of any people so self-appreciative as Colonel C. E. Yate had described the Persians, to defend themselves and their country. Like Mr. Ispahani, he had studied Persian history, and he could trace it back in detail, at any rate, to the beginning of the last century. He hoped Mr. Ispahani remembered that it was one British officer in Herat who was the main instrument in the defeat of the Persian Army when in 1836, egged on by Russia, it attacked the Afghans, and that British officers led Persians to victory against the Russians in 1828, and again later, when the accession to the throne of Mahommed Shah was a signal for rebellion. It was Lindsay-Bethune who crushed the rebellion. Sir Charles McGregor in "Khorasan" tells a touching story of the pride with which old Persian officers looked back to the prowess of the Persian Army led by Christie and Bethune. No one, more strongly than the speaker, had advocated the sending by the British Government of the nucleus of a force into Southern Persia such as might enable that part of the country to pacify and to defend itself. Finally, Sir Percy Sykes and others were sent there for this purpose. He gathered that, owing to the general disorganization, comparatively little had been done in South-Eastern Persia, and that the influence of the South Persia

Rifles was less than we had hoped it would be. He was told that it took twenty-five days to communicate between Bushire and Shiraz. That fact gave an idea of what the condition of the roads must be. They now had the Turks in Tabriz, and there was no news that the Persians had made any stand in self-defence. India had taken certain notable steps which the Censorship did not wish made public.

Mr. Ameer Ali, in his most fascinating lecture, has recalled the glories of Rustam and Sohrab. He (Colonel Yate) declined to believe that Iran of to-day could not, if given a free hand, produce a second Rustam, and keep Turan at bay. Whatever temptations Berlin, using Pan-Turanian ambitions as its instrument, may throw in the way of Persia—and they are, as the Press shows, being freely thrown—the Iranian tradition, the sanctity of the Shi'a faith, and the memory of Britain's long-standing (ever since about 1798) friendship should render Persia proof against them—a state of "proof" which was stoutly reinforced by the British Army of the Tigris. He knew only too well the brutality of the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan from 1910 onwards. He agreed with the lecturer's picture of the manner in which Mr. Morgan Shuster was hampered in his work, and recognized fully that the Russians had from the outset infringed the terms of the Convention of 1907. He recalled a conversation he had with Lord Curzon in or about 1910, when no one foresaw the Russian Revolution. Lord Curzon said that the Russians, having occupied Azerbaijan, would never leave it. He (Colonel Yate) expressed surprise that Great Britain, which had been so truly friendly to Persia, should be ready to wink at this departure from the 1907 Agreement, though he recognized that the matter was then in the hands of a Cabinet which was neither that of Lord Lansdowne nor Lord Curzon. Recently Persia had repudiated the Agreement—although it could easily be shown that it had materially benefited Persia—and they could now say with the lecturer in regard to it, *Requiescat in pace*.

When the Persia Society was started, Sir Mortimer Durand gave the first lecture before it, and entitled it "The Charm of Persia." That dealt with the æsthetic charm. To-day Mr. Ameer Ali had initiated them into the historic charm of the kingdom of the Sassanian, Safavean and Kājār Dynasties.

During the discussion, the Chairman had invited a further definition of what "bast" (*i.e.*, sanctuary) meant in Persia. He instanced the case of a Persian who took "bast" with Sir Percy Sykes' roadster. The stables of any personage of high position in Persia are "bast," and therefore it was not the roadster, but the stall in which it stood, that afforded a secure refuge. Had I time, I would like to investigate this custom; as it is, I will for the present only quote a passage from Goldsmid's "Eastern Persia," vol. i., p. 182: "The stables, often a place of great sanctitude: the stables of the Shah and the British

Minister at Teheran are, for instance, privileged places, where all criminals can securely take refuge.”

Mr. AMEER ALI said he wished to avoid, in reply, all controversial matters so far as possible. With reference to the question of the Chairman regarding the practice of *bast*, he had only to say that it had existed amongst all the Western Asiatic nations in ancient times; and the Persians had received it as a legacy of the past. The word *bast* was derived from *bastan* or binding. When a man bound himself to a sacred object, it was considered an act of sacrilege to cut the rope in order to arrest the culprit. In Persia the institution had lasted, like the observance of New Year's Day on March 21, down to our own times. There was a sanctuary at Meshed, at the shrine of Imâm Ali al-Reza, the eighth Imam of the Shias, an ancestor of his own. As the Chairman had mentioned, a flagstaff or a gun belonging to the Sovereign provided a place of sanctuary.

He hoped the Persians would take to heart the Chairman's admonition to raise an army for their own defence, and that they would be permitted to do so. However willing they might be to defend themselves, their ability must depend on circumstances and considerations over which they had no control. During the Romanoff domination they were never allowed to raise an army, for Russia imposed on Persia, as on other neighbouring countries, selfish limitations on their defensive power. Colonel Yate knew that it was Russia's object to cripple, not only Persia's defensive power, but also her economic resources, in order to direct everything into her own hands. If the trade was made safe, it was for no purpose that was agreeable to the development of Persian resources. Colonel Yate also knew how onerous were the terms of the Treaty of Turkomanchai, and when they talked of Persia not being able to raise an army or to set her house in order they ought to remember that for a long series of years Persia had been crippled (indeed, there was no other word for it but emasculated) by the remorseless northern neighbour. They could not expect the country to do wonders within three or four years. Give them the same chances as it was proposed to give to European nations for self-expression, and let us then see if Persia did not take advantage of them. He could not imagine that any other nation could have succeeded better in the conditions in which Persia was placed.

In respect to Colonel Yate's charge of conceit against the Persians, he would remind him that there were other people besides Persians who took immense pride in themselves, and this had been a feature in the march of history. The arrogance of Athens, and the proud boast *Civis Romanus sum*, have their modern counterpart. "Modern Athens," not the Athens of King Alexander, suffers equally from overweening pride. Neither England nor the Continent is free from that characteristic. The American also considers himself a very superior person.

Nor could the test of patriotism Colonel Yate suggested be considered inapplicable to Persians, for not a few of whom, as his paper had shown, had laid down their lives for the liberty of their country. The zealots who had resorted to the crime of assassination at the time of the murder of Nâsir-ud-din were mistaken in their methods, but they were utterly careless of their own lives if they could aid the cause of their country's freedom. Persia was not the only country where the Cabinet, rather than the Parliament, became powerful in difficult times. Even in the West, among people long accustomed to govern themselves, they saw Parliaments increasingly impotent and the Cabinets taking power on themselves. In the most democratic countries in time of war the Cabinet became all-powerful. It seemed to him that Parliaments in the West as well as in Persia required stiffening up. He earnestly hoped that the Chairman's recommendation that the Persians should organize for their own defence and try to drive out their enemies, whether Turks or anyone else, would be carried out. And he hoped their efforts in this direction would be supported by our Government. (Cheers.)

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the lecturer.





